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Political scientists have devoted little attention to the role of specialized courts in the
United States federal and state judicial systems. At the federal level, theories of judicial
decision making and institutional structures widely accepted in discussions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and other generalist courts (the federal courts of appeals and district courts)
have seen little examination in the context of specialized courts. In particular, scholars are just
beginning to untangle the relationship between judicial expertise and decision making, as well
as to understand how specialized courts interact with the bureaucratic agencies they review
and the litigants who appear before them. In this dissertation, I examine the consequences of
specialization in the federal judiciary. The first chapter introduces the landscape of existing
federal specialized courts. The second chapter investigates the patterns of recent appointments
to specialized courts, focusing specifically on how the qualifications of specialized court
judges compare to those of generalists. The third chapter considers the role of expertise in a
specialized court, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and argues that expertise
enhances the ability for judges to apply their ideologies to complex, technical cases. The
fourth chapter shifts focus to the impact of litigant resources, specifically attorney expertise,
in specialized courts. The fifth chapter evaluates the role of law in a specialized court by
examining how changes in legal standards of review impact specialized court judges’
decisions. Finally, the sixth chapter concludes.
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Specialization is perhaps the defining feature of institutional organization in almost
every facet of professional life. Automobile mechanics repair cars by specializing in the inner
workings of the automobile. Doctors effectively treat patients by specializing in specific parts
of human anatomy. And lawyers help their clients by specializing in particular areas of law.
Specialization is equally characteristic of most aspects of government.1 In the United States
Congress, specialization is the focal attribute of the standing committee system, a core
characteristic of its legislative organization since the early 19th century (Gamm and Shepsle,
1989).2 Proponents of both distributional and informational theories of congressional
organization give important attention to the role of specialization in the committee system
(Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Weingast and Marshall, 1988;
Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel, 1992; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). In these theories,
committee specialization allows members of Congress to obtain particularistic benefits or
provide important bill information to non-committee members. A product of specialization,
expertise plays a central role in Krehbiel’s (1992) information theory of legislative
organization, where the committee system’s investment in gaining expertise serves to reduce
the larger congressional body’s uncertainty over the connection between policy instruments
and policy outcomes. Moreover, specialization is central to David Mayhew’s (1974) theory of
congressional behavior. The congressional committee system, according to Mayhew, allows
members to specialize within a given jurisdiction and helps facilitate the member’s reelection
goal by making a member’s credit-claiming appeals more credible to constituents back home.
Specialization also forms a key component of the institutionalization process for
1As Cole Porter might phrase it, even educated bureaucrats do it.
2For example, the committee system has historically been the primary venue for congressional action. As
Woodrow Wilson (1885) noted: “Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work.”
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governmental organizations. Among other factors, the presidency was not fully
institutionalized until the introduction of the Executive Office of the President, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the White House Office, organizations heavily reliant on
specialization (Ragsdale and Theis III, 1997). Additionally, the institutionalization of the
House of Representatives was partly a result of the growth of committee autonomy and
importance (Polsby, 1968).
Finally, specialization and division of labor are indisputably the vital instruments to a
successful, working bureaucracy. The lack of specialized experience among several of
President Trump’s cabinet appointees alarmed some members of the public and government,
as bureaucratic specialization is largely taken for granted. Indeed, we would be concerned if
air traffic controllers were not specialists in directing aviation routes, if military commanders
were not specialists in tactical strategy, or if NASA scientists knew little about astronomy.
However, specialization in the judiciary, particularly at the federal level, has proceeded
at a slower pace.3 This appears to be, at least in part, a result of a prevailing preference for
generalist judges among judicial scholars and legal practitioners who have decried
specialization in the judiciary.4 Martin Shapiro (1968) writes that when judges specialize
“they lose the one quality that clearly distinguishes them from administrative lawmakers”
(53). Concurring with this opinion, Tenth Circuit Judge Deanell Reece Tacha noted: “I like
the fact that federal judges are generalists. I often say that judges may be the last generalists
left in professional life, and I have resisted mightily any suggestion that the federal courts
become specialized in any particular area.”5 Opponents have further argued that specialization
leads to narrow perspectives that create biases, limit understanding, and lead to capture by
3This is unlike many countries in Latin America and Europe, where specialized courts are more common.
For example, many European countries have constitutional courts charged with hearing constitutional questions.
The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany is a prime example (Vanberg, 2004; Comella, 2011; Garoupa,
Gomez-Pomar and Grembi, 2013). Other countries have courts with specific jurisdictional purviews, such as the
Land and Environment Court of New South Wales (Preston, 2012).
4Cheng (2008) writes that legal culture “celebrates the generalist judge...[and has] a deep-seated aversion to
specialization” (520-521).
5Bashman (2004), “20 Questions for Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,” “How Appealing” blog (http://howappealing.law.com/20q/).
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external interests (Baum, 2011). Most famously, writing in 1982 on the creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, legal scholar and judge Richard Posner feared
specialization would create job dissatisfaction among judges and decrease objectivity by
engendering legal tunnel vision, thereby promoting instability in law (Posner, 1982).
Yet, despite this preference for generalization, Congress and state and local entities
continue to create specialized courts and give them jurisdiction over narrow areas of law. This
growth in specialized courts has occurred in spite of those policymakers involved in the
creation of specialized courts demonstrating little understanding of the operation and
performance of such courts. For example, during the debate over the formation of the Court of
Veterans Appeals, a member of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee remarked: “So far as I
know...” the Tax Court and Court of Military Appeals “...are both doing a thoroughly
competent job” (Quoted in Baum, 2011, 212).6
Like government policymakers, political scientists have directed little attention toward
the workings of these courts, focusing their efforts toward the more traditional generalist
courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals, and the district courts.7
While the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are of immense importance in directing legal
policy, creating bound precedent, and shaping legal doctrine, the Court currently hears only 75
cases a year on average, limiting its ability to influence certain legal areas. Moreover, the
growth of the administrative state has put increasing pressure on the federal court system to
address issues arising from administrative agencies, leading to jurisdiction over such technical
issues being transferred from the general appellate courts to more specialized judicial bodies.8
6Further, despite the intense debate surrounding the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s prediction of close scrutiny of this court, the Supreme Court fully
reviewed none of the Federal Circuit’s antidumping or countervailing duty cases (Unah, 1997).
7The literature on U.S. specialized courts within the political science discipline is concentrated within the
hands of only a handful of scholars, the most notable of these being Lawrence Baum (Baum, 1977, 1990, 1994,
2011), Isaac Unah on the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Hansen,
Johnson and Unah, 1995; Unah, 1997, 1998, 2001), Robert Howard on the Tax Court (Howard and Nixon, 2003;
Howard, 2004, 2005, 2010; Howard and Brazelton, 2014), and the writing partnership of Brett Curry and Banks
Miller on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and specialization within generalist courts (Miller and
Curry, 2009, 2013; Curry and Miller, 2015).
8Miller and Curry (2013) cite a finding by the Judicial Business of the US Courts that, from 1997-2007, the
number of appeals from administrative agencies reviewed in the federal appellate courts increased by over 6,000,
3
The importance of the obscure and technical areas of administrative law these specialized
federal courts deal with may not be immediately apparent. However, these courts have a large
direct impact on many Americans, including the millions of Americans who seek veterans’
benefits and those seeking to protect their intellectual property. For example, the importance
of specialized courts in these areas of law can be demonstrated by the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), the two courts
subject to multivariate analysis in this dissertation.
First, according to former Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the creation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides “reassurance and predictability” and helps protect
intellectual property and patent rights, which are worth over 5 trillion dollars and make up
almost three-fourths of U.S. corporate assets (Hatch, 2010, 517). Second, prior to the creation
of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) in 1988, veterans were prevented from
challenging their claims denials in court. Decisions over benefits awards were entirely within
the hands of three-member panels in regional offices housed within the Department of
Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Benefits Administration.9 The decisions of these panels were
subject only to internal appellate review by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA). The VA is
a massive federal bureaucratic agency, employing over 300,000 people10 and serving more
than 9 million veterans in the United States.11 The VA is among the top five funded federal
agencies, and since its creation in 1930, the department has administered the distribution of
veterans’ benefits. In fiscal year 2002, the VA paid more than twenty-two billion dollars in
disability compensation to veterans (Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 2005).12 In fiscal year
reaching nearly 10,400. Moreover, from 1995 to 2005, the number of appeals filed in the US Courts of Appeals
increased from 50,072 to 68,743 (Curry and Miller, 2015).
9Prior to 1930, the benefits programs were administered by departments within the Departments of War, the
Interior, and the Treasury (Ridgway, 2010).
10Edwards (2014). “Number of VA Employees.” http://www.cato.org/blog/number-va-employees.
11Estimates from CNN (2019) at http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/30/us/department-of-veterans-affairs-fast-
facts/.
12Funding for the VA trails the Department of Defense, Health and Human Services,
and the Social Security Administration. $163 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 2016,
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2005, the figure was $30.8 billion for disability compensation, death compensation, and
pensions (Allen, 2007). Moreover, almost one out of every four people in the country is
eligible for a benefit from the VA.
The creation of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims made VA benefit decisions
subject to judicial review for the first time. Possessing exclusive review over BVA findings of
fact, the court’s appellate position makes it an important player in the decision to award
billions of federal dollars, and its rulings can have huge impacts on VA policy. While the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is empowered to hear appeals from the CAVC, the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions is limited to consideration of “the
validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof” that the CAVC relied on in
making its decision.13 Similarly, the Federal Circuit cannot review factual determinations
unless a constitutional issue is present. Thus, the direction of veterans’ law is largely in the
hands of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
Thus, the issues arising in a variety of legal areas that now occupy the dockets of
specialized courts, ranging from patent law to veterans claims and from the income tax to
bankruptcy appeals, allow these courts the opportunity to greatly shape the direction of legal
policy in many important areas of law. Given the lack of scholarly and policy-maker attention,
an increasingly relevant part of the American court system has been overlooked, making study
of judicial outcomes on these courts vital to a full understanding of the American judiciary.
For judicial scholars, of great import is addressing the deficiency in our understanding of the
consequences of specialization for these courts. Does specialization lead to the negative
consequences feared by the legal practitioners quoted above, or does judicial specialization
present positive developments beyond easing the workloads of generalist courts? Rather than
leading to tunnel vision or litigant capture, the creation of specialized courts has the potential
$71.4 billion of which was discretionary funding. Figures obtained from Shane III (2015) at
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/12/16/budget-omnibus-fy16-defense-veterans-affairs-
pentagon/77416466/. Moreover, the VA’s budget will likely continue to increase; President Trump’s proposed
VA budget for fiscal year 2020 was $220.2 billion, $97 billion of which was discretionary funding. See Annual
Budget Submission (2019) at http://www.va.gov/budget/products.asp.
1338 U.S.C. Section 7292(c) (2000).
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for more positive consequences or the creation of neutral virtues, such as creating uniformity
and consistency in law, encouraging efficient workload completion, and allowing judges to
develop expertise (Baum, 2011). These questions are ripe for consideration, and the presence
of more narrowly focused specialized courts, where cases in the same specific area of law are
continuously heard, offers the ideal opportunity to address how judicial specialization affects
judges’ decision making. At its core, this dissertation is aimed at exploring the consequences
that specialization has for the federal judiciary. Before presenting an overview of the
dissertation, I provide a brief sketch of the landscape of specialization in the federal judiciary.
Specialization in the Federal Judiciary
Specialized courts can be organized into two categories based on their purview. In the
first category, there are those that are focused on regulatory or administrative control. These
courts often review the decisions of regulatory agencies, and the federal government is often
the defendant. In the second category are courts that are oriented toward rehabilitation or
therapeutic jurisprudence (Unah and Williams, 2017). These courts are found at the state and
local level and represent much of the recent growth in specialized courts. This therapeutic
jurisprudence or problem-solving court movement has expanded from drug courts to mental
health courts, domestic violence courts, and veterans treatment courts. As a study of
specialization in the federal judiciary, this dissertation focuses on the first category. These
specialized federal courts, such as the Tax Court, which resolves federal income tax disputes,
and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, with jurisdiction over decisions of the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals, are distinguished in a number of important ways from the more familiar
generalist courts, which include the United States Supreme Court, the 12 U.S. circuit courts of
appeals,14 and the 94 federal district courts. These differences can be organized according to
relative obscurity, institutional design, and jurisdiction (Unah and Williams, 2017).
Specialized courts are traditionally “lesser known, yet still powerful, courts in the
federal system” (Diascro and Ivers, 2006, 74). While these courts are becoming more familiar
to academics and policymakers, particularly those state and local actors engaged in the
14There are thirteen United States courts of appeals. The thirteenth is the specialist Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
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problem-solving, therapeutic jurisprudence revolution, the average citizen is largely
unfamiliar with these courts. Moreover, it has been legal scholars rather than social scientists
who prioritized the study of specialized courts. The importance of specialized courts was
recognized even in the early 20th century, as Felix Frankfurter and James Landis wrote: “An
important phase in the history of the federal judiciary deals with the movement for the
establishment of tribunals whose business was to be limited to litigation arising from a
restricted field of legislative control” (1928, 147). This lack of attention on the part of citizens
is not surprising given the limited knowledge most citizens demonstrate regarding the
judiciary in general.15 Further, the often complex and policy-specific issues of specialized
courts makes their activities largely inaccessible to the general public.
Interestingly, while recent decades have seen great growth and structural changes in
judicial specialization, particularly at the state and local level, specialized courts at the federal
level are not entirely a new development. The first specialized federal court, the Court of
Claims, was created in 1855, and some specialized courts have been dissolved, such as the
Commerce Court. Moreover, many of today’s operating specialized courts existed in earlier
forms. For example, the Court of International Trade was created in 1890 as the Board of
General Appraisers, and the Tax Court was established in 1924 as the Board of Tax Appeals.
Many of these courts subsequently underwent changes to their jurisdictions or merged with
other courts. Originally composed of a trial and appellate level, the current Court of Federal
Claims emerged in 1992 after a name change and the loss of its appellate level to the new
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
With respect to design, while specialized court judges, like generalist federal courts,
are often appointed by the sitting president and confirmed by the Senate, the majority of
specialized courts are created by Congress through powers arising under Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution to “constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Because their
existence is derived from Article I of the Constitution, these courts are called Article I courts.




Moreover, judges on these courts are not afforded the protections of lifetime tenure and salary
security granted to judges whose courts are created under Article III of the Constitution: “The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”16 The Court of Federal
Claims, the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the bankruptcy courts, and
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are all Article I courts. However, a few specialized
courts do possess Article III status, including the Court of International Trade and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which possesses appellate jurisdiction over a number of the
above courts, as well as certain types of cases arising from the U.S. district courts. In fact, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the only specialized Article III appellate court.
Beyond institutional status and constitutional protections, specialized courts are
unique because of the nature of their jurisdictions. For example, whereas the generalist circuit
courts of appeals possess jurisdiction over a wide-range of legal issues originating within their
regional geographies, specialized courts are charged with adjudicating cases in more narrow
legal areas, such as the Court of International Trade’s focus on unfair trade cases or the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces’ review of courts-martial. Specialized courts are not
typically bound by geography like many generalist courts. Certainly, there are elements of
specialization in the generalist courts. For example, on the U.S. Supreme Court, judges who
are perceived as experts in certain areas may be assigned the Court’s opinion when a case
dealing with that issue arises (Brenner, 1984; Brenner and Spaeth, 1986; Maltzman, Spriggs
and Wahlbeck, 2000). In Roe v. Wade,17 Justice Harry Blackmun was assigned the majority
opinion partly because of his recognized expertise in medical law and history given his
long-time role as a counsel to the Mayo Clinic. At the intermediate courts of appeals, some
scholars find that judges are assigned to panels based on their subject-matter (Cheng, 2008).
For example, an “oil and gas panel” emerged in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals following
consistent recusals from a number of judges who possessed financial interests in those
16Court-like military commissions and tribunals such as the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)
were created by presidential action.
17Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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industries (Barrow and Walker, 1988). However, on the whole, judges on these courts are
expected to be generalists because they hear and decide cases in many different areas of law.
This wide caseload means that they are not afforded the opportunities to become specialists in
any one particular aspect of law. So while policymakers specialize, the same is not expected
of judges.
The specialization of these narrow-jurisdiction courts means that an important
component of their structure is expertise. Much of the dissertation to follow grapples with the
role of expertise in the specialized context. What constitutes expertise in a specialized court?
How do we define and measure it? Answering these questions will help us understand perhaps
the most important characteristic of what makes specialized courts unique.
Table 1 lists some of the most important federal specialized courts, along with their
jurisdictions and constitutional status as Article I or III courts, and Figure 1 presents an
organizational chart of the U.S. federal judiciary to show the location of these courts with
respect to their generalist brethren.18 This selection of specialized courts reflects those that are
oriented toward administrative law or regulatory oversight. For example, the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims reviews the Department of Veterans Affairs distribution of veterans
claims benefits, and the Tax Court reviews income tax decisions of the Internal Revenue
Service. This list reflects specialized courts whose judges are appointed by the president and
confirmed by the Senate. In other specialized courts, such as the bankruptcy courts or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the judges are appointed by other judges. The judges
on bankruptcy courts, for example, are appointed by the circuit judges in their geographic area
(Howard and Brazelton, 2014).19
While the theoretical framework developed in the chapters to follow largely applies to
specialized courts broadly, this dissertation focuses specifically on two of the courts listed in
Table 1, one Article I and one Article III court. Specifically, it focuses on the Article I Court
18This chart excludes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. While also an Article I court that is
certainly specialized in its jurisdictional purview, this court is equivalent to a state supreme court in its status
as the highest court in the District of Columbia. See Courts (2019) at https://www.dccourts.gov/court-of-appeals.
19Another Article I specialized court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, is staffed by judges from
other courts.
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of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) and the Article III Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Of the courts featured in Table 1, the CAVC is the youngest, having been created in
1988. The CAVC solely reviews appeals from veterans who were denied claims benefits by
the Department of Veterans Affairs. The court’s heavy reliance on single-judge disposition
as its primary method of case adjudication makes it unique among federal courts, especially
among courts with appellate capacity. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s caseload
is wider in range than most specialized courts,20 but the plurality of its cases concerns patents.
This wide caseload results from the Federal Circuit’s position as an appellate specialized court
charged with reviewing decisions from a number of specialized courts.
Table 1: Federal Specialized Jurisdiction Courts
Court Jurisdiction Status
Court of Appeals for the Handles appeals from the Court of Federal Claims, Article III
Federal Circuit Court of International Trade, and Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims. Handles claims against administrative
agencies involving federal employees and contracts,
patents and trademarks, and customs duties.
Appeals go to the US Supreme Court.
Court of Appeals for the Handles appeals in military case, including courts-martial. Article I
Armed Forces Appeals go to the US Supreme Court.
Court of International Trade International trade cases seeking administrative Article III
protection against foreign dumping and countervailing
duties as well as customs duties. Appeals go to
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Court of Federal Claims Financial claims against the federal government, Article I
including contract disputes, bid protests, military pay,
tax refunds, and takings. Appeals go to Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Tax Court Tax cases involving assessments. Appeals go to the Article I
various U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Court of Appeals for Handles appeals from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals Article I
Veterans Claims involving denial of veterans’ disability and survivor benefits.
Appeals go to Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Information Sources: Unah and Williams (2017) and Baum (2011).
Dissertation Overview
Ultimately, specialization is a key part of how political scientists understand political
institutions and is a chief characteristic of executive, congressional, and bureaucratic bodies in
the United States. However, political scientists have yet to adequately examine the
consequences of specialization in the judiciary. This dissertation seeks to fill that gap, by
20For this reason, some scholars refer to the Federal Circuit as a semi-specialized court (Golden, 2009).
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considering the consequences of introducing specialization to the federal judiciary. In total,
this dissertation consists of four substantive, empirical chapters.
Chapter 2 explores the patterns of appointments to specialized courts, focusing
specifically on judicial qualifications and executive and interest group influence in the
confirmation process. Noting the stark disparities in the attention the U.S. Senate gives to
specialized court nominees compared to generalist nominees, I use American Bar Association
(ABA) ratings to compare the qualifications of these nominees. The next two chapters feature
the role of expertise in specialized courts as a primary concern. Chapter 3 considers the role
that expertise plays in a specialized context. Rather than assuming specialization on the part
of specialized court judges, I construct a theoretical framework that partitions judicial
expertise into three component parts. In this framework, expertise is derived from 1) Previous
Professional Occupation; 2) Credentials or Educational Attainment; and/or 3) Experience on
the Court. I then consider how these different components influence the ability of specialized
court judges to apply ideology to their decision making. In the fourth chapter, I turn from
judicial expertise to attorney expertise, and I explore how different dimensions of attorney
expertise impact their clients’ chances of winning cases in a specialized court. This chapter
builds on the role of litigant resources in court by developing expectations for how specialized
court judges should respond differently to expert attorneys than do generalist court judges.
In the fifth chapter, I turn from expertise to the role of a law in a specialized court,
specifically, whether an institutional shift in a specialized court’s interpretation of its standard
of review alters the proportion of decisions it issues in favor of its primary litigant. Judicial
scholars have long pitted ideological factors against legal ones in attempting to explain
judges’ decisions. However, rather than pitting ideology against law, I seek to understand the
role of law as an institutional constraint rather than as a mechanistic force in judges’
decisions. Finally, the sixth chapter concludes.
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Fig. 1: United States Federal Judiciary
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CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS OF APPOINTMENTS TO SPECIALIZED COURTS
Introduction
Despite the growth in specialized courts and their increasing role in tackling issues in
a number of important legal areas, political scientists have devoted little attention to
understanding specialized courts, focusing their efforts toward the more traditional generalist
courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal district courts. Moreover, evidence
suggests that specialized courts are often formed ad hoc, without sufficient consideration of
the courts’ prospects for success, and by policymakers who display ignorance over their
conduct (Baum, 2011).21 This inattention to specialized courts extends to the Senate’s
treatment of presidential appointments to such courts, which constitutes the focus of this
chapter. After documenting the disparity in attention between generalist and specialized court
confirmations, I consider whether specialized court judges display greater or lesser
qualifications than their confirmed generalist counterparts.22
Specialized courts have a large amount of administrative influence in the federal
government and private sector, so if there is indeed a lack of attention paid to their nominees,
then this would be a normatively important issue. Larry Baum (1977) writes: “Specialization
tends to increase the influence of litigant groups over judicial decisions, and that increased
21See the quote from a former member of the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee member in the first chapter.
Further, despite the intense debate surrounding the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s prediction of close scrutiny of this court, the Supreme Court fully reviewed
none of the Federal Circuit’s antidumping or countervailing duty cases (Unah, 1997).
22I recognize the potential for the exaggeration of inattention to specialized courts in my choice of
comparing only judges that were confirmed by the Senate. However, in my research on confirmation votes using
congress.gov, I found not one specialized court nominee who was rejected by the Senate in a recorded vote. For
nominees who did not receive confirmation, the most frequent outcome was that the president did not resubmit
their nomination to the Senate after that nomination was returned to the president under the provisions of Senate
Rule XXXI. Rule XXXI states: “Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are
made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Senate by the President;
and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally
acted upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the Secretary to the President,
and shall not again be considered unless they shall again be made to the Senate by the President.”
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influence may lead to policies that differ significantly from those made by generalist courts”
(846). Baum’s work indicates that specialized court decisional trends can be influenced by
litigant interests. In particular, Baum finds that the Patent Bar was able to exert significant
influence on the selection of justices to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
such that the court subsequently reversed Patent Office decisions at a greater rate (Baum,
1977, 2011). Further, research on specialized courts such as the Tax Court (Howard, 2005),
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Miller and Curry, 2009, 2013), Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels (Howard and Brazelton, 2014), and the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (Williams, 2017) indicates that judges on these courts engage in ideological decision
making despite the technical nature of the issues under consideration.
In sum, policymakers’ inattention to specialized courts may have important
consequences for who wins and who loses before these courts and for the direction of law in
specialized areas. This chapter considers the patterns of appointments to specialized courts,
demonstrates greater Senate attention to generalist court judges than specialized ones, and
seeks to adjudicate between two possibilities. First, the lack of contention over specialized
court nominees may signal that these judges are well-qualified, superbly credentialed
individuals possessed of the requisite amount of expertise and experience to perform their
prospective roles. If this is the state of affairs, then senators’ lack of contention is justified and
no problem exists. However, if this is not the case and senators are not giving in-depth
consideration to nominees with less than ideal qualifications and credentials, then the Senate
is shirking its constitutionally mandated advice and consent role and placing greater power in
the hands of the president and committed interest groups to shape law and policy in certain
legal areas. In this chapter, I adjudicate between these possibilities by using American Bar
Association (ABA) ratings to compare the qualifications of generalist to those of specialized
court nominees. I turn now to exploring the landscape of specialization in the federal
judiciary, before documenting the disparity in Senate attention between specialized and
generalist court confirmees. I then review the brief literature on patterns of appointments to
specialized courts before then commencing with my ABA analysis.
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Patterns of Appointments to Specialized Courts
I begin with a look at the landscape of specialization in the federal judiciary. Table 1
in the introduction lists the six federal specialized jurisdiction courts subject to presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation.23 Column 2 details the jurisdiction and issues
considered by each court, and column 3 lists each court’s constitutional status (Article I or
Article III court). The primary distinction between Article I and Article III courts lies in their
constitutional protections, as judges on Article I, unlike Article III, courts are appointed for
finite term lengths and do not possess constitutionally-imposed salary security. Before delving
into the patterns of appointments of judges to these courts, a note on the partisan breakdown
of these judges.24 Figure 2 shows the percentage of current specialized court judges appointed
by Democratic and Republican presidents. Of the 52 active, specialized court judges, 42
percent (22) were appointed by Republican presidents, and 55 percent (30) were appointed by
Democratic presidents. The appointees of George W. Bush and Barack Obama make up 83
percent (43) of the current judges.25
23Although its judges are also subject to this selection process, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is
excluded because it is equivalent to a state supreme court.
24Interestingly, the Court of International Trade’s enacting statute, the Customs Act of 1980, states that “No
more than five...judges shall be from the same political party.” However, while this requirement is meant to
limit partisanship and ideology on the court, presidents are free to select nominees who, while demonstrably
independent or unaffiliated in their party registration, actually share the president’s policy views (Brown, 1982;
Unah, 1998).
25However, of those 43, 4 were originally Clinton appointees to the Tax Court whom Obama reappointed.
Thus, the percentages in the figure do not add to 100 because I am double counting those 4 judges appointed by
both Obama and Clinton.
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Fig. 2: Percentage of Current Specialized Court Judges by President
The Senate Attention Gap
In this section, I explore whether the judges confirmed to specialized courts received
similar attention during their Senate confirmation proceedings as did their generalist
counterparts.26 Table 2 presents a comparison of confirmation votes of the 12 generalist
circuit courts of appeals with the six specialized courts whose judges are subject to
presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. The third column shows the percentage of
currently sitting judges on each court who were confirmed by unanimous consent or voice
vote, while the fourth column shows the percentage of confirmed judges who received at least
one vote against their nomination. Confirmation statistics for individual judges and the
identity of their appointing president are presented in Tables 18 and 19 (for specialized court
judges) and Tables 20, 21, and 22 (for generalist circuit court judges) in the appendix of this
chapter.27 Of the 52 currently sitting specialized court judges, 41 (79%) were confirmed by
voice vote or by unanimous consent. Further, of the remaining 11 judges who were subjected
to a recorded vote, only 2 (3.8%) received any votes against them. These percentages are
26Confirmation vote histories were found using Congress.gov and searching under nominations.
27These numbers and judges are accurate as of April 1, 2019. The Court of Federal Claims currently is
operating with only five judges out of 16 total seats.
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fairly consistent across the six specialized courts listed in the table, as all current judges of the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Tax Court, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims were confirmed by voice vote or unanimous consent. Moreover, at least 80% of Court
of Federal Claims and Court of International Trade judges were confirmed in this manner.
While only 25% of Federal Circuit judges received voice votes or unanimous consent, only
one current judge received any votes against their nomination.28
Finally, when active senior judges are included, the number receiving confirmation by
voice vote or unanimous consent rises to 86 (88%) out of 98 judges. Only one of these senior
judges received any votes against them. In federal courts, judges who are at least 65 years of
age and have served for at least 15 years may opt for senior status, a form of semi-retirement.
These judges hear fewer cases and their seat becomes vacant.
This evidence suggests that judicial nominations to specialized courts are
non-controversial in nature. Separating active and senior judges is instructive because there
may be generational differences in how the Senate treats judicial nominees. With respect to
the Supreme Court, Senators have increasingly subjected Court nominees to greater scrutiny.
For example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia, both considered to sit on opposite
ends of the ideological spectrum, were each confirmed with more than 90 senators in support.
However, recent nominees such as Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch both received greater
opposition. While this certainly reflects increased political polarization, it is useful to observe
that this pattern of increasing scrutiny does not seem to apply to specialized court judges.
To explore this phenomenon further, it is instructive to compare the treatment of
specialized court appointments to that of appointments to the generalist circuit courts of
appeals. Of the 156 currently sitting judges, 48 (31%) were confirmed by voice vote or
unanimous consent, while 108 (69%) received a recorded vote and 73 (47%) received at least
one vote against them. The percentage of voice vote/unanimous consent confirmations ranges
from 8.3% for the 3rd Circuit to 45.4% for the 2nd and 7th Circuits, while the percentage of
judges receiving votes against them ranges from 18.1% for the 2nd Circuit to 62.5% for the
28The confirmation records of District of Columbia Court of Appeals judges is similar. Using Congress.gov, I
found not one confirmed judge who received any votes against his nomination.
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6th Circuit.
Additionally, while the growth in partisan warfare in the U.S. Senate has made the
generalist court nominees of recent presidents (George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump) more
contentious, this same pattern is not present for nominees to specialized courts. Of President
Trump’s 33 confirmed nominees to the generalist circuit courts, 21 (64%) received more than
40 votes in opposition. In contrast, all seven of Trump’s confirmed specialized court nominees
were confirmed by voice vote.29
A comparison between the generalist appellate courts and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is particularly useful because
the Supreme Court may exercise appellate review over each of these courts. Of the 17
non-senior judges currently hearing cases on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and
the Federal Circuit, only one judge received any votes opposed to his nomination. Thus, in
comparison to their generalist counterparts, specialized court judges face much less scrutiny
from senators. While a number of logical possibilities may explain this pattern (boundedly
rational senators opting to direct their limited policy attention to more immediately observable
issues, for example (Jones, 2001)), this pattern is normatively troublesome given the
aforementioned administrative responsibility of specialized courts and evidence that these
courts may be subject to disproportionate litigant influence and a propensity for ideological
decision making. As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, a lack of Senate attention to
specialized court appointees may give greater discretion to presidents to select their more
favored nominees. Thus, the next section reviews existing evidence that specialized court
appointments result from political patronage and presents descriptive data to examine this
claim.
Patronage
The literature on judicial selection to specialized courts is scant, and much of this
work has focused on the perceived role that political patronage plays in nominations to these
courts (Unah, 1998). As Unah (1998) notes:
29These statistics are derived from the appendix tables.
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Table 2: Generalist vs. Specialized Judges’ Confirmation Votes
Court Type %Voice/Unanimous Consent %With Votes Against
1st Circuit Generalist Article III 33.3% 33.3%
2nd Circuit Generalist Article III 45.4% 18.1%
3rd Circuit Generalist Article III 8.3% 50%
4th Circuit Generalist Article III 40% 40%
5th Circuit Generalist Article III 43.7% 46.6%
6th Circuit Generalist Article III 25% 62.5%
7th Circuit Generalist Article III 45.4% 36.3%
8th Circuit Generalist Article III 36.3% 54.5%
9th Circuit Generalist Article III 20.8% 54.1%
10th Circuit Generalist Article III 25% 41.6%
11th Circuit Generalist Article III 25% 50%
DC Circuit Generalist Article III 30% 60%
Federal Circuit Specialized Article III 25% 8.3%
Armed Forces Specialized Article I 100% 0%
Federal Claims Specialized Article I 80% 20%
International Trade Specialized Article III 83.3% 0%
Tax Court Specialized Article I 100% 0%
Veterans Claims Specialized Article I 100% 0%
All Generalist 30.7% 46.7%
All Specialized 78.8% 3.8%
With Active Senior Judges 87.7% 3.1%
“Because of the presumed ineffectiveness of senatorial courtesy when it comes to
vacancies on specialized courts, the president and his lieutenants in the White
House and the Department of Justice are thought to have free rein in picking
individuals to those courts, with scant, if any opposition from senators.
Consequently, it is generically thought that the president uses these positions as
plums for rewarding patronage or loyal service or for accomplishing constituency
obligations...the popular thinking is that the president doles out these ‘spoils’
without paying much attention to such qualities as the judicial temperament, legal
competence, and integrity of the appointee” (23).
The senatorial courtesy that characterizes appointments to federal district courts is
seemingly absent given the nationwide jurisdiction of specialized courts, and the ease with
which specialized court judges achieve confirmation seems to support the notion that White
House officials have great discretion and power over specialized court appointments.
Moreover, critics of specialized courts argue that political patronage leads to judges on
specialized courts having slimmer qualifications than generalist court judges and insist that
the monotony of subject matter concentration in specialized courts creates tunnel vision and
makes it difficult to “maintain [or attract] a high quality federal...bench” (Posner 1983, 780).
However, research on the extent to which patronage characterizes appointments to specialized
courts has been limited. To my knowledge, only Unah’s (1998) work on patterns of
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appointments to the Court of International Trade (CIT) and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit provide empirical examination of this question. Unah reports that patronage,
partisanship, and interest groups play important roles in appointments to specialized courts.
As regards patronage, at the time of Unah’s study, many judges on the CIT had little
international trade experience, and New York Senator D’Amato appeared to use the CIT for
patronage appointments, as six of eight judges appointed to the court in 1991 were from New
York. President Clinton also appointed two judges to the court who were close personal
friends.
If patronage plays a role in selecting judges for specialized courts, it may be expected
that presidents and their staff draw from familiar names and faces when selecting nominees to
these courts. Such individuals may have come to the attention of White House officials in
their careers in the executive branch. For example, senior Federal Circuit judge S. Jay Plager
worked in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during the Reagan and Bush
administrations as the OMB Associate Director and Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs. Plager was then appointed to the Federal Circuit by
President George H.W. Bush. Given that nothing in Judge Plager’s background suggests
experience with patents, international trade, or contracts, his appointment may reasonably be
seen as a patronage or partisan appointment. Patronage can also take the form of rewarding
individuals for loyal service to the administration or the political party. This type of
appointment may characterize a handful of specialized court judges. For example, senior CIT
judge Jane Restani was a member of the Justice Department during the Carter and Reagan
administration. Restani had no previous experience in international trade when she was asked
by a Reagan DOJ official to accept an appointment to the court. Restani admitted her
unfamiliarity with the court and asked for time to research the CIT before accepting
(Rowenstein, 1991; Unah 1998). Moreover, Federal Claims judge Susan G. Braden was an
active supporter of the Republican Party, as she served as Assistant General Counsel to the
Republican National Convention, was on the National Steering Committee, Lawyers for
Bush-Quayle, and worked for the Dole presidential campaign, among other activities. She
was appointed to the Court of Federal Claims by George W. Bush.
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Interestingly, a sizable number of specialized court appointees with executive agency
experience served in the executive agencies of their appointing presidents. Of the 55 judges
who worked in cabinet-level executive agencies,30 29 (53%) worked in the executive branch
of their appointing branch. Figure 3 presents the percentages broken down by senior and
current judges. A higher percentage of senior judges exhibit this pattern than current judges.
Moreover, of the six specialized courts considered in this study, the Tax Court is the venue
most subject to this pattern in appointments. While this pattern certainly does not prove that
specialized court judges attain their positions due to presidential patronage, it does reinforce
the notion that presidents draw from familiar individuals when making their appointments.
Fig. 3: Same Executive Agency as Appointing President
ABA Ratings
Having considered the potential for specialized court appointments to result from
presidential patronage, I address this chapter’s central question by considering the
qualifications of the judges who occupy these specialized jurisdiction courts. Again, if
specialized court judges exhibit sufficient qualifications for their positions, then concern over
the Senate’s potentially lax treatment of their nominations may be lessened.31 First, a
30This includes organizations housed under the Executive Office of the President.
31While sufficient qualifications may lessen concern, specialized court judges could still be appointed based
on patronage and ideological considerations. Sufficient qualifications also do not mean that interest groups are
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subjective and distilled look at the qualifications of specialized court judges can be observed
in the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
ratings of judicial nominees. While the majority of specialized court nominees are not rated
by the ABA because of their Article I status, two specialized courts are Article III-designated
courts: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade.
Nominees to these courts are rated by the ABA, and those ratings for both current and active
senior judges are presented in Table 3. ABA ratings of judicial nominees are on a three item
scale (Not Qualified, Qualified, and Well Qualified). Single entries in Column 3 indicate a
unanimous rating by the committee, while multiple entries present the rating of the committee
majority first and the committee minority’s rating second. From the table, one observes that
only one judge received less than a unanimous Qualified rating: Court of International Trade
Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves. In Figure 4(a) below, I collapse ABA ratings of Federal Circuit
judges into two categories. The first category includes any judge who received at least a
minority committee rating of Well Qualified. The second category includes judges who
received a rating of Qualified. According to the figure, a greater percentage of senior Federal
Circuit judges received at least a minority committee rating of Well Qualified. Figure 4(b)
collapses ABA ratings of Court of International Trade judges into three categories. The first
two categories are identical to those from Figure 4(a), while the third category includes the
single judge who received a Qualified/Not Qualified rating. We can see that current
International Trade judges received higher ratings on average than did senior judges, as no
senior judge received even a minority rating of Well Qualified. Overall, however, nominees to
these two courts demonstrate at least a modicum of requisite qualifications in the eyes of the
ABA.
Moreover, using ABA ratings I can test critics’ contention that specialized court
judges are generally less qualified than generalist court appointees. Figure 5 and Table 4
compare the ABA ratings of generalist circuit court and specialized court judges (combining
senior and current Federal Circuit and International Trade judges together). For a complete
list of ABA ratings of generalist court judges, please see Tables 23, 24, and 25 in the
not heavily involved and influential in this selection process.
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appendix. From the figure and table, one observes that a greater percentage of generalist
judges receive higher ratings from the ABA. Moreover, a chi-square test reveals that the ABA
ratings of specialized and generalist courts are statistically different at the p < 0.05 level of
significance. Thus, based on ABA ratings, there does appear to be some truth to critical
assessments of the qualifications of specialized court judges. However, this difference in
qualifications should not be overstated, as all but one specialized court judge received at least
a rating of unanimously qualified. Moreover, a greater percentage of generalist court judges
received at least a minority rating of Not Qualified.
Table 3: ABA Ratings of Article III Specialized Court Judges
Court Judge ABA Rating Status
Federal Circuit Sharon Prost Qualified/Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Pauline Newman Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Alan David Lourie Well Qualified/Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Timothy B. Dyk Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Kimberly Ann Moore Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Kathleen M. O’Malley Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Jimmie V. Reyna Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Evan Wallach Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Ricard G. Taranto Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Raymond T. Chen Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Todd M. Hughes Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Kara Fernandez Stoll Well Qualified Current
Federal Circuit Haldane Robert Mayer Well Qualified Senior
Federal Circuit S. Jay Plager Qualified/Well Qualified Senior
Federal Circuit Raymond Clevenger III Qualified/Well Qualified Senior
Federal Circuit Alvin Anthony Schall Well Qualified/Qualified Senior
Federal Circuit William Curtis Bryson Well Qualified Senior
Federal Circuit Richard Linn Qualified Senior
International Trade Timothy C. Stanceu Qualified Current
International Trade Leo M. Gordon Well Qualified Current
International Trade Mark A. Barnett Well Qualified/Qualified Current
International Trade Claire R. Kelly Well Qualified Current
International Trade Jennifer Choe-Groves Qualified/Not Qualified Current
International Trade Gary S. Katzmann Well Qualified Current
International Trade Jane A. Restani Qualified Senior
International Trade Thomas J. Aquilino Jr. Qualified Senior
International Trade Richard W. Goldberg Qualified Senior
International Trade Richard K. Eaton Qualified Senior
Sources: Unah (1998), ABA (2019)
Also https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/history/judges.xlsx
ABA ratings are on a three item scale (Not Qualified, Qualified, Well Qualified)
Single entries in Column 3 reflect unanimous ratings.
For multiple entries in Column 3, the first entry is the rating from the majority.
The second is the rating from the minority.
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Table 4: Comparing ABA Ratings of Specialized and Generalist Court Appointees
Court Type Well Qualified/Qualified Qualified Not Qualified Total
Generalist Circuit Court 118 (76%) 24 (15%) 14 (9%) 156 (100%)
Specialized Courts 17 (60%) 10 (36%) 1 (4%) 28 (100%)
Total 135 (73%) 34 (19%) 15 (8%) 184 (100%)
ABA rating of specialized court judges is statistically different from that of generalist court judges (χ2 = 6.8806)
Fig. 4: ABA Ratings of Article III Specialized Court Judges
(a) Federal Circuit
(b) Court of International Trade
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Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has sought to address a deficiency in judicial scholars’ understanding of
appointments to federal courts by providing an overview of the patterns of appointments to
specialized federal courts. While generalist court appointees, including circuit court and
Supreme Court nominees, receive a moderate to high amount of scrutiny from the U.S.
Senate, this level of attention seems lacking for specialized court appointees. Yet, the growth
of the administrative state and the transfer of jurisdiction over technical and specific areas of
law from generalist to specialized courts means that specialized courts play an important role
in formulating the direction of law in the United States. Thus, explaining this lack of attention
is important in light of the two possibilities presented in the introduction to this chapter. First,
senators may give little attention to these nominees because they are well qualified and
deserving of appointment based on their merit. Second, senators are largely ignoring the
merits of specialized court appointees and implicitly granting great discretion over specialized
court selection to the president, White House officials, and other interested groups. Inherent
within each of the possibilities is the potential for political patronage to color appointments to
specialized courts, a criticism leveled against specialized court judges and moderately
supported by previous scholarship (Unah, 1998). To adjudicate between these possibilities, I
examined the qualifications of the judges who are appointed to specialized courts. Comparing
ABA ratings of generalist and specialized court appointees demonstrates a statistically
Fig. 5: Specialized-Generalist Comparison
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significant difference in the subjectively-assessed qualifications of these judges, with
specialized court judges possessing slimmer qualifications on the whole than generalist court
judges. This analysis seems to support specialized court critics such as Judge Richard Posner,
who argue that the characteristics of specialized courts create disincentives for well qualified
judges to accept appointments to these courts. However, the generalizability of this result
should be viewed with three reservations. First, the ABA only provides ratings for Article III
judges, and only two specialized courts have Article III status. Thus, only a small number of
specialized court judges are included in this analysis. Second, the results of the chi-square test
may reflect the choice to collapse the ABA ratings into three categories. Third and perhaps
most importantly, the ABA ratings of specialized court judges do not indicate that these
judges are unqualified. As Figure 5 shows, the majority of specialized court judges fall into
the top category. Thus, it seems unfair to characterize specialized court judges as unqualified
or poorly credentialed. While generalist court judges do receive higher ABA ratings, the ABA
ratings of Federal Circuit and International Trade judges paint a picture of qualified jurists.
Ultimately, the lack of Senate attention/involvement, the concerns of legal
practitioners, and the potential for presidents to use specialized court appointments as
patronage, as well as the ABA ratings comparisons, provide a normative foundation to
investigate the decision making of specialized court judges. The differences in qualifications
and policymaker attention between specialized and generalist court judges may have
important consequences for the decision making of specialized court judges. In the next
chapter, I begin my exploration of judicial specialization’s consequences by examining
expertise in the specialized context. Specifically, I build a three-component theoretical model
of expertise in specialized courts that I then test using longitudinal data on the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.
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CHAPTER 3: IN SEARCH OF EXPERTISE IN SPECIALIZED COURTS:
IDEOLOGY AND EXPERTISE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS
CLAIMS
Introduction
By introducing specialization to the judiciary through the creation of specialized
courts, policymakers generate a number of important consequences. On the one hand,
specialization creates opportunities for efficiency,32 quality, and uniformity in legal action, or
what Baum (2011) calls the three neutral virtues. Specialized court judges should have more
agreement on legal principles, more consistent precedent, and more efficient caseload
completion. Moreover, we might expect that transferring jurisdiction over technical matters
from generalist to specialized courts would improve the quality of judicial decisions. Inherent
within these virtues, however, is the important role played by expertise. Hearing the same
technical issues again and again, judges on specialized courts can apply or develop expertise
to deal with such complex cases, improving on the decision quality of generalist judges in
these areas. Furthermore, expert judges should feel comfortable with the body of law, relying
less on outside information or signals from lawyers, and should produce an output of higher
quality given their sole focus on this area of law. Familiarity with the subject matter and the
similarity of cases should cultivate better decision making (Baum, 2011). Due to the wide
range of issues they adjudicate, generalist judges are not afforded the same opportunities to
develop such subject matter expertise.
However, expertise can also greatly influence a court’s decision making in ways that
go beyond these organizational benefits. Importantly for regulatory specialized courts in
particular, first, the accumulation of expertise affects how judges treat bureaucratic agencies.
While generalist court judges are more reliant on litigants and agencies for the bulk of their
32Specialization necessarily creates opportunities for the efficient allocation of judicial resources (i.e., judges
charged with adjudicating cases in a narrow legal area) to increase the efficiency of case processing in technical
areas and serves to lessen the caseload burdens of the generalist courts.
27
information in technically complex cases, the expertise of a specialized court allows its judges
to be less reliant on litigants for relevant information, placing the court on more equal footing
with these agencies. Thus, the decisions of specialized courts tend to be less deferential to the
agencies they review than are the decisions of generalist courts (Sheehan, 1992; Hansen,
Johnson and Unah, 1995; Howard, 2005).33 Second, while ideology is a consistently strong
predictor of decision making on generalist courts (Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Hettinger,
Lindquist and Martinek, 2004), more limited evidence exists to support this finding in
specialized courts. Further, there are reasons to expect that ideology would not apply to
decision making in this more technical setting. Since specialized judges are repeatedly
hearing the same types of cases, it may be expected that they will more readily apply existing
law and precedent to the very technical issues before them, leaving less room for their
ideology to play a role. Thus, the following explores the relationship between expertise and
ideology, since there is reason to think that relationship might be different in specialized
courts than in generalist courts.
Finally, it is important to understand that levels of expertise vary on any court,
specialized or general, and such differences in expertise create differences in decisions among
justices. Moreover, the role that expertise plays on a specialized court will differ from court to
court, depending on the area of law the court is charged with overseeing. In this chapter, I
examine expertise as a consequence of specialization in the judiciary and consider the unique
role expertise plays in the jurisprudence of judges on specialized courts. Focusing my
attention on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), I broaden previous
conceptions of judicial expertise, emphasize the nature of expertise as dependent on the issues
occupying a court’s docket, and demonstrate how expertise works in tandem with ideology to
inform decision making. Specifically, I examine how expertise impacts the CAVC’s
relationship with the bureaucratic agency it reviews, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA).
33Certainly, expertise exists on generalist courts. See McGuire (1995) on the role of process expertise and
legal representation on U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Scholars have also examined the influence of expertise in
opinion assignment on the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals (Brenner, 1984; Maltzman and Wahlbeck,
1996; Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 2000). However, where generalist court judges may have only one or
two experts on any given policy area, almost all of a specialized court’s judges would typically have at least some
expertise in the court’s legal area, whether that expertise be from technical qualification/credentials, previous
occupation experience, or experience gained from serving on the court.
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Focusing on the CAVC is informative because it affords the opportunity to extend previous
understanding of expertise on other specialized courts, such as the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Miller and Curry, 2009), to a court that has received almost no scholarly
attention from political scientists. Further, the CAVC’s unique method of adjudicating the vast
majority of its cases by a single judge rather than three-judge panels allows for an analysis
that removes some strategic considerations judges may have, such as expectations about how
their colleagues will rule. By relying on single-judge decisions as its primary resolution
method, the CAVC acts more like a federal district court than an appellate body.
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
For two hundred years, veterans were prevented from challenging denials of their
benefits claims in court. Instead, regional office panels within the Department of Veterans
Affairs’ (VA) Veterans Benefits Administration had sole authority over benefits decisions,
which were subject only to internal appellate review by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
(BVA).34
The creation of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as a court of record separate
from the Department of Veterans Affairs made VA benefit decisions subject to judicial review
for the first time. Possessing exclusive jurisdiction over the decisions of the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is a relatively new court in the
federal judiciary.35 Originally established as the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, the
34Prior to 1930, the benefits programs were administered by departments within the Departments of War,
the Interior, and the Treasury (Ridgway, 2010). In fact, Congress has provided support to the nation’s veterans
since the country’s founding. In 1789, Congress began providing veterans pensions, and by World War I,
veterans benefits programs also provided disability compensation, insurance, and vocational training for
disabled servicemen (Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 2005). Until the early twentieth century, these programs
were administered and benefits were allocated by agencies within the Departments of War, the Interior, and the
Treasury (Ridgeway, 2010). Authority for these programs transferred to the Veterans Administration (VA) upon
its creation in 1930. Unique among federal agencies, the benefits decisions of these agencies were insulated from
judicial review. The Tucker Act of 1887 exempted citizens from pursuing pension claims, including veterans’
claims, in the Court of Claims (Sisk, 2003), and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 effectively excluded
the VA from its oversight procedures (Hagel and Horan, 1994).
35Information for this discussion of the court’s history is taken from the official government website of the
CAVC at https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about.php and from the discussion in Baum (2011). See also Light
(1992) and Helfer (1992).
29
court was renamed under the Veterans’ Programs Enhancement Act of 1999.
The CAVC has seven permanent and two temporary judges. Although the court is an
Article I tribunal, its judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, just
like Article III judges. Appointments are for fifteen years, but retired judges are eligible to
serve as a recall-eligible senior judge with all the authority and powers of an active judge.
Most cases before the court concern disability or survivor benefits, and a smaller
percentage deal with education benefits, life insurance, and home loan foreclosure
(Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 2005). Moreover, the CAVC is unique among federal courts in
its manner of adjudicating cases. The traditional method of case resolution in appellate courts,
both specialized and generalist, is via three-judge panels. In contrast, about 98% of merit
decisions on the CAVC are resolved by single judges. Examining how this method of
adjudicating cases impacts the court’s decisions is instrumental in understanding the court’s
role in the federal judiciary. As Smith (2003) notes: “No other federal appellate court may
exercise similar power to have a single judge decide an appeal on its merits” (279). According
to the CAVC’s internal operating procedures, single-judge decisions are not precedential and
cannot establish new rules of law. Instead, single-judge adjudication is more appropriate for
error correction than for law-giving (Allen, 2007).36 However, despite the court’s stated
procedures, Ridgway, Stichman and Riley (2016) finds that the court does use single-judge
disposition for cases that present novel issues of law. Thus, these single-judge decisions are
more than just simple applications of court precedent to current cases.
The CAVC has one of the highest caseloads of any federal appellate court, as
36The internal operating procedures of the CAVC, available at http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/documents/
IOP2004.pdf, determine whether an appealed case is appropriate for single-judge or panel consideration. After
an appeal is filed with the court, the appeal is assigned to a screening judge, a position that rotates among
the judges, who determines whether the case is ripe for single-judge or panel treatment. The screening judge
evaluates an appeal on the following to determine if it qualifies for single-judge adjudication:
(1) does not establish a new rule of law;
(2) does not alter, modify, criticize, or clarify an existing rule of law;
(3) does not apply an established rule of law to a novel fact situation;
(4) does not constitute the only recent, binding precedent on a particular point of law within the power of the
Court to decide;
(5) does not involve a legal issue of continuing public interest; and
(6) the outcome is not reasonably debatable.
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approximately 2,500 appeals per year are disposed of by the court’s judges and clerk.37 As
such, the CAVC does not conduct trials, receive new evidence, or hear the testimony of
witnesses. Only rarely does the court hold oral arguments. The CAVC only reviews BVA
denials of benefits claims. While the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may hear
appeals from the CAVC, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions is
limited, and the Federal Circuit cannot review factual determinations unless a constitutional
issue is present.38 Thus, the direction of veterans law is largely the purview of the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims. Having briefly introduced the court, I turn now to the central
questions of this chapter: how judicial expertise and ideological factors impact decision
making on the CAVC.
Defining Expertise
Political scientists have traditionally defined expertise to mean technical or substantive
knowledge (McGraw and Pinney, 1990). These scholars have thought of expertise as
familiarity with and substantive knowledge of a technical legal topic derived from immersion
in that subject (Unah, 1998; Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 2000). Measuring such
knowledge, however, has proven challenging and has led to semantic and empirical
confusion.39 In particular, we need to recognize that what constitutes technical or substantive
knowledge is not uniform across courts and that expertise takes different forms, depending on
the court that is being studied. Previous scholars have treated expertise as a multidimensional
concept. McGraw and Pinney (1990) define expertise along two dimensions: a “mode of
acquisition dimension” and a “frequency of use dimension.” Similarly, research on attorney
expertise has distinguished “substantive expertise” from “process expertise” (McGuire, 1995;
37Based on data obtained from the CAVC annual reports published online at the CAVC website at
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/report.php. A large growth in the number of filings in the court led Congress to
temporarily increase the court’s size to nine members and to more regularly use retired judges.
38The Federal Circuit may consider “the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof”
that the CAVC relied on in making its decision 38 U.S.C. Section 7292(c) (2000).
39As McGraw and Pinney (1990, 9) note, “the lack of consistency in operationalizing the construct has
resulted in some theoretical and empirical confusion.”
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Kritzer, 1998; Haire, Lindquist and Hartley, 1999). Terminology aside, both substantive
expertise and mode of acquisition refer to skills in or mastery of a technical subject that are
obtained in a context removed from the court in question. Such contexts may include relevant
educational attainment (e.g., undergraduate or graduate degrees, professional positions, and
other background characteristics). Process expertise and frequency of use, on the other hand,
refer to knowledge gained from familiarity with the court, its institutions, and its workings.
With respect to judges, this dimension of expertise is about experience serving on the court. In
sum, previous theories posit that judicial expertise can be derived from 1) background sources
(credentials, prior occupations) and from 2) experience on the court. This classic treatment of
expertise is illustrated in the top left panel of Figure 6.
Recent work by Miller and Curry (2009)40 has followed this track, although with some
semantic differences. Miller and Curry consider both dimensions but refer only to the “mode
of acquisition/substantive expertise” dimension as expertise. In their view, expertise is any
subject matter knowledge or skill attainment a judge has accrued before sitting on the court.
In their study of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, they define expertise as prior
technical qualification or the possession of relevant credentials. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit adjudicates factually complex questions of patent obviousness, and federal
requirements mandate that applicants for the patent bar must meet a technical qualification
(e.g., degree in technical field). Therefore, Miller and Curry define a Federal Circuit judge as
technically qualified if she 1) possesses an undergraduate or graduate technical degree in an
area such as chemistry, and 2) was previously a member of the patent bar. In contrast, the
“process expertise/frequency of use” dimension is termed “experience” and refers to an
acclimation effect that comes from being exposed to the technical subject again and again
while serving on the court. Experience is measured as the number of years a judge has served
on the court. Miller and Curry’s treatment of expertise is illustrated in the top right panel of
Figure 6.
Despite the differences in terminology, these authors above are all measuring the same
40See also Miller and Curry (2013) and Curry and Miller (2015).
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concepts. Miller and Curry’s “experience” is the same concept as “process expertise” and
“frequency of use,” and “substantive expertise” and “mode of acquisition” are what Miller and
Curry consider “expertise.” While I follow earlier scholars in treating experience/process
expertise/frequency of use as a component of expertise, I propose a simpler terminological
framework. This framework is depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 6. In sum, in any court,
expertise may derive from a number of sources. These sources may be lumped into
components that occur before a judge is appointed to serve on a court and components that
occur once the judge begins service on the bench. Within the pre-court components, I theorize
that expertise may derive from a judge’s attainment of technical qualifications or credentials.
This component frequently constitutes educational credentials (graduating from certain
institutions with an undergraduate or graduate degree in a relevant area of study). Also within
the pre-court components, I go further than previous literature by considering a judge’s
professional positions or background occupation before joining a court. Here, judges can gain
expertise from employment or service in occupations or positions related to the technical area
in which they later hear cases. With respect to on-court components, judges gain expertise as
they accrue years of experience on the court. Here, expertise is derived from on-the-job
training and learning by doing rather than possessing mastery from previous training. Unlike
Miller and Curry, I treat the on-court component, years on bench, as a component of expertise.
With this framework, I have, in essence, retained core characteristics of previous scholars’
treatments of expertise, as expertise from credentials and experiential sources remain.
Moreover, beyond what I hope is a simpler semantic framework, I have broadened the
theoretical model of expertise by separating previous occupation from technical
qualifications/credentials and years on bench. A strength of this model is not just that it
simplifies expertise better than the others do, but also that it provides all the categories one
might need to examine expertise in specialized judges. As I have noted, every specialized
court might have a different set of factors that matter most for expertise, but I have included
all of the categories a specialized court might need for analyzing expertise. Before proceeding
with my theoretical contribution to the conception of judicial expertise, I provide an extended
examination of the previous occupation component of expertise by documenting the
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background attributes of judges on the six specialized courts featured in chapter 2.
Fig. 6: Models of Expertise
Previous Occupation in Specialized Courts
Expertise in the form of previous occupation may be derived from a number of career
paths. First, specialized court judges may gain expertise from previous relevant judicial
experience. Figure 7(a) below shows the percentage of judges who had previous experience
on another court. From this figure, one observes that specialized court judges do not have a
great deal of experience as judges, with senior judges displaying a slightly greater amount of
such experience. However, to a lesser degree, judicial experience can be gained by serving as
a law clerk to a federal or a state court judge. In particular, U.S. Supreme Court law clerks
serve important roles in drafting opinions, screening cases for review, and even shaping
justices’ decisions (Peppers and Zorn, 2008). Figure 7(b) depicts the percentage of specialized
court judges with previous experience as law clerks. In contrast to judge experience, more
than 40 percent of current specialized court judges previously served as law clerks. Moreover,
where senior judges had greater judge experience, current judges are more likely to have
experience as law clerks. I expect that previous judicial experience as a judge or law clerk will
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lead these judges to be less deferential to the federal government and bureaucratic agencies.41
To the extent that judicial experience familiarizes judges with legal arguments and the process
and substance of the court and its issues (process expertise, see Haire, Lindquist and Hartley
(1999)), judges should develop greater expertise with which to adjudicate legal issues.
Judicial scholars have argued that the accumulation of expertise by judges in specialized
courts places these justices on equal footing with the agencies they review and leads to less
deference to agency decisions. Research on international trade, income taxes, and patent
obviousness supports this assertion (Hansen, Johnson and Unah, 1995; Howard, 2005; Miller
and Curry, 2013). As Baum (2011) notes, specialized judges “tend to feel greater confidence
in their judgment than their generalist counterparts. Because of this confidence, they are likely
to be more assertive than generalists in their policy-making” (35). This pattern distinguishes
specialized courts from their generalist counterparts, whose greater deference to bureaucratic
agencies has been long documented (Sheehan, 1992; Humphries and Songer, 1999).42 This
development of expertise should be particularly effective for judges whose previous judicial
experience came on benches that considered cases similar to the ones heard in their current
courts. For example, of the 19 current and senior specialized court judges with previous
judicial experience, 12 previously served on other specialized or administrative level courts
that heard cases similar in substance to their current case loads. As an example, Judge
William Green Jr., former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, served for
four years as an Immigration Judge prior to his appointment to the CAVC.
Expertise in the form of previous occupation may also manifest from service in
Congress and the Executive Branch. Figure 8(a) below shows that approximately a quarter of
current specialized court judges worked in Congress or as legislative aides to members of
Congress. Senior judges are less likely to have such experience. Recall that senior judges are
considered semi-retired. They hear fewer cases and their seats are filled by a new judge. For
41The federal government or an executive agency or cabinet department is the most frequent defendant in
specialized courts.
42See the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)
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example, Federal Circuit judge Sharon Prost was the Chief Counsel to the Senate Labor
Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee, and Federal Claims judge Victor J. Wolski was
Counsel to Senator Connie Mack. In contrast, Figure 8(b) shows that a majority of current
specialized court judges worked in various executive agencies.43 Furthermore, unlike the
pattern observed for judges’ previous congressional experience, current specialized court
judges are less likely to have executive branch experience than are senior judges. The most
common previous executive position for these judges is in the Department of Justice as trial or
staff attorneys.44 However, some judges served in the Executive Office of the President and in
various other cabinet-level departments, including the Department of Veterans Affairs
(formerly the Veterans Administration) and the Department of Defense. In Figure 8(b), I
include judges who worked for agencies housed within executive departments. For example, a
majority of active Tax Court judges worked for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prior to
their appointments to the Tax Court. Because the Tax Court is located within the Department
of the Treasury, I include those judges here. Further, a number of Federal Circuit judges
served in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, which is housed within the
Department of Commerce. Those judges are also included here. As suggested in Chapter 2,
the inattention to specialized court judges by the Senate gives greater leeway for presidents,
and potentially interest groups, to have discretion over who ultimately ends up on these
courts. The potential for presidents to treat specialized court appointments as political
patronage makes considering executive branch experience an important part of expertise
emanating from previous occupation.
43I count only judges who worked in organizations within Cabinet departments or the Executive Office of the
President. I do not include service in agencies of the armed forces or independent agencies.
44See Tables 26-37 in the appendix.
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Fig. 7: Previous Judicial Experience
(a) Judge Experience
(b) Law Clerk Experience
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Fig. 8: Previous Congressional and Executive Experience
(a) Congressional Experience
(b) Executive Experience
Ultimately, previous occupation differs depending on the specialized court being
considered. For example, because a large portion of the Federal Circuit’s docket consists of
patent cases, judges with backgrounds in patent or intellectual property law would be
considered to possess this type of expertise. However, because the Federal Circuit also hears
cases on international trade and contracts, judges with backgrounds in these areas would also
possess previous occupation expertise. The largest portion of the Court of Federal Claims’
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docket concerns contract disputes, but the docket also features an amalgamation of issues such
as bid protests, military pay, and takings. Thus, subject matter specific expertise could derive
from a number of sources. However, my research into the backgrounds of the judges of the
Court of Federal Claims reveals limited experience with contract disputes. Of the 17 active
and senior judges on the court, the biographies of only two explicitly reference experience
with contracts. Senior Judge Lynn J. Bush was previously an administrative judge on the
Department of Housing and Urban Development Board of Contract Appeals. Senior Judge
Mary Ellen Coster Williams was an administrative judge on the General Services
Administration Board of Contract Appeals and Chair of the ABA’s Section of Public Contract
Law. This lack of expertise is potentially problematic given that “contract disputes are the
court’s bread and butter...more contract disputes come in and go out than any other matter
over which the court exercises jurisdiction” (Schooner, 2003, 753).
Other specialized courts have more narrow jurisdictions. The Court of International
Trade’s docket features cases concerning customs duties and other aspects of international
trade law. Here, expert judges should have backgrounds in international trade law. The Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), the Tax Court, and the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims all deal with specific military matters, tax assessments, and veterans benefits
claims, respectively. Thus, subject-matter expertise on the CAAF might come from working
as a Judge Advocate General. Similarly, expertise on CAVC would include working as an
attorney for a Veterans Service Organization (VSO), experience as a Judge Advocate General,
or service as a veterans attorney. Finally, Tax Court experts should have legal expertise in tax
law. Overall, specialized court judges demonstrate a great deal of relevant subject-matter
specific expertise (please See Tables 26-37 in the appendix).
Theoretical Contributions
Beyond addressing the semantic confusion surrounding expertise, I assert that
previous work has 1) failed to examine adequately whether, within the context of judicial
specialization, the components of expertise matter to varying degrees in different contexts,
and, as suggested above, has 2) improperly considered the role of previous occupation. First,
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it is more useful to consider the components of expertise on a spectrum. For theoretical
simplicity, we can compare technical qualifications/credentials to years on bench. The role of
technical qualification/credentials will certainly be greater in courts whose cases require
understanding complex, technical principles that are related to certain degrees. Degrees in
chemistry or electrical engineering would aid judges on the Court of Appeals for Federal
Circuit in adjudicating patent obviousness cases since these degrees are substantively related
to the cases heard by these judges. Likewise, judges on the Court of International Trade would
benefit from economics degrees since this court is charged with adjudicating cases of
antidumping and countervailing duty laws. In contrast, courts such as the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims hear challenges involving the award of veterans claims benefits, an issue
where a technical degree that would aid these judges does not exist, short of a master’s degree
in social work, a qualification few federal judges possess. This is not to say that educational
credentials do not exist on the CAVC. On the contrary, given that the court hears cases solely
in the area of veterans law, I expect that those judges who graduated from military institutions
or colleges can be credibly considered to possess expert credentials. While I expect that
judges with expert credentials will differ from judges without those credentials on the CAVC,
I am simply positing that the importance of these credentials will be greater in courts such as
the Federal Circuit.
On the other hand, previous work finds that years on the bench do not inform judicial
decision making, especially as these components of expertise relate to ideology, which I
discuss below (Miller and Curry, 2009, 2013; Curry and Miller, 2015). However, given the
nature of the cases heard in courts like the CAVC, where the role of credentials may not have
the same impact, we might expect more of a role for on-court components. Because the
CAVC uses single-judge adjudication and because the court deals with almost 2,000 cases a
year, experience on the court is likely invaluable to the judge in learning to process the large
number of cases efficiently and effectively. Compared to the CAVC, the Federal Circuit hears
fewer cases.
In sum, the role of expertise in the judiciary is dependent on the nature of the issues
that occupy a court’s docket. Figure 9 is a simple illustration of the relationship between
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expertise components with respect to specialized courts.
Fig. 9: Importance of Technical Credentials vs. Years on Bench
Second, previous work on judicial expertise has also failed to account for the separate
role of previous occupation. Beyond service on a court and educational history, expertise is
also derived from scenarios where the judge could have accumulated knowledge of the subject
matter. Previous employment, professional positions, and other background occupations
should be considered in this component of expertise.
I examine below the role of expertise in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. I
argue that expertise in the decision making of CAVC judges is different from its role in
decision making on other specialized courts, because technical credentials, defined as an
undergraduate or graduate degree in the relevant issue area, are not as important for
adjudicating questions of veterans claims and health benefits, outside of perhaps a master’s
degree in social work. Thus, expertise on the CAVC will also include previous professional
positions and background occupations, in addition to educational credentials and years on the
bench components. I will operationalize previous occupation as the 1) total number of years a
judge has served as a soldier, plus 2) the number of years working as a military lawyer in the
Judge Advocate General’s Corp and as a military administrator, plus 3) the number of years
served as a legal counsel/commander for a Veterans Service Organization (VSO) or provided
legal representation to veterans, plus 4) the number of years served as a legal counsel for a
congressional subcommittee on veterans affairs, plus 5) the number of years worked in the
executive Department of Veterans Affairs, plus 6) the number of yeras worked as a judge or
law clerk.
Thus far, I have posited a new terminological and theoretical framework for
41
understanding the development of expertise in the judiciary. The role that expertise plays in
judicial decision making, however, lies in its interaction with ideology.
Ideology and Expertise
The role that expertise plays in enhancing the influence of ideology is the subject of
this section and my empirical test below. Specifically, expertise conditions whether
specialized court judges demonstrate ideological patterns of decision making. In the judicial
decisions of Supreme Court and appellate court judges, proponents of the attitudinal model
find that ideology is a powerful explanatory factor (George and Epstein, 1992; Segal and
Spaeth, 1996, 2002; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2004). Put famously by Segal and
Spaeth (2002, 86): “Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative;
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal.” However, recent work has
examined how the context of the cases justices hear conditions the importance of ideological
attitudes on their decisions. Unah and Hancock (2006), for example, find that U.S. Supreme
Court justices vote more ideologically in salient cases, those cases that present justices with
issues about which they care deeply. In this case, the context is the specialized setting. One
might expect ideological considerations to be irrelevant to judges who decide jargon-filled
technically complex cases about tax law, international trade, or veterans claims. Indeed,
previous research on district judges’ adjudications of patent claims (Moore, 2001) and the
Federal Circuit (Allison and Lemley, 2000) finds little role for ideology. Further, Nash and
Pardo (2012) find no evidence of ideological voting by circuit court judges in bankruptcy
cases.
Recent work, though, has re-conceptualized the role of ideology in specialized courts
by focusing on how ideology interacts with expertise (Miller and Curry, 2009, 2013; Curry
and Miller, 2015). According to this literature, judges who possess greater subject matter
expertise in a technical area of law are more likely to engage in ideological decision making.
This argument builds on public opinion research that finds that citizens’ higher levels of
political knowledge are associated with increased levels of ideological constraint (Zaller,
1992) and more ideologically consistent opinions (Converse, 1964). As Miller and Curry
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(2009) note, federal judges are certainly sophisticated political actors who should have no
trouble in applying their levels of legal knowledge in order to make ideological decisions in
hot-button, controversial cases concerning free speech or the rights of criminal defendants.
These same judges, however, may have greater difficulty in applying their ideological
schemas to more technical cases. Expertise, they argue, allows judges to “superimpose...that
ideological schema upon a particular legal controversy” (843). In short, specialist judges
should apply ideological principles to a case more often than nonspecialists (Posavac,
Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1997; Federico and Schneider, 2007). Psychological research
indicates that experts possess not only more knowledge about an issue domain but also
stronger links among knowledge nodes (McGraw and Pinney, 1990). Experts engage in more
principled and systematic thinking about issues, leading to the development of consistency in
ideological attitudes. Expertise, then, is a principal determinant of attitudinal consistency, as
experts engage in more principled and systematic thinking about issues (Judd and Downing,
1990).
With respect to the judiciary, Collins (2008) finds that ideologically consistent
decision making is more likely when judges view cases as salient (see also Unah and
Hancock, 2006). If cases are salient when judges care greatly about the underlying legal
issues, judges who possess greater expertise in a given area of law should find these cases
more salient than their non-expert counterparts, as indicated by prevailing literature (Epstein
and Segal, 2000). Ultimately, given their greater ideological consistency, expert judges should
be better equipped to apply ideological principles to their decisions in technical or specialized
settings.
Previous work on expertise in the specialized setting has uncovered evidence that
pre-court expertise components, technical credentials, but not years on the bench, interact
significantly with ideology to predict judge decision making on the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Miller and Curry, 2009, 2013; Curry and Miller, 2015). The authors observe
this effect for Federal Circuit review of district court rulings and Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences rulings relating to patent obviousness cases (2009; 2013).45 However, as noted
45Curry and Miller (2015) also investigate the influence of judicial specialization on decision making in
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above, I assert that the role of expertise varies depending on the court that is being studied.
Miller and Curry’s significant finding for technical qualification with respect to patent
obviousness cases on the Federal Circuit is likely a function of the benefits that possessing
specialized degree qualifications impart in the specific field of patent law. The same might not
hold for other specialized fields, such as veterans’ claims. In Miller and Curry’s findings,
experience emerges as insignificant because of the nature of the court and the importance of a
technical degree in science, mathematics, or engineering for understanding the substance
matter of patent cases. On the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, however, I predict that
years on the bench, in addition to the pre-court expertise components, technical credentials
and previous occupation, will condition whether judges demonstrate patterns of ideological
decision making. Handling veterans claims cases is very different from patents, for example.
Whereas Federal Circuit judges may have experience or credentials as patent attorneys
registered before the patent bar, there is no formal credentialing process for handling veterans
claims. Thus, a lot of expertise in this area should come from the experience CAVC judges
gain from handling these cases on the court.
Ideology on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Following Miller and Curry (2009, 2013), I conceptualize ideology in terms of the
traditional economic stances of Republicans and Democrats. Traditionally, Republicans
exhibit fiscally conservative economic principles. These principles include an aversion to
spending on government programs, social welfare, etc. Democrats, on the other hand, espouse
more fiscally liberal economic principles and favor government spending on health care and
social programs. On the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, decisions favoring veterans
could be construed as favoring government spending for social welfare, a principle associated
with fiscally liberal economic policy. Moreover, while veterans are certainly a favored group
in American politics, many of the veterans appealing benefits decisions are not appealing
courts with generalized jurisdictions, specifically subject matter expertise and opinion specialization pertaining
to antitrust litigation in the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits from 1995-2005.
Ideological voting is conditional on opinion specialization and subject matter expertise but not on judicial
experience.
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complete denials of their claims. Veterans before the CAVC often received a non-zero initial
disability rating and are disputing what they perceive as a rating that is too low given their
injury. Thus, CAVC decisions reversing the Board of Veterans’Appeals constitute liberal
decisions, whereas decisions affirming the BVA are conservative decisions. Given this
formulation, more liberal judges, measured by DW-NOMINATE scores described below,
should be more likely to reverse BVA decisions than conservative judges because the research
on expertise described above indicates that more expert liberals should be more consistently
liberal and more expert conservatives should be more consistently conservative. This
hypothesis, along with the hypothesis for the interactive effect between expertise and
ideology, is featured below.
• Hypothesis 1: A liberal (conservative) judge will be more (less) likely to rule in favor of
a veteran.
• Hypothesis 2: Liberal (conservative) judges with technical credentials/more previous
occupation values/more years on the bench will be more (less) likely to rule for veterans
than liberal (conservative) judges with lower values of these expertise components.
Data and Methods: Single-Judge Decisions
To test my hypotheses, I conduct two analyses. The first analysis considers the court’s
single-judge decisions and employs data from the decisions of the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims issued between October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2016.46 To obtain this
data, I collected almost 15,000 court opinions from fiscal years 2010-2016 using Lexis/Nexis
Academic.47 I chose 2010 to 2016 in order to maximize the variance in justice ideology based
on expectations about the ideology of justices appointed by ideologically different presidents.
Because the CAVC is a relatively new court, only 17 judges had been appointed to the court
46Court decisions are tabulated by fiscal year. Thus, 2010 court decisions are from October 1, 2009 -
September 30, 2010.
47On Lexis/Nexis Academic, I searched: “United States Court of Veterans Appeals” and “United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.” Court opinions are available via Lexis/Nexis for fiscal years 1990-2017.
Lexis/Nexis Academic has recently transitioned to Lexis Uni.
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through December 2016. The seven years represented in this dataset contain 15 of the 17
judges, including the four judges appointed by Clinton and Obama, the six judges appointed
by George W. Bush, and five of the seven judges appointed by George H.W. Bush.48 After
downloading all opinions from Lexis/Nexis, I used quantitative text analysis tools available in
R to clean and prepare the text and to pull out relevant information from each opinion. Such
information included the date the case was decided, the outcome of the case, the judge who
decided the case, whether the petitioner had representation by counsel, whether the decision
was made by a panel of three judges, whether the judge who decided the case was the chief
justice, and the full text of the opinion. I then excluded all cases where a three-judge panel
decided the case and all cases where the court disposed of a case for lack of standing, lack of
jurisdiction, or for mootness, leaving only the court’s single-judge “merits decisions” in which
the court made a substantive ruling on a veteran’s claims for benefits, more than 10,000 cases
in total. The dependent variable is coded “1” if the court ruled for the veteran (the BVA’s
decision is reversed, set aside, or vacated and remanded) and “0” if the court affirmed the
BVA’s decision.49
Turning to my independent variables, I measure three components of expertise. I
collected the information for these measures from the congressional directory and the
biographies of the judges available at the CAVC’s official website. Table 5 presents the coding
rules for these measures. The first component, technical credentials, is coded “1” if the judge
graduated from a military institute, college, or program, including West Point, the Naval
Academy, or the Army War College. Seven of the fifteen judges in my dataset meet this
condition. The second component, years on the bench, is simply a count of the number of
48The judges not included in this dataset are Jonathan R. Steinberg and Hart T. Mankin, both of whom were
appointed by George H.W. Bush, and the three Trump appointees, Joseph Toth, Amanda Meredith, and Michael
Allen.
49A number of cases qualify as “mixed” decisions, meaning that the CAVC affirmed-in-part and vacated-in-
part the BVA’s decision. These cases are excluded from the primary analysis. When these cases are included as
decisions for a veteran, the results are substantively and statistically similar. Please see Table 45 in the appendix
of this chapter. Moreover, as Baum (2011) notes, “reversal rates merit consideration as indicators of decision
quality” (219).
46
years a given justice had been on the court at the time of the decision.50 The third component,
previous occupation, equals the total number of years of the judge’s life, prior to their service
on the court, that they worked in areas related to veterans or the military. This variables takes
on values equal to: 1) total number of years a judge has served as a solider, plus 2) the number
of years working as an active duty military lawyer in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
plus 3) the number of years working as a military administrator, plus 4) the number of years
served as a legal counsel/commander for a Veterans Service Organization (VSO) or provided
legal representation to veterans, plus 5) the number of years served as a legal counsel for a
congressional subcommittee on veterans affairs, plus 6) the number of years worked in the
Department of Veterans Affairs, plus 7) the number of years worked as a judge or law clerk.51
The subject-matter specificity of this measure, which I developed specifically for the CAVC,
indicates the importance of developing a different set of previous occupation measures for
judges on each different specialized court.
50Precise dates for when a judge first took office were not available. Thus, this variable is measured from
the judge’s Senate confirmation date. For example, since Judge Mary Schoelen was confirmed by the Senate on
November 21, 2004, she is coded as 0 for all cases prior to November 21, 2005. She receives a 1 for all cases
from November 21, 2005 to November 20, 2006.
51To illustrate, I have provided some examples. Current Associate Judge Margaret Bartley worked for 19
years as a law clerk to former CAVC Chief Judge Jonathan Steinberg and as senior staff attorney and staff
attorney for the National Veterans Legal Services. Bartley is coded as 19 on this measure. Former Chief Judge
Lawrence B. Hagel was Deputy General and General Counsel to the Paralyzed Veterans of America, a veterans’
service organization that promotes legal issues surrounding veterans’ benefits, for 13 years. Hagel also served 17
years as a Marine Corps Judge Advocate and was commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps for 3 years. Thus,
Hagel is coded as 33 for this measure. Judge William A. Moorman previously served in the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs and later was appointed by President George W. Bush as the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Management for the Department of Veterans Affairs. Moorman was also a longtime member of the
Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Moorman is coded as 33. Please note that I do not double count experience.
For example, Judge Coral Wong Pietsch is coded as 37 because she was an active duty Judge Advocate General
from 1974-1980; a member of the Army Reserve from 1980-2007; a Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator for the
Department of State from 2007-2008; and a Civilian Attorney in the US Army Pacific from 1986-2011. Judge
Pietsch was a member of the Army Reserve and employed in the US Army Pacific from 1986-2007, but I do not
count these years of experience twice. Thus, Judge Pietsch has 37 years of experience (1974-2011) in various
positions relevant to her role as a judge on the CAVC. Moreover, when considering experience as judge or law
clerk, I only count such experience when it is related to military, veterans, or claims-type issues. For example,
I do not count former Chief Judge Frank Nebeker’s experience as a judge on the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, while I do count William Greene’s service as an immigration judge. Moreover, I include Margaret
Bartley’s clerkship on the CAVC, but not William Greenberg’s clerkship on the Superior Court of New Jersey.
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Table 5: Coding Rules: Components of Expertise
The Components of Expertise on the CAVC
Experience Previous Occupation Technical Credentials
Years on bench Years as soldier + Graduated from military
Years as JAG/Military Lawyer + institution, college, or program,
Years as military administrator + including West Point, Naval
Year as VSO legal counsel or commander + Academy, and Army War College
Years as congressional veterans committee
counsel+ Years in VA +
Years as Judge/Law Clerk
The variable for ideology tests whether there is a direct effect of a judge’s ideological
attitudes on her decisions. No ideal measure of the ideology of lower federal court judges is
currently in existence. Because the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is located in
Washington, D.C., which has no senator, I cannot rely upon the measure developed by Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers (2001), which combines the ideology of same-state, same-party
senators with the ideology of the appointing president. Moreover, neither Judicial Common
Space (Epstein, Martin, Segal and Westerland, 2007) nor Martin-Quinn scores (Martin and
Quinn, 2002) tapping justice ideology are available for the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims. Thus, I use the first-dimension DW-NOMINATE score of a CAVC judge’s appointing
president as a proxy for the judge’s ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000).52 While not ideal,
the measure is the best available. In this case, NOMINATE is particularly useful as a proxy
for ideology in this court because I have posited that ideological decisions on the CAVC
regarding veterans claims issues are economic in nature, and the first dimension of
NOMINATE captures economic policy preferences.53 Moreover, the disparity in the Senate’s
treatment of specialized and generalist court nominees, as evidenced by confirmation vote
records, may signal the potential for presidents to have great leeway over the individuals who
sit on specialized courts. Given this consideration, using NOMINATE to measure ideology on
a specialized court seems particularly appropriate because this measure inherently posits a
52Data available from Lewis and Sonnet (2019) at https://www.voteview.com/data.
53DW-NOMINATE scores allow researchers to treat presidents as if they voted on bills in Congress by
estimating ideological scores based on presidential positions taken on bill voted on by Congress. These scores
are scaled along two dimensions. The first represents liberal-conservative or government economic intervention.
The second dimension represents racial issues.
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link between judge ideology and presidential ideology. Finally, NOMINATE has also been
used by other researchers in measuring the ideology of specialized court judges (Miller and
Curry, 2009). Higher values for this measure indicate a conservative ideology, and I expect
that the conservative aversion to government spending and social welfare programs makes
conservative judges less likely to rule for the veteran.
Most importantly, in order to test whether expertise conditions ideology on the CAVC,
I include an interaction term between ideology and each component of expertise to determine
whether the effects found by Howard (2005) and Miller and Curry (2009; 2013) in the Tax
Court and the Federal Circuit are applicable only to these courts. I expect that the interactive
effect will prove significant and that expert judges will be more likely to make ideological
decisions than non-experts. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction should be negative and
statistically significant.
I also include four control variables. I compare the behavior of chief and associate
judges with an indicator variable coded “1” if the chief judge issued the decision. I also
control for differences in the status of the judge by including an indicator variable coded “1”
if the case was decided by a recall-eligible senior judge. I control for the presence of attorney
representation and expect veterans represented by counsel to win more often than veterans
who are self-represented. Finally, I control for the effect of year by including an indicator
variable for each year in the model. The excluded baseline is fiscal year 2010.54 Summary
statistics for all variables are presented in Table 6. The mean value for the dependent variable
indicates a fairly even distribution of votes for and against veterans. Moreover, the same
pattern emerges for credentials. However, the mean ideology of judges skews in a
conservative direction, and more than 75% of cases analyzed feature a veteran represented by
an attorney.
54Table 44 in the appendix models Fiscal Year in three different ways. Column 1 removes Fiscal Year, and
Column 3 adds a random intercept for Fiscal Year. The results for both are very similar to those in column 2 of
Table 8. However, the interaction term between ideology and years on the bench is also insignificant when Fiscal
Year is included as a continuous variable in the second column.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics-Single-Judge Decisions Data
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Decision for Veteran 0.476 0.499 0 1 9350
Years on Bench 8.026 5.064 0 23 10593
Previous Occupation 20.808 10.804 0 37 10593
Credentials 0.472 0.499 0 1 10593
Ideology 0.461 0.426 -0.438 0.693 10593
Ideology*Years on Bench 4.501 3.806 -7.884 12.811 10593
Ideology*Previous Occupation 7.752 11.597 -14.016 22.869 10593
Ideology*Credentials 0.222 0.373 -0.438 0.693 10593
Chief Judge 0.111 0.315 0 1 10593
Counsel 0.765 0.424 0 1 9918
Senior Judge 0.109 0.312 0 1 10593
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression to analyze the
relationship between the outcome and predictor variables. However, because the data is
structured as cases within years within judges, I estimate a mixed effects logistic regression
model with a random intercept for judge, where judges appear in the data multiple times per
year. I use the following basic model, where the dependent variable is whether the court
issued a decision in favor of the veteran:
yt =β0 + β1Years on Bench + β2Credentials + β3Previous Occupation + β4Ideology
+ β5Chief Judge + β6Counsel + β6Senior Judge + β8Ideology*Years on Bench
+ β8Ideology*Credentials + β9Ideology*Previous Occupation
+ Fiscal Year Fixed Effects + Random Intercept for Judge + ε
Data and Methods: Panel Decisions
The second analysis examines the votes of CAVC judges in panel decisions from fiscal
years 2004-2018.55 Again, this time span was chosen to maximize the ideological variation of
judges. Also, since the Court disposes of only about 34 cases by panel decision per year, a
55Panel cases were identified on the CAVC official website at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/opinions.php.
Although Trump’s four appointees had joined the court by 2018, panel decisions including these judges are not
included in the analysis because no DW-NOMINATE score existed for Donald Trump at the time of writing.
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greater time span is needed to obtain enough cases for analysis.56 However, while
single-judge decisions are disposed of by memorandum opinions and are nonprecedential and
unpublished (see footnote 35 above), panel decisions involve less straightforward applications
of relevant law or establish new rules of law. Indeed, scholars have found important
differences between published and unpublished decisions (Szmer, Christensen and Kuersten,
2012). For this analysis, I kept only cases disposed of by full opinion (including per curiams),
but excluding cases under the Equal Access to Justice Act. These cases concern applications
for attorney’s fees. All panel cases disposed of through orders or for procedural reasons (e.g.,
dismissals for lack of jurisdictions) were excluded. In all, I identified 350 three-judge panel
decisions during this time period for a total of 1050 individual votes.57
As with the analysis for single-judge decisions, the dependent variable is coded “1” if
the judge voted in favor of the veteran and “0” if the judge voted to affirm the BVA’s decision.
Again, the primary variables of interest are my three measures of expertise and ideology.
They are coded in the same fashion as above. Again, I include variables indicating whether
the judge was serving as the chief judge and as a senior judge. Once more, I add a variable
denoting whether the veteran was represented by counsel. Cases where the veteran was
self-represented or represented by a non-attorney practitioner are coded as “0.” For this
analysis, I also control for the degree of disagreement among the judges on the panel by
including a variable for whether a concurring or dissenting opinion was filed in the case. I
control for the linear effect of year by including a continuous variable for fiscal year.58
Existing research indicates that individual judges may be influenced by their
colleagues on the panel (Farhang and Wawro, 2004; Sunstein, Schkade and Ellman, 2004).
Moreover, Unah (1998) found that, on the Federal Circuit, the partisan composition of the
panel has a significant effect on how individual judges made decisions. Thus, I include “Panel
56Statistic obtained from the CAVC’s annual reports, available at https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/report.php.
57As in the single-judge analysis, several of these decisions were mixed (affirmed-in-part and vacated and
remanded-in-part). I exclude these cases from the analysis, leaving me with 909 total votes. Including these
votes as votes for the veteran yields similar results. See Table 47 in this chapter’s appendix.
58I also run a model with fixed effects for fiscal year. Those results are presented in Table 49 in the appendix.
Results are substantively and statistically similar to those featured in Table 9.
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Ideology” as a variable that measures the median ideology of the three-judge panel.
Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 7 below. Mean values
across variables are substantively similar to those for single-judge decisions. Ideology, as well
as panel ideology, skew conservative. However, the mean value for the outcome variable is
slightly more favorable to veterans, and the vast majority of votes are cast by active judges.
Finally, there are very few cases where a veteran is self-represented or represented by a non-
attorney practitioner. I again model judges’ votes using mixed effects logistic regression with
a random intercept for justice.
Table 7: Summary Statistics-Panel Decisions Data
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Decision for Veteran 0.530 0.499 0 1 909
Years on Bench 5.827 4.020 0 21 1050
Previous Occupation 21.274 10.357 4 37 1050
Credentials 0.523 0.499 0 1 1050
Ideology 0.477 0.424 -0.438 0.693 1050
Panel Ideology 0.587 0.296 -0.354 0.693 1050
Ideology*Years on Bench 2.695 3.454 -6.570 11.697 1050
Ideology*Previous Occupation 8.4477 11.789 -14.016 22.869 1050
Ideology*Credentials 0.227 0.398 -0.438 0.693 1050
Chief Judge 0.154 0.361 0 1 1050
Counsel 0.931 0.253 0 1 1050
Senior Judge 0.007 0.081 0 1 1050
Separate Opinion 0.303 0.460 0 1 1050
Fiscal Year 2009.849 3.941 2004 2018 1050
Results
The results for the single-judge analysis are featured in Table 8 below.59 The creation
of multiple interaction terms necessarily leads to the presence of multicollinearity among the
independent variables. I attempt to reduce this issue by centering the variable for Previous
59The total number of cases is 8725 because I lose a number of observations by including the counsel
measure. This loss of data is due to an inability to determine whether the veteran was represented by counsel.
To determine the veteran’s representation status, I relied on the text of the judges’ opinions. The majority of
cases included language in the judge’s opinion that specified whether the veteran was represented by counsel or
appeared pro se. However, in some cases, it is impossible to observe a veteran’s representation status from the
text of the opinion. These cases are excluded from the model when the counsel variable is included.
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Occupation and including this transformed variable in the model.60 Column 1 examines the
effects of my expertise components, ideology, and controls without interactions.61 Column 2
adds the interactions between ideology and the expertise components. The variable tapping
judicial ideology is negative in both columns 1 and 2, but the variable is only statistically
significant in the interactive model. Thus, hypothesis 1 receives conditional support. In both
models, a judge’s credentials and previous occupation are significant. Judges with degrees
from military institutions are less likely than judges without such credentials to rule in favor
of veterans. However, judges with greater values of previous occupation are more likely to
rule for veterans. Predicted probability plots for these two variables are presented in Figure 10
below. For both models, being represented by counsel increases the likelihood of a veteran
receiving a favorable decision, while chief judges are not statistically distinct from associate
judges in their decision making. Finally, senior judges are more likely to rule for veterans than
active judges in column 1, but not in column 2.
60Multicollinearity tests show some cause for concern after centering previous occupation. Centering
ideology further reduces collinearity. However, results from models with both the centered previous occupation
and ideology variables yield almost identical results to those in Table 8 below. These results are presented in
Table 41 in the appendix for this chapter.
61Because only one judge prior to 2012 was appointed by a Democrat, the ideological measure is heavily
skewed in a conservative direction. Between May and December 2012, three new judges appointed by President
Barack Obama joined the court: Margaret Bartley, Coral Wong Pietsch, and William Greenberg. The court
between 2013 and 2016 featured a more balanced number of Republican (Alan Lance, Lawrence Hagel, William
Moorman, Mary Schoelen, Bruce Kasold, and Robert Davis) and Democratic appointees (Bartley, Pietsch,
and Greenberg). Thus, Table 42 in the appendix for this chapter analyzes a subset of the data from fiscal year
2013 through fiscal year 2016. While the non-interaction model looks very similar to column 1 of Table 8, the
interaction between ideology and years on the bench in column 2 is not statistically significant.
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Previous Occupation 0.048* 0.060*
(0.014) (0.019)
Chief Judge 0.107 0.107
(0.103) (0.103)














Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
Indicators for Fiscal Year included but not shown
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I turn to testing the interactive effects of expertise and ideology in column 2. While
previous occupation and credentials remain significant, the results in Table 8 indicate that
there is no statistically significant interactive effect between ideology and expertise in the
form of credentials or previous occupation. However, the interaction term between ideology
and years on the bench is significant. While this lends support for my hypothesis that the role
of ideology would be conditional on expertise, the positive sign on the interaction runs
counter to expectation.
The direct effects of the expertise components and ideology are difficult to interpret
because I have modeled their interactive effect. The coefficients on years on bench, previous
occupation, and credentials are the direct effect of expertise when ideology is zero, and the
coefficient on ideology is the direct effect of ideology when the expertise components are
zero. Because ideology never takes on a value of zero in the dataset, the coefficients on the
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expertise components are substantively meaningless. Thus, I turn to examining both
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 using predicted probability plots. These plots are created from
the model depicted in the second column.62 These hypotheses predict that liberal judges will
be more likely to rule for veterans than will conservative judges and that liberal (conservative)
judges with greater values for the expertise variables will be more (less) likely to rule for
veterans than will liberal (conservative) judges with less expertise.
Figure 11(a) shows the predicted probability of issuing a ruling favorable to the
veteran for various ideological values for judges with and without expert credentials. Because
I use the appointing president’s DW-NOMINATE score to measure CAVC judges’ ideologies,
judges appointed by the same president all have the same ideological score. For example, all
judges appointed by Obama have an ideological score of -0.354, and all George W. Bush
appointees have ideological scores of 0.693. Thus, in Figure 11(a) and throughout, George
H.W. Bush appointees represent an ideological score of 0.557 and Clinton appointees have an
ideological score of -0.438. Regardless of ideology, credentialed judges are less likely to rule
for the veteran than are judges without credentials. This result matches my expectation for
conservative judges but not for liberal ones. The similarity in slopes between liberal and
conservative judges reflects the insignificant interaction term. Figure 11(b) shows these same
patterns by charting the impact of expertise across a range of ideological values. Again,
credentialed judges are less likely to rule for the veteran than their non-credentialed
counterparts. Moreover, the effect across ideology is fairly flat.
62I created these plots in STATA 13. Creating predicted probability plots from mixed effects logistic
regression models is difficult in STATA given that the built-in margins command is not compatible with melogit.
All created plots set variables at mean values.
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(b) Credentials Across Ideology
Figure 12 presents the predicted probability of ruling for a veteran for various
ideological values across a range of previous occupation levels. Judges with higher levels of
prior experience are more likely to rule for veterans than judges with less prior experience.
This result fits with my expectation for liberal judges but not for conservatives. In substantive
terms, Obama appointee Margaret Bartley has a centered previous occupation value of just
under 0. Her predicted probability of ruling for a veteran is approximately 45%. However, her
colleague with a greater previous occupation, William P. Greene, Jr. at 11, has a 62%
predicted probability of deciding a case in favor of a veteran. For the conservative judges, the
result is substantively similar. Greater previous occupation expertise yields an increase in the
likelihood of deciding for a veteran for these judges. For example, George W. Bush appointee
Mary Schoelen has a centered previous occupation value of -9. According to the figure, the
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predicted probability of Schoelen voting in favor of a veteran is about 38%. In comparison,
fellow George W. Bush appointee William Moorman is coded as 13, which means his
predicted probability of ruling for a veteran is approximately 60%. Again, this is not the
expected result for Republican-appointed judges. Moreover, for values of previous occupation
greater than zero, liberal judges are more likely to rule for veterans than conservative judges.
However, both conservative and liberal expert judges are more likely than their less expert
counterparts to rule for veterans, reflecting the insignificant interaction term.
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Finally, Figure 13 presents the predicted probability of ruling for a veteran for various
ideological values across a range of years on the bench. Unlike with credentials and previous
occupation, Figure 13 reveals different effects for ideology across years on the bench. Among
judges with less than 10 years of experience on the bench, liberal judges are more likely to
rule in favor of the veteran than conservative judges. Among judges with more than eight
years of experience, conservative judges are more likely to rule for veterans than liberal
judges.63
63However, because I am examining CAVC decisions from 2010-2016, most of the judges with more than
twelve years of experience on the bench are senior judges whose decisions appear less frequently in the dataset
than active judges. Most of the decisions from 2010-2016 were made by active judges with less than twelve
years of experience. Moreover, only one of the four Democratic appointees on the court accrued more than 10
years of experience on the bench.
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Although the substantive effect size is small, conservative judges with more years on
the bench are more likely to rule for a veteran than are conservative judges with fewer years
on the court. Going from minimum to maximum values of years on the bench, a Republican
appointee moves from an approximately 44% predicted probability to a 50% predicted
probability of ruling for a veteran.64 This runs counter to my expectations in Hypothesis 2.
Also contrary to my expectations, liberal judges with greater experience on the court are less
likely to rule for a veteran than are their less experienced colleagues. For a Democratic
appointee, going from the minimum to maximum value of years on the bench decreases the
predicted probability of ruling for the veteran from about 60% to approximately 20%.65
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While this result does not comport with my expectations, it does fit with empirical
findings on how Supreme Court justices change their voting behavior over their tenures on
the bench. In fact, research by Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal and Spaeth (1998) and Martin and
Quinn (2007) find that justices do exhibit significant changes in their voting behavior as they
gain experience on the court. This finding matches with anecdotal evidence from the tenures
of Harry Blackmun and David Souter, both Republican appointees whose voting behaviors
64For Republican-appointed judges the minimum is four and the maximum is 23.
65For Democratic-appointed judges the minimum is zero and the maximum is 18.
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moderated, in the case of Souter, and even became liberal, in the case of Blackmun. Given
this work, it may be more fruitful to expect different effects for pre- and on-court expertise
components. Put simply, judges change when they are appointed to and gain experience on a
court. Applying this understanding to specialized courts seems an important avenue for future
exploration.
In sum, for single-judge decisions I have found some support for my hypotheses.
Democratic appointees often have a greater likelihood of ruling for veterans than conservative
judges, and Democratic appointees with greater previous experience have a greater likelihood
of issuing favorable decisions for veterans than such judges with less previous experience.
However, liberal judges with credentials and with more years of experience on the bench are
less likely to rule for veterans than liberal judges without credentials and with fewer years of
court experience. The finding for years on the bench, in particular, may stem from how judges
change their behavior once they join a court.
Turning to Table 9 and the results for the panel decisions analysis, column 1 presents
results for a model without interactions and column 2 adds the interactions between each
measure of expertise and ideology.66 In the first model, I find no effect for individual justice
ideology, but panel ideology is negative and significant, indicating that more conservative
panels are less likely to issue decisions for veterans. However, of the remaining variables,
only representation by counsel has a significant impact on a judge’s vote. In the interaction
model in column 2, counsel and panel ideology are again significant and retain the same sign,
and there is a significant interactive effect between ideology and credentials.
66As with the single-judge analysis, collinearity diagnostics reveal some cause for concern. Thus, I again
center Previous Occupation. I also run additional models with the variable for ideology also centered. See Table
46 in the appendix for these similar results.
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(0.023) (0.043)
Previous Occupation 0.016 0.051
(0.016) (0.036)
Chief Judge 0.156 0.181
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Separate Opinion 0.015 0.007
(0.152) (0.152)












Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Once again, I turn to predicted probability plots for proper interpretation. These plots
use the estimates from the interaction model in Table 9. Figure 14(a) presents the predicted
probabilities for different ideological values for judges with and without credentials. Liberal
judges with credentials are less likely to rule for veterans than liberal judges without these
qualifications. On the other hand, conservative judges with credentials have a slightly greater
likelihood of ruling in favor of veterans than their non-credentialed conservative counterparts.
This result runs counter to my expectations. Figure 14(b) shows these results in a different
light. Here, one observes the effect of possessing and not possessing expert credentials across
a range of ideological values. Again, expert, liberal judges are less likely to rule for the
veteran than liberal judges without expert credentials. However, a different result emerges for
conservative judges. As specified earlier, the ideological values for conservative judges in this
dataset are 0.557 and 0.693. These values are represented at the far edge of the x-axis in
Figure 14(b). According to this figure, these conservative judges are slightly more likely to
vote for veterans than are conservative judges who did not attend military institutions.
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Figure 15 shows the predicted probabilities for ideology across various values of
previous occupation. As expected, liberal judges with greater previous occupation values are
more likely to rule for veterans than liberal judges without such expertise. In contrast to my
expectation, the same pattern emerges for conservative judges. Moreover, conservative judges
are more likely than liberal judges to rule in favor of veterans for many values of previous
occupation. However, of the four Democratic appointees in the datasets, three have centered
previous occupation values greater than 9, where liberal judges are more likely to rule for
veterans than conservatives.
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Finally, Figure 16 depicts the predicted probabilities for ideology across years on the
bench. As expected, liberal judges with greater experience on the court are more likely to rule
for veterans. However, the effect for conservative judges is similar across years of experience.
Moreover, liberal judges are less likely to rule for veterans. Again, the similarity in slopes
between Republican and Democratic appointees matches with the non-significant interaction
term in Table 9. As with single-judge decisions, mixed findings emerge with respect to my
hypotheses.
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Discussion and Conclusion
While political scientists have devoted much attention to the role and consequences of
expertise and specialization in Congress and the bureaucracy, scholars have failed to
adequately examine specialization in the judiciary. A prevailing focus in the literature on
generalist courts, where the development of judicial expertise is limited, has prevented
researchers from fully exploring how expertise impacts judicial decisions. Building on the
work of Howard (2005) and Miller and Curry (2009), I explore the role of expertise, ideology,
and their interactive effect in the decision making of specialized courts, whose dockets are
filled by cases in more narrow areas of law. Focusing specifically on the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, I examine the influence of expertise on veterans benefits claims, and I
develop a more nuanced understanding of how the components of expertise vary across
specialized courts. Previous work has dichotomized expertise into two components: technical
qualifications/credentials and experience. In contrast to this literature that has emphasized the
role of technical qualifications/credentials, I argue that the years on the bench (experience)
component should be more operative on specialized courts where advanced degrees of any
kind are less relevant in aiding judges in adjudicating the court’s cases. Moreover, I depart
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from previous research by treating expertise as derived from both pre-court and on-court
components. In addition to experience on the court, I include previous occupations and other
relevant background characteristics in conceptualizing this component of expertise. I apply
this treatment of expertise to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, a court previously
subject to little empirical work and whose method of adjudication by single-judge is unique.
Using my self-collected datasets of approximately 10,500 CAVC single-judge and
1050 panel merits decisions from fiscal years 2004 to 2016, I find that while the newly
constructed measures of expertise have some effect on the decision making on the court, the
effect of a judge’s ideology is more limited. Importantly, this chapter finds a small role for
ideology in an area where judges might be expected to be less reliant on ideological
principles, as the interaction between years on the bench and ideology is significant in the
single-judge decision model and the interaction between credentials and ideology, as well as
the variable for panel ideology, is significant in the panel decisions model. This finding is in
keeping with Miller and Curry’s (2009) work on the Federal Circuit and Howard’s (2005)
work on the tax court. However, while an effect is present, the results are mixed with respect
to my expectations. Expert, liberal judges were sometimes less likely to rule for veterans than
their non-expert counterparts. Also, conservative experts were sometimes more likely to make
favorable rulings for veterans than their less expert conservative brethren. However, the
difference in predicted values for non-expert and expert conservative judges is often small,
particularly in panel decisions. Furthermore, it is important to note here that the effects for
liberal judges are dependent on only four judges.
In addition, the result for years on the bench in single-judge decisions may be
evidence that specialized court judges, like Supreme Court justices, change their behavior
once they begin serving on a court. Moreover, one may interpret this result as a general
learning effect over time that may reflect this court’s institutional mission to rule against
veterans. Indeed, some work on the CAVC suggests that the court is inclined against veterans’
claims (Cragin,1994; Hagel and Horan, 1994; Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 2005) and has
been captured by the executive branch (OReilly, 2001). Such a concern also recalls Judge
Richard Posner’s (1982) criticism of subject-matter specialization as creating monotony and
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tunnel vision in judicial work. Nonetheless, future research should consider different
expectations for how pre- and on-court expertise components interact with ideology to inform
decision making.
However, the insignificant interaction effects in the models above suggest another
narrative of judicial decision making in specialized courts. Conventional wisdom and neutral
virtue adherents suggest that greater specialization should make ideology less operative in an
environment where experts apply their specialized knowledge to consistently similar cases.
While Miller and Curry (2009) find an interactive effect between ideology and expertise on
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that court shares certain characteristics with
more generalist courts in that its subject-matter jurisdiction is not limited to one type of issue.
While the CAVC hears only cases that deal with veterans claims, the Federal Circuit considers
patents, federal claims, and cases on international trade, among other issues. Thus, Miller and
Curry’s findings in the Federal Circuit may reflect that court’s semi-specialized nature, while
the more limited jurisdiction of the CAVC may limit the influence of ideology in its decision
making. Indeed, these differences show the importance of developing different measures of
the three components of expertise for different specialized courts
Alternatively, another potential explanation for my unexpected results may lie with
how I have treated the liberal/conservative ideology. For judges deciding veterans claims
cases, the liberal/conservative ideology may break down along lines other than economic
policy. Issues concerning veterans, a politically popular constituency group, may tap into
considerations going beyond concern over government spending. Rather than tapping into an
ideology based on government spending, judges’ decisions in these cases may center around a
“support our troops” mentality, a frame traditionally owned by conservatives and Republicans.
Moreover, the result that liberal judges with greater years on the bench are less likely to rule
for the veteran may be suggestive of a relationship between the BVA and the court that has not
been fully explored. Future research examining this possibility is needed. Finally, using
presidential NOMINATE scores to measure ideology of judges is necessarily limited and may
not provide an accurate reflection of judicial ideology.
Ultimately, this chapter provides a novel approach to understanding expertise in
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specialized courts, applies this understanding to an understudied court in the federal judiciary,
and finds an effect for the interactive role ideology and expertise play in the court’s decision
making. Future work on specialization in the American judiciary should continue to explore
what consequences expertise has for jurisprudence in these more specialized settings,
particularly for those litigant groups who bring their cases and claims before specialized
courts.
Finally, while this chapter has tackled the form and function of expertise in judges, I
turn in the next chapter to expertise among a different set of actors in specialized courts.
Results in this chapter indicate that the presence of attorneys in the CAVC strengthens the
cases of many veterans. However, in Chapter 4, I go beyond examining only whether counsel
is present to considering the manner in which attorneys are effective in specialized courts.
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CHAPTER 4: REPEAT PLAYERS AND ATTORNEY ADVANTAGES IN
SPECIALIZED COURTS
Introduction
Compared to Congress and the federal bureaucracy, specialization in the United States
federal judiciary has been limited.67 However, the specialized courts created over the past
several decades have come to occupy an important place in the federal judiciary beyond
providing workload relief for the more familiar generalist courts, such as the U.S. Supreme
Court and the federal district courts. Charged with adjudicating cases in more narrow,
technical areas of law, specialized courts play an important role in shaping the direction of
legal policy in many important legal areas, including patents, veterans claims, taxes, and
bankruptcy.68 Given the increased transfer of jurisdiction over certain issue areas from
generalist to specialized courts, understanding how specialized courts differ from their
generalist counterparts is important for a full understanding of our judicial system.
In particular, the effect of litigant resources in specialized courts is an important and
relatively unexplored question. Because specialized courts consistently hear cases in the
same, specific area(s) of law, these courts necessarily encounter the same litigants time and
time again. In the generalist courts, particularly the Supreme Court, the resource advantages
possessed by wealthier or more experienced litigants often translate into frequent success
before the Court (Galanter, 1974; Sheehan, 1992; Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992).
67This limited specialization is due, at least in part, to a prevailing preference for generalist judges
among judicial scholars and legal practitioners who have criticized increased specialization in the judiciary.
Cheng (2008) writes that legal culture “celebrates the generalist judge...[and has] a deep-seated aversion to
specialization” (520-521). Martin Shapiro (1968) criticizes specialized judges because “they lose the one quality
that clearly distinguishes them from administrative lawmakers” (53). In agreement with Shapiro, Tenth Circuit
Judge Deanell Reece Tacha noted: “I like the fact that federal judges are generalists. I often say that judges
may be the last generalists left in professional life, and I have resisted mightily any suggestion that the federal
courts become specialized in any particular area.”(“20 Questions for Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, “How Appealing” blog (http://howappealing.law.com/20q/).
68Such courts include the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Tax Court, The Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, The Court of International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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Specifically, repeat experience before generalist courts is an important predictor of litigant
success.
Perhaps the most important resource litigants possess is the attorney they retain to
represent them. Called the high priests of American politics (Miller, 1995), attorneys play a
pivotal and ever-present role in all aspects of government. The impact of repeat player
attorneys in the generalist courts has been well-documented (Galanter, 1974; Haire, Lindquist
and Hartley, 1999; Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs, 2006; McAtee and McGuire, 2007;
Szmer, Songer and Bowie, 2016), and the empirical success of repeat attorneys has even been
extended to the comparative context (Szmer, Johnson and Sarver, 2007; Chen, Huang and Lin,
2014). However, little scholarly research has been conducted on the impact of the resource of
oral advocacy in specialized courts.69
Despite this lack of scholarly attention, the importance of attorney expertise in
specialized courts has not been ignored by corporations in recent litigation. For example, in
2012, Apple sued Samsung for violating Apple’s patent on its slide-to-unlock and other
features. After several iterations of court battles in a California district court and several
appeals to the federal circuit, Apple prevailed in an en banc70 ruling of the Federal Circuit.71
To represent their interests in the Federal Circuit, both companies retained two of the nation’s
most eminent patent attorneys, William F. Lee for Apple and Kathleen Sullivan for Samsung.
While Sullivan had made six arguments before the federal circuit, Lee has argued more than
50 times before this court, and it was Lee whose arguments prevailed in the case. Regardless
of the outcome, the choice of attorneys by both Apple and Samsung suggests that
mega-corporations have recognized what political scientists have not: that attorney expertise
matters in a specialized context. This knowledge helps explain why both companies hired
experienced and credentialed lawyers who were repeat players before the Federal Circuit.
69Exceptions include Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015).
70Most cases in federal appeals courts are heard by a panel of three judges. However, en banc cases are heard
by the full court.
71Joe Mullin, “Apple got its verdict back-$120M against Samsung” https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/10/apple-got-its-verdict-back-120m-against-samsung/.
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Yet this anecdotal account runs counter to the conventional understanding of the role
of specialized courts that focuses on legalistic or policy neutral goals, particularly the
development of expertise. Given their familiarity with the subject matter, expert judges, it
would be expected, should feel comfortable with their area of law, relying less on lawyers for
information. Ultimately, this should lead to better decision making (Baum, 2011). Some
scholars argue that the expertise of specialized court judges places them on an even playing
field with the agencies they review, which results in less deference to agency decisions
(Hansen, Johnson and Unah, 1995; Howard, 2005; Miller and Curry, 2013). While scholars
have demonstrated generalist courts’ greater deference to bureaucratic agencies, deference to
lawyers has not yet been shown (Sheehan, 1992; Humphries and Songer, 1999).72 However,
this literature suggests that the impact of repeat attorneys might be lessened when compared
with their role in generalist courts.
A growing body of literature, however, has cast doubt on the assumption that judicial
specialization has policy-neutral outcomes (Unah, 1997; Howard, 2005; Miller and Curry,
2009, 2013). Instead, the consequences of specialization may be more partisan and
policy-focused and less directed at meeting the organizational needs of the judicial system.
Unah (1997) finds that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit often rules to protect U.S.
industries from the unfair trade practices of foreign competitors. Similarly, specialized courts
respond differently to different regulatory agencies, depending on that agency’s institutional
makeup (Unah, 1997; Hansen, Johnson and Unah, 1995). Others have further argued that
specialization leads to narrow perspectives that create biases, limit understanding, and lead to
capture by external interests (Baum, 2011). The concentration of specific cases in a specific
court means that specialized court judges may consistently encounter the same litigants and
attorneys, a familiarity that may have important effects on judges’ decisions.
Given the consistent effect found for attorney capability advantage in generalist courts,
considering this element of litigant resources in the specialized context presents an excellent
opportunity to consider the competing expectations presented by critics of judicial
72See the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
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specialization, on the one hand, and scholars such as Hansen, Johnson and Unah (1995) on the
other. Moreover, this research has important implications for who wins and who loses in the
American political system. If wealthier litigants in specialized courts can simply hire more
expert attorneys, then the effectiveness of specialized courts is called into question. In this
chapter, I consider the role of attorney expertise through oral advocacy in patent cases before
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Specifically, I theorize two forms of attorney
expertise, substantive and process, and examine how these two types of expertise impact
judges’ decisions. I turn first, however, to a brief introduction of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is an Article III court that was created in
1982 by merging the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. The court has twelve active judges appointed by the
president and confirmed by the Senate. Like the other circuit courts, the judges of the Federal
Circuit serve lifetime tenures and possess salary security. The court is unique among the 13
circuit courts of appeals in that its jurisdiction is based on subject matter rather than
geography. The Federal Circuit possesses nationwide jurisdiction and hears appeals from both
specialized courts and bodies, such as the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, and the Court of International Trade, and generalist venues such as
federal district courts. The Federal Circuit hears a diverse range of cases, ranging from patents
to international trade and from veterans benefits claims to claims against the federal
government. Due to its varied jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
sometimes considered a semi-specialized court (Golden, 2009). However, the court is
particularly known for its patent jurisprudence. The patent bar was instrumental in the court’s
creation, and patent cases often comprise the plurality of the court’s docket (Baum, 1990;
Miller and Curry, 2013).73 It is the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence that forms the
73Miller and Curry (2013) report that patent cases comprised approximately 35 percent of the court’s time in
2008.
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universe of cases I analyze below. First, however, I present an overview of the literature on
party capability theory that forms the core of my theoretical expectations for the impact of
attorney expertise on specialized court decision making.
Party Capability Theory and Attorney Expertise
Judicial scholars have long considered how the stratification of the U.S. legal system
impacts who wins in court. The core division in the U.S. judicial system lies with the resource
differential that exists between litigants. The nature of this division is exemplified by the party
capability theory that originated with the work of Marc Galanter (Galanter, 1974).
Specifically, litigants with certain characteristics and resources possess advantages over the
less resource-laden opponents they face in court. Galanter’s work (1974) divides litigants into
a series of categories. First, litigants are either one-shotters, “claimants who only have
occasional recourse to the courts” or repeat-players, litigants “who are engaged in many
similar litigations over time” (97). Second, litigants can be classified as “Haves” or “Have
Nots.”74 Litigants who are classified as “Haves” are also often “repeat players” and their
greater resources translate into success in court (Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan and Friedman,
1987). The predictions of party capability theory have been confirmed in studies of the U.S.
Supreme Court (Ulmer, 1985; Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992), the courts of appeals
(Songer and Sheehan, 1992; Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 1999), and state supreme courts
(Wheeler et al., 1987).
This research used the identity of the litigant (federal government, business, union,
etc.) to consider the impact of resources on success rates, where litigants were organized in a
hierarchy of perceived resource advantage (Songer and Sheehan, 1992). However, beginning
with McGuire (1995), some scholars shifted the examination of litigant resource effects from
a focus on party capability to a focus on attorney capability. Attorneys are repeat players
themselves, and scholars demonstrated that previous experience before a particular court
74The Haves/Have Nots dichotomy is also called Upperdogs/Underdogs. Upperdogs/Haves include the
federal government and big business. Underdogs/Have Nots include the poor and minorities. The federal
government is often considered the most successful upperdog (Kritzer, 2003).
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constituted important resources for litigants that yielded great success (McGuire, 1995; Haire,
Lindquist and Hartley, 1999; Szmer, Johnson and Sarver, 2007; McAtee and McGuire, 2007;
Szmer, Songer and Bowie, 2016).
Existing literature considers attorney capability along two dimensions: substantive
expertise and process expertise (Kritzer, 1998; Haire, Lindquist and Hartley, 1999).
Substantive expertise refers to an attorney’s specialization in a substantive legal area. For the
purposes of this chapter, substantive expertise before the Federal Circuit would be
characterized as proficiency in patent law. Attorneys with substantive expertise possess
greater understanding of the minutiae or complexities of a particular area of law and should be
more skilled in their ability to frame the issues and facts of a case before a court. One can
consider substantive expertise to be credentials-based. For example, a lawyer who is a
member of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (patent bar) has passed the
USPTO’s registration exam and met the qualifications to represent patent applicants before the
USPTO. Thus, for attorneys arguing before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which hears primarily patent cases, being a member of the patent bar would constitute
substantive expertise. As Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015) argue, substantive expertise should
be particularly valuable for attorneys in courts where judges are not experts in a given area of
law. Thus, we might expect substantive expertise to be particularly important in the generalist
courts, whose wide jurisdictions do not afford its judges the ability to gain the same level of
substantive expertise as some of the attorneys who argue before them (Szmer, Johnson and
Sarver, 2007).
Process expertise, on the other hand, is expertise gained from experience on the court.
Attorneys who frequently appear before a given court develop a reputation for credibility
among judges and engender a certain degree of trust. Because these repeat players can expect
to continually litigate before the same judges, they have incentives to present their arguments
and information in a non-biased, fact-forward fashion to avoid incurring sanctions from the
judges (McGuire, 1995; Kritzer, 1998; Haire, Lindquist and Hartley, 1999; Miller, Keith and
Holmes, 2015). This method of advocacy may send an important signal to judges. A judge
who trusts such an attorney may be more likely to see the attorney’s arguments as credible,
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reliable, and worthy of consideration. Moreover, these attorneys benefit from the familiarity
they possess with a court’s judges, which allows them to target specific judges with specific
arguments. The effectiveness of process expertise has been examined in the Supreme Court
(McGuire, 1995; McAtee and McGuire, 2007), grievance arbitration hearings (Kritzer, 1998),
and the generalist courts of appeals (Haire, Lindquist and Hartley, 1999). Given the
substantive expertise possessed by specialized court judges, I expect an attorney’s process
expertise to be more impactful in the specialized context. The differences in process and
substantive expertise are presented in Table 10 below.75
Table 10: Attorney Expertise
Conceptualizing Attorney Expertise
Process Expertise Substantive Expertise
On-Court Expertise Pre-Court Expertise




Research on attorney capability/expertise has been limited in the specialized context.
To my knowledge, work by Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015) is one of the few studies to
consider the role of attorney expertise in specialized courts.76 In their examination of asylum
decisions of U.S. immigration courts, the authors find mixed results. While attorneys with a
specialty in immigration and those with greater experience do not lead to more successful
outcomes for their client, attorneys with higher levels of past success achieve more favorable
outcomes for the asylum applicants they represent.
Given the expectations regarding the effects of attorney expertise on case outcomes
in generalist courts, without considering the specific context of specialized courts, we might
75In the previous chapter, I treated judicial expertise as constituting three component parts: credentials,
previous occupation, and years on the bench (experience). In the context of this chapter, process expertise is
equivalent to years on the bench (experience), while substantive expertise encompasses both credentials and
previous occupation.
76Other studies have examined the impact of attorney representation in the specialized context. For example,
Lederman and Hrung (2006) find that the presence of an attorney before the Tax Court, as compared to self-
representation, improves some outcomes for clients.
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expect the following in generalist courts:
• As the process expertise of the appellant’s attorney increases relative to that of the
opposing party’s attorney, the appellant will be more likely to win the case.
• As the substantive expertise of the appellant’s attorney increases relative to that of the
opposing party’s attorney, the appellant will be more likely to win the case.
However, given the unique context of specialized courts, I expect attorney process expertise to
matter more than substantive expertise in explaining outcomes. In generalist courts, if an
attorney is a high-level expert on the subject of the case she is arguing, we would expect this
to help that attorney’s case because the judge relies on the attorney for specialized
information, for example on biochemical technology or tax law. In specialized courts,
however, that same attorney who is a subject-matter expert will not necessarily be more of an
expert than the judge, who because she hears cases about that subject all day is on more of an
equal footing with the attorney. So, for specialized courts, the substantive expertise of its
judges should lessen any advantages that attorneys have from being a subject-matter expert.
Patent lawyers and judges on the Federal Circuit should possess similar levels of substantive
expertise about patents, which means that judges should defer to attorneys less. Following
Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015), I expect that specialized court judges, who possess their
own expertise in the narrow areas of law they consider, will be less swayed by the substantive
expertise of attorneys in those same specific areas of law. However, attorneys with repeat
appearances may develop the process expertise advantages of trust, credibility, and familiarity
with the judges that may enhance their chances of winning, just like in generalist courts.
Process expertise means attorneys have a working relationship with the judges and the court.
They may know court staff members by name. They may know the order of how things are
done, and how the judges interact with one another. This presents the potential for important
advantages related to process expertise.
• Hypothesis 1: As the process expertise of the appellant’s attorney increases relative to
that of the opposing party’s attorney, the appellant will be more likely to win the case.
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• Hypothesis 2: As the substantive expertise of the appellant’s attorney increases relative
to that of the opposing party’s attorney, the appellant will not be more likely to win the
case.
Data and Methods
The data for this analysis include three-judge panel decisions in the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit issued between October 1, 2006, and September 30, 2017.77 To obtain
this data, I collected all Federal Circuit cases from fiscal years 2007-2017 available via
Lexis/Nexis Academic by using the search terms “United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.”78 This yielded a dataset of more than 16,000 cases. After downloading all
opinions from Lexis/Nexis, I used quantitative text identification tools available in R to clean
and prepare the text and to pull out relevant information from each opinion.79 I then excluded
all cases without an opinion (e.g., order cases, cases where the court disposed of a case for
lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, or for mootness), leaving only the court’s “merits
decisions” in which the court made a substantive ruling on a patent claim, more than 4,000
cases in total. Because I am interested in patent cases, I excluded all cases where the word
“patent” did not appear in the court’s opinion. I also excluded cases decided by an en banc
sitting of the court and cases where a district court judge was part of a three-member panel.
This process left me with about 2200 cases. I then took a random 25 percent sample, yielding
514 total cases.80 However, because I am interested in the impact of oral advocacy, I then
excluded any of the remaining cases that were not orally argued, leaving me 425 cases for
analysis. The unit of analysis in this study is the individual judge’s vote in each case. Like the
77Court decisions are tabulated by fiscal year. Thus, 2010 court decisions are from October 1, 2009 -
September 30, 2010.
78Court opinions were available via Lexis/Nexis Academic for fiscal years 1988-Present. However,
Lexis/Nexis Academic has recently shifted to Lexis Uni, which also includes Federal Circuit decisions back to
1982.
79Such information included the date the case was decided, the outcome of the case, the identity of the three
judges who decided the case, the identity of parties’ counsels, and the full text of the opinion.
80I used the sample command in Stata 13 to obtain these 514 total cases.
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other circuit courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit’s typical method of adjudication is the
three-judge panel. In total, my data set includes 1,367 individual judge votes.81 To obtain my
dependent variable, I hand-coded the outcome of each case as “1” if the judge voted for the
appellant (the lower court’s decision is reversed, set aside, or vacated and remanded) and “0”
if the judge voted to affirm the decision of the lower court or board.82 A number of cases
feature “mixed” votes, meaning that the judge affirmed in part and vacated/reversed in part the
lower court’s decision. I followed the coding scheme adopted by the Supreme Court Database
(Harold J. Spaeth and Benesh, 2018) and treated these “mixed” votes as votes for the
appellant.83
81This number is greater than the 1275 votes that would result from multiplying 425 by three due to the
following choices. First, while the majority of cases in my data set feature just two opposing attorneys (one
for the appellant and one for the appellee), there are approximately 70 cases where an appellant is opposed by
a cross-appellant. In these cases, both the appellant and cross-appellant are appealing a portion of the lower court
or board’s decision. Thus, I create an additional set of three judge votes in these instances and treat the cross-
appellant as the appellant for the portion of the case they are appealing. For example, in a hypothetical cases
such as Jane Doe, Appellant vs. Bob Smith, Cross-Appellant, I treat Bob Smith as the appellee for the portion
of lower court decision that Jane Doe is appealing. I then treat Jane Doe as the appellee for the portion of the
decision Bob Smith is appealing. I then code each judge vote with respect to how they treat the separate appeals.
There are a few instances where the court does not reach the cross-appeal in a case. In these cases, I only include
votes on the issue raised by the appellants.
Moreover, there are approximately 50 cases where different attorneys argue for different appellants or
appellees. For example, in the case Jane Doe, Appellant, and John Doe, Appellant, vs. Samsung, Appellee, Jane
Doe may be represented by Attorney A, and John Doe may be represented by Attorney B. In these cases, when
the court treats the appellants collectively and rules on their appeal together, I include only one set of three judge
votes. For the purposes of the Oral Argument Difference variable described below, I include the expertise values
of the attorney with the most process expertise. So I would model the expertise of Attorney A over B if A had
more experience arguing before the Federal Circuit. For these cases, if the court made separate rulings for the
two appellants, I create a second set of three judge votes such that Attorney A opposes the appellee’s attorney
on one issue, and Attorney B does the same on the other issue. I followed this same coding scheme when one
appellant opposes multiple appellees with different arguing attorneys. For cases where an appellant opposes
an intervenor and an appellee, and the intervenor and the appellee have different arguing attorneys, I choose to
include the expertise values for the attorney with greater process expertise. Finally, in a few cases, an appellant
opposes an intervenor, rather than an appellee. I treat these cases like appellant vs. appellee.
82Most cases dealing with patents and trademarks are appealed from the various federal district courts, the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (now the Patent Trial and Appeal Board), and the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board. A few are appealed from the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the
International Trade Commission.
83The Supreme Court Database notes in its coding of the variable, “Winning Party,” that “This variable
indicates whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory
the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating
and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable
one.” Moreover, the Database further notes: “The petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court
reversed..., reversed and remanded..., vacated and remanded.., affirmed and reversed in part.., affirmed and
reverse in part and remanded... or vacated.”
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Measuring Attorney Expertise
I create three variables to measure attorney expertise/capability. To measure attorney
process expertise, I followed existing literature by using previous oral advocacy as an
indicator of expertise acquired from experience (McGuire, 1995; Haire, Lindquist and
Hartley, 1999; McAtee and McGuire, 2007; Szmer, Songer and Bowie, 2016). For each
attorney, I counted the number of previous oral arguments before the Federal Circuit prior to
the current case. I acquired this information by downloading all Federal Circuit cases
available on Lexis/Nexis Academic from 1988-2017 and searching for the relevant attorney’s
name.84 I then used these two values to construct a relative measure of attorney expertise
before the Federal Circuit. Following Johnson, Wahlbeck and Spriggs (2006) and McAtee and
McGuire (2007), I took the natural log of each value and then subtracted the value for the
appellee’s attorney from the value for the appellant’s attorney.85 Thus, larger values of this
variable indicate greater relative process expertise for the appellant’s attorney relative to that
of the appellee’s attorney. Using this natural log transformation gives greater weight to
attorneys’ first few arguments and assumes that the difference between an attorney with two
previous arguments and an attorney with four previous arguments is more substantial than the
difference between attorneys with 27 and 29 previous arguments, respectively.86
I measure attorney substantive expertise with two variables: patent bar registration87
84Only cases that identify the attorney as the arguing counsel are included in the count of previous oral
arguments. Cases where the attorney is listed as “Of Counsel” or “for defendant-appellants/plaintiff-appellees”
are not included in this count. Lexis/Nexis Academic has recently shifted to Lexis Uni, which includes Federal
Circuit decisions all the way back to its inception in 1982. Thus, I am actually underestimating the total number
of previous arguments for some older attorneys.
85Because the natural log of zero is undefined, I take the natural log of 1 + the number of previous oral
arguments given by the attorney.
86As described in footnote 80 above, for cases with multiple appellants or appellees represented by different
attorneys, I use the process expertise value of the most experienced attorney. Frequency distributions of the
natural logs for the appellant and appellee attorneys’ previous arguments, as well as the difference between them,
are presented in Figures 31 and 32 in the appendix.
87This measure of expertise would constitute the previous occupation component of expertise articulated in
Chapter 3.
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and elite law school attendance.88 For the first variable, I coded whether each attorney was
registered as a patent practitioner by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
or worked as an attorney in the Office of the Solicitor in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. To acquire this information, I searched the USPTO’s online patent
practitioner database.89 However, because the database only includes current practitioners, I
occasionally consulted previous USPTO practicioner roster publications.90 I then created a
variable reflecting the relative level of substantive expertise of attorneys in each case. For each
case, I constructed the variable, “Difference in Patent Bar,” and coded the variable “1” if the
appellant’s attorney was registered as a patent practitioner but the appellee’s attorney was not;
“0” if the attorney’s from both sides were both registered (not registered) by the USPTO; and
“-1” if only the appellee’s attorney was registered.
Finally, I use the law school from which the attorney graduated as a second measure of
substantive expertise. I used the online Martindale database (martindale.com) to obtain law
school information for each attorney. For attorneys not included in the database, I obtained
their law school information by searching their law firm’s website, their personal websites,
and other attorney identification sites, including Westlaw. Since I am analyzing patent and
trademark cases, I coded whether each attorney received a JD or LLM from one of the schools
listed in the current U.S. News rankings of best law schools for intellectual property
(Stanford, UC-Berkeley, NYU, Santa Clara University, George Washington, University of
New Hampshire, University of Houston, American University, Boston University, Duke,
Texas A&M, and University of Pennsylvania).91 As with the other measures of attorney
expertise, I create a variable reflecting the relative level of substantive expertise of attorneys in
88This measure of expertise would constitute the credentials component of expertise articulated in Chapter 3.
89The USPTO database is available at https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/practitionerSearchEntryForm.jsp.
90For example, see the USPTO 1988 roster publication at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Roster% 201988.pdf.
91Obtained from U.S. News & World Report at https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/intellectual-property-law-rankings.
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each case. For each case, I constructed the variable, “Difference in IP92 Law School,” and
coded the variable “1” if the appellant’s attorney graduated from an elite IP law school but the
appellee’s attorney did not; “0” if the attorneys from both sides graduated (did not graduate)
from an elite IP law school; and “-1” if only the appellee’s attorney graduated from a top IP
law program.93
Controls
I also include a number of control variables. “Chief Judge” is coded “1” if the judge
was the Federal Circuit’s current Chief Judge at the time the case was decided. I also included
an indicator variable for whether the judge is serving as a senior status judge. “Per Curiam” is
coded “1” if the decision was issued without an opinion authored by an identified judge of the
court. Party capability literature demonstrates the great success enjoyed by the federal
government as a quintessential “Have” litigant (Kritzer, 2003). Thus, I also include an
indicator variable coded “1” if the federal government was a direct party and opposed the
appellant in the case as the appellee or as an intervenor. I include any case in this category
where the USPTO, the International Trade Commission, or the United States is a direct party.
Additionally, I include the continuous variable, “Fiscal Year,” to control for the linear effect of
year on a judge’s vote.
There is no ideal measure of the ideology of specialized federal court judges currently
in existence. Like the CAVC, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has its headquarters
in Washington, D.C., which has no senator. Thus, I cannot use the Giles, Hettinger, and
Peppers (2001) measure, which combines the ideology of same-state, same-party senators
with the ideology of the appointing president. Moreover, neither Judicial Common Space
92Abbreviation for Intellectual Property
93Following Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015), I also consider whether each attorney received a JD or LLM
from one of the top 10 schools in the current U.S. News rankings of law schools (Yale, Stanford, Harvard,
Chicago, Columbia, New York University, Pennsylvania, Michigan, UVA, Duke, Northwestern, UC-Berkeley)
obtained from U.S. News & World Report at https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/law-rankings. I then create a relative measure of expertise in the same manner as above. Substituting
this measure in the place of IP law school yields similar results.
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(Epstein et al., 2007) nor Martin-Quinn scores (Martin and Quinn, 2002) tapping justice
ideology are available for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Thus, I again use the
DW-NOMINATE score of a Federal Circuit judge’s appointing president as a proxy for the
judge’s ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000).94 Higher values for this measure indicate a
conservative ideology.
Existing research indicates that individual judges may be influenced by their
colleagues on the panel (Farhang and Wawro, 2004; Sunstein, Schkade and Ellman, 2004).
Moreover, Unah (1998) found that, on the Federal Circuit, the partisan composition of the
panel has a significant effect on how individual judges made decisions. Thus, I include “Panel
Ideology Median” as a variable that measures the median ideology of the three-judge panel. I
again use DW-NOMINATE scores for this variable.
Finally, previous research suggests that specialized courts treat the decisions of
generalist courts differently than the decisions of more specialized bodies on appeal (Hansen,
Johnson and Unah, 1995; Howard, 2010). Thus, I control for the source of the case with an
indicator variable, “District Court,” which is coded “1” if the case was appealed from a federal
district court.
Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table
11 below.
94Data available at https://www.voteview.com/data. DW-NOMINATE scores allow researchers to treat
presidents as if they voted on bills in Congress by estimating ideological scores based on presidential positions
taken on bill voted on by Congress. These scores are scaled along two dimensions. The first represents liberal-
conservative or government economic intervention. The second dimension represents racial issues.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics-Panel Decisions Data
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Appellant Win 0.474 0.500 0 1 1367
Difference in Attorney Experience -0.031 1.388 -3.602 4.673 1355
Difference in Patent Bar Registration -0.047 0.570 -1 1 1355
Difference in IP Law School -0.040 0.564 -1 1 1349
Federal Government Appellee/Intervenor 0.160 0.367 0 1 1367
Judge Ideology 0.130 0.520 -0.504 0.693 1367
Panel Ideology Median 0.123 0.493 -0.438 0.693 1367
Chief Judge 0.067 0.249 0 1 1367
Senior Judge 0.149 0.356 0 1 1367
Per Curiam 0.031 0.173 0 1 1367
Fiscal Year 2012.544 3.198 2007 2017 1367
District Court 0.750 0.433 0 1 1367
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression to analyze
the relationship between the outcome and predictor variables. I model the data in two ways.
First, I consider the data to be structured as cases within years within judge. Thus, I estimate
a mixed effects logistic regression model95 with a random intercept for judge ID. I use the
following basic model, where the dependent variable is whether the court issued a decision in
favor of the appellant:
yt =β0 + β1Difference in Attorney Experience + β2Difference in Patent Bar Registration
+ β3Difference in IP Law School + β4Federal Government + β5Judge Ideology
+ β6Panel Ideology Median + β7Chief Judge + β8Senior Judge + β9Per Curiam
+ β10Fiscal Year + β11District Court + Random Intercept for Judge ID + ε
However, I also model the data with a logistic regression model with robust standard
95I use the xtmelogit command in Stata 13. I also model the data using a mixed effects logistic regression
with a random intercept for judge ID and year, since judges appear in the data multiple times per year. These
results are depicted in Table 50 in the appendix. The results are substantively and significantly similar to the
other models reported in the body of the chapter.
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errors clustered by judge.96
yt =β0 + β1Difference in Attorney Experience + β2Difference in Patent Bar Registration
+ β3Difference in IP Law School + β4Federal Government + β5Judge Ideology
+ β6Panel Ideology Median + β7Chief Judge + β8Senior Judge ∗ β9Per Curiam
+ β10Fiscal Year + β11District Court + ε
Results
Column 1 of Table 12 presents the results from the mixed effects model, and Column
2 presents the results from the regular logit.97 In both models, I treat the substantive expertise
variables, “Difference in Patent Bar Registration” and “Difference in IP Law School,” as
categorical. Thus, each level of these variables receives a parameter estimate in the table, with
the “0” or “No Difference in Patent Bar/IP Law School Expertise” category as the excluded
baseline.98
The results across the two model specifications are quite similar. In both columns, the
variable tapping process expertise, “Difference in Attorney Experience,” is positive and
statistically significant. As the process expertise of the appellant’s attorney increases relative
to the appellee attorney’s, the appellant’s likelihood of winning increases.99 This result
matches with the expectation that greater relative process expertise would increase the
likelihood of winning a judge’s vote. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
With respect to the first measure of substantive expertise, “IP Law School,” one
96Clustering standard errors by case id yields similar results.
97Running a model using xtlogit in Stata 13 with Judge as the panel/group variable yields substantively and
statistically similar results. Moreover, I check for multicollinearity among my independent variables using the
collin package and command in Stata. The mean VIF is 1.27, indicating no problem with multicollinearity.
98Treating these variables as continuous yields almost identical results.
99There is certainly the potential for selection bias in this study. It can be argued that more capable attorneys
simply sit back and choose their cases based on their perceived likelihood of winning the case. Thus, this effect
may be an artifact of this selection.
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observes no statistically significant advantage accruing to either the appellant’s or appellee’s
attorney. When the appellant’s attorney attended an elite IP law school but the appellee’s
attorney did not (coefficient on “Appellant Attorney IP Law School”), the appellant is not
more likely to receive a judge’s vote than in the baseline category where there is no difference
in their IP law school attendance. Further, relative to the no difference baseline, the appellant
is not more likely to lose when the appellee’s attorney attended an elite IP law school but their
attorney did not (coefficient on “Appellee Attorney IP Law School”).
With respect to the second measure of substantive expertise, “Patent Bar Registration,”
when the appellant’s attorney is registered before the USPTO, but the appellee’s attorney is
not, the appellant is less likely to receive a judge’s vote, relative to the baseline category
where the two attorneys are both registered or both not registered (coefficient on “Appellant
Attorney Patent Bar”). On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference
between the baseline category and the scenario where the appellee’s attorney is registered and
the appellant’s attorney is not (coefficient on “Appellee Attorney Patent Bar”). Ultimately, the
results for both of these substantive expertise variables match my expectations that greater
relative substantive expertise would not improve the appellant’s chances of winning a judge’s
vote. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Turning to the control variables, four are statistically significant in both models. The
positive sign on the coefficient for “Panel Ideology Median” indicates that more conservative
panels are more likely to rule for the appellant. Moreover, as expected, the presence of the
federal government in opposition to the appellant reduces the likelihood of the appellant
winning.100 Interestingly, the coefficient on “District Court” is negative, indicating that
appellants are less likely to receive favorable votes on appeals from district court decisions.
This result is surprising in light of research suggesting that specialized courts are less likely to
affirm the decisions of generalist courts as compared with the decisions of more specialized
bodies (Hansen, Johnson and Unah, 1995). In this analysis, the Federal Circuit appears more
likely to affirm the decisions of the generalist District Court than the more specialized Patent
100Running the models without the variable for federal government yields similar results.
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Trial and Appeal Board, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, International Trade Commission,
and Court of Federal Claims. Finally, “Fiscal Year” is significant in both models.
Additionally, one other control variable is significant in the logit model. Appellants
are less likely to receive a judge’s vote when the court’s opinion is issued per curiam.
Table 12: Logit Results, Sample of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions
Mixed Effects Logit Logit
(Intercept) 74.757∗ 76.539∗
(40.396) (42.499)
Difference in Attorney Experience 0.114∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.043) (0.042)
Appellant Attorney Patent Bar -0.346∗∗ -0.350∗∗
(0.150) (0.146)
Appellee Attorney Patent Bar -0.194 -0.202
(0.138) (0.144)
Appellant Attorney IP Law School 0.045 0.042
(0.165) (0.167)
Appellee Attorney IP Law School 0.051 0.053
(0.150) (0.171)
Federal Government Not Appellant -0.537∗∗ -0.521∗∗
(0.210) (0.221)
Judge Ideology 0.044 0.058
(0.147) (0.159)
Panel Ideology Median 0.280∗∗ 0.286∗∗
(0.134) (0.103)
Chief Judge -0.083 -0.075
(0.247) (0.165)
Senior Judge 0.028 0.012
(0.172) (0.130)
Per Curiam -0.432 -0.437∗∗
(0.341) (0.219)
Fiscal Year -0.037∗ -0.038∗
(0.020) (0.021)
District Court -0.544∗∗ -0.542∗∗
(0.176) (0.124)
N 1346 1346
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
No Difference is excluded baseline category for Patent Bar and IP Law School
To better explore the impact of process expertise on a judge’s vote, I construct
predicted probability plots. Figure 17 presents this plot from the logit model in Table 12,
Column 2. Going from the minimum to maximum values of the difference in oral argument
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advocacy increases the likelihood of voting for an appellant by more than twenty percentage
points. When the two attorneys are of equal process expertise, the appellant has a predicted
probability of approximately 45 percent of receiving a judge’s vote. This increases as the
appellant’s attorney gains process expertise relative to the appellee’s attorney. Figures 18 and
19 present predicted probability plots for my two measures of attorney substantive expertise.
In the plots, the point estimate on the far left of the graph reflects the condition where the
appellee’s attorney, but not the appellant’s, is registered before the USPTO or attended an elite
IP law school. The middle point reflects the condition where both are registered/attended or
neither registered/attended. The estimate on the far right shows the condition where the
appellant’s attorney, but not the appellee’s, is registered before the USPTO or attended an elite
IP law school. In Figure 18, one observes a small decrease in the likelihood of the appellant
receiving a favorable vote when the appellant’s attorney is registered before the USPTO but
the appellee’s attorney is not. Ultimately, an appellant’s position is not improved by retaining
the services of an attorney with this form of patent expertise. In Figure 19, one observes little
movement across the three categories of the IP law school variable. Thus, an elite IP law
education does not place an attorney in a more advantageous position before the Federal
Circuit.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Firmly established in the literature on generalist courts, the role of attorney
capability/expertise is less well understood in the specialized context. In this chapter, I extend
the work conducted by Miller, Keith and Holmes (2015) and examine the impact of attorney
substantive and process expertise on the patent decisions of Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit judges. While some scholars decry the potential for undue litigant influence in
specialized courts, others point to the insulating role that expertise may provide specialized
court judges from the resource advantages inherent to certain classes of litigants. These
competing perspectives constitute the framework of this study, and ultimately, I find evidence
to support both predictions. While the substantive expertise of appellant attorneys has no
effect on the appellant’s likelihood of receiving a judge’s vote, their relative process expertise
does. This finding matches with the expectation put forward by Miller, Keith and Holmes
(2015). Because specialized court judges are more likely to possess substantive expertise in
the narrow area of law over which they preside, they should be less likely to defer to the
arguments of expert attorneys and less reliant on these attorneys for information. On the other
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hand, since these judges encounter some of the same attorneys over and over again, the
incentives existing for these attorneys to engender goodwill and trust among the judges they
practice before may provide important advantages for their clients.
Overall, these findings suggest that specialized courts are, in some ways, not all that
special when it comes to the impact of litigant resources, particularly the process expertise of
attorneys. Just like in the generalist courts, repeat attorneys possess advantages in specialized
courts. However, specialized courts are also unique in that an attorney’s substantive expertise
makes little difference. Put simply, attorney representation does matter in specialized courts.
This finding can also be seen in the third chapter of this dissertation that examines the votes of
judges of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. In that chapter, I find that veterans who
are represented by an attorney are more likely to receive favorable outcomes from the court
than are veterans who are self-represented. Future work should continue to explore the role of
litigant resources in specialized courts and extend the analysis conducted here by improving
my measures of substantive expertise, incorporating variables for previous attorney success
before the court, and considering how these variables may differ in their effectiveness across
different specialized courts. The mixed findings for process expertise variables by Miller,
Keith and Holmes (2015) suggest that the role of attorney expertise varies across courts.
Finally, this research continues to show that the inequity of resources in the American
political system has real consequences for who wins and who loses. For a litigant, these
results suggest that hiring a repeat player is the most effective method for winning in a
specialized court. Future research should seek to understand whether the most successful
attorneys are the same as the most expensive attorneys. If this is the case, successful
representation in a specialized court may be out of the question for many litigants. Finally,
future research should further study the effect of resources in specialized courts beyond
attorney representation. It is important to study the various factors that can give litigants
advantages in the specialized court system if we are to understand fully the important
institutional development of judicial specialization.
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CHAPTER 5: LIKE A DEAD FISH: THE EFFECT OF CHANGING STANDARDS OF
REVIEW IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
Introduction
Lawyers and legal thinkers have long assumed what judicial scholars have taken great
pains to empirically confirm: law constrains and influences judicial decision making. Legal
precedent is a central component of legal models of judicial decision making and states that
justices are constrained by past court decisions in making current decisions. Such efforts to
establish great influence for legal precedent have largely come up short, as ideological and
strategic explanations of courts’ behavior consistently outperform precedent in empirical
models (George and Epstein, 1992; Segal and Spaeth, 2002).101 However, ground-breaking
research on jurisprudential regimes offers an alternative formulation of how law factors into
judicial decisions. Articulated in a series of papers by Richards and Kritzer (Richards and
Kritzer, 2002; Kritzer and Richards, 2003, 2005), law is here treated not as a system of
precedent for judges to blindly follow but rather as an institutional construct that justices
create to emphasize certain case factors and to set the level of scrutiny to use. A
jurisprudential regime is a key precedent (decision) or a set of precedents that structures how
justices evaluate certain case factors in a given legal area. Richards and Kritzer have
suggested that key Supreme Court decisions in areas of law such as free speech and search
and seizure effectively changed the relevance of certain case factors and then changed how the
Supreme Court made decisions in that area of law. While the concept of jurisprudential
regime refers to a single area of law, this notion of law as an institutional construct can be
applied to a court’s standard of review, the amount of deference one court gives to the
decisions of other lower courts or administrative bodies. While standards of review are often
set by statute, judges have a considerable amount of discretion in their interpretation of that
101Exceptions include Songer and Lindquist (1996).
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standard. I posit that a change in how a court interprets its standard functions in a similar way
as a change in jurisprudential regime and has important implications for that court’s treatment
of litigants. In this chapter, I apply this understanding of law as a factor in courts’ decision
making to a more narrow category of American courts: specialized courts.102
Compared to their more generalist brethren (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S.
Courts of Appeals), specialized courts are charged with adjudicating cases in more narrow
legal areas, such as the Court of International Trade’s focus on unfair trade cases, and many
are staffed by judges without the same levels of independence and protection afforded the
generalist courts: lifetime tenure and salary security. In particular, I focus on the newest
specialized court in the federal judiciary: the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This
court provides an ideal scenario by which to test the impact of law on court decisions because
a brief change in how the court interpreted its standard of review allows me the opportunity to
conduct a natural experiment by comparing the rate at which it ruled for and against its
primary litigant, veterans, before and after its standard change.
Law, Standards of Review, and Jurisprudential Regimes
Under United State Code, the CAVC has “exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA).”103 However, the scope of the court’s review is limited
by law. The CAVC cannot subject findings of fact by the BVA to trial de novo104 and should
only reverse the BVA’s finding against a claimant if the finding is clearly erroneous. For most
of its history, the court has interpreted the “clearly erroneous” standard to mean that no
plausible basis in the record exists to support the BVA’s finding of fact. “If there is a plausible
basis in the record for the factual determinations of the BVA, even if this court might not have
reached the same factual determinations, we cannot overturn them...To be clearly erroneous,
102The majority of these courts are created by Congress through powers arising under Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution.
103Thirty-eight United States Code section 7252(a).
104Courts conducting de novo review may reconsider the issues tried in a lower court as if no previous trial had
taken place.
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the [decision being appealed] must be dead wrong.”105 Under this standard, a certain level of
deference to the BVA’s fact-finding is mandated.
To understand this standard of review, I turn to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the statute that guides court review of the rules and findings of federal agencies. The
APA illustrates three standards of review. The first, de novo review, is the most favorable to a
challenger of agency action. De novo review allows a court to essentially examine the full
prior case record without regard to an agency’s prior ruling. The second standard is more
limited and allows a court to reverse agency decisions if they are “unsupported by substantial
evidence.” The final standard is the most limited. Here, courts may only reverse agency
decisions if they are “arbitrary and capricious.” While the CAVC’s “clearly erroneous”
standard of review is distinct from the APA’s trichotomy, the standard is comparable to the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard, given that the CAVC is prohibited from engaging in de
novo review by statute.106 In the landmark 1990 decision, Gilbert v. Derwinski, the court first
interpreted the “clearly erroneous” standard to mean that no plausible basis in the record
exists to support the BVA’s finding of fact. “If there is a ‘plausible’ basis in the record for the
factual determinations of the BVA, even if this court might not have reached the same factual
determinations, we cannot overturn them.”107 Under the original interpretation of the standard,
the court understood that for a BVA decision “[t]o be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike
us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must ...strike us as wrong with the force of a
five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish. ” (Quoted in Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 759).108
Yet, on April 19, 2005, the court temporarily redefined its interpretation of its standard
of review to be a definite-and-firm conviction criterion. Arguing that the congressional
105Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990), quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969). Quoted in Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 759.
106Helfer (1992) notes some dissension among legal commentators over just how broad the “clearly
erroneous” standard is. Goldstein (1989) argues that the standard is the same as “arbitrary and capricious,” but
Stichman (1991) insists the standard is marginally broader.
107Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990), quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
108This quotation comes from Hicks v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 417, 422 (1995) in which the CAVC cited a ruling
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Veterans Benefits Act (2003) had effectively changed the CAVC’s standard of review, Judge
Kasold wrote: “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”109 This new standard essentially allowed the court to substitute
its own fact-finding in place of the BVA’s, which could make the court more likely to vacate
or reverse BVA decisions. This latter interpretation was effectively de novo review
(Lowenstein and Guggenheim, 2005). However, the case in which this interpretation was
developed was rendered moot on September 7 following the death of the veteran.110 While the
court’s standard remains “clearly erroneous,” the court’s continued use of “definite-and-firm
conviction” versus “no plausible basis” is unclear. Given this uncertainty, I have chosen to
consider the change in interpretation to have ended on September 7. Although the change was
only temporary, the court’s large caseload, 1,000 to 2,000 merits cases per year, means that
there was a sizable number of cases decided between April 19 and September 7. Excluding
cases dismissed for procedural reasons, such as mootness, lack of jurisdiction, etc., there were
approximately 200 cases decided in the interregnum. This presents an opportunity to test what
effect this temporary transition to a new interpretation of its standard of review had on the
court’s treatment of its litigants. Given that the new standard was, on its face, less deferential
to the BVA, I would expect that the court would rule in favor of the veteran more under the
new interpretation, reversing or vacating the decisions of the BVA to a greater extent than
before April 19.
• Hypothesis: The CAVC issued a higher percentage of decisions in favor of veterans
during the months it operated under the new interpretation of its standard of review.
As expressed in the introduction, I assert that the discretion with which courts can
reinterpret the mandates of their standards of review presents a potentially powerful
mechanism for alterations in judges’ decision making and a method to explore how law
109Padgett v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 133 (2005).
110As the court noted in the September 7 case: “Consequently, because claims for disability compensation
under chapter 11 of title 38, U.S. Code, do not survive a veteran, when a veteran dies while appealing a Board
decision to the Court, there no longer remains a case or controversy and the Court must dismiss the appeal.”
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impacts decision making. I posit that, like the concept of jurisprudential regimes, standards of
review function as legal constraints that guide how judges approach cases. “Jurisprudential
regimes structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which case factors are
relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny the justices are to employ
in assessing case factors” (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 315). In this framework, the Court’s
1972 decisions in Grayned v. Rockford and Chicago Police Department v. Mosley established
a content-neutrality regime that altered how the Court viewed free expression (2002).
Moreover, the Court’s 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman changed how the Court
considered Establishment Clause cases (Kritzer and Richards 2003). Importantly, this
approach does not assert that attitudinal factors are not important for understanding Court
decisions. Rather, this framework complements models like those in the previous chapter that
consider the impact of expertise and ideology, as well as strategic factors. It asserts a novel
role for law as a filter through which various decision elements, which include justices’ policy
preferences or desires for strategic action, impact justices’ decisions.111 Changes in how a
court interprets its standard of review functions in a similar way as a change in jurisprudential
regime and has important implications for that court’s treatment of litigants. Adopting an
interpretation of its standard of review that is less deferential provides greater latitude for
judges to make decisions more in line with their policy preferences.
Moreover, the role that law plays in constraining court decisions is important for
helping scholars to understand the nature of specialized courts’ relationships with the federal
agencies they review. Conventional understanding of the role of specialized courts focuses on
legalistic or policy-neutral goals, what Baum (2011) calls the three neutral virtues: efficiency,
quality, and uniformity. Here, specialized courts allow its justices the opportunity to develop
the expertise to deal with complicated technical cases and lessen the caseload of the generalist
courts, as jurisdiction over technical matters is transferred to panels or tribunals of experts.
Expert judges should be more versed in their respective body of law and should rely less on
litigants for information. For specialized court judges, this expertise, along with hearing
111Richards and Kritzer (2002) write that “what the regimes approach allows that other institutionalist
approaches have not succeeded in doing is incorporating a role for law in testable models of the justices’ votes”
(309).
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similar types of cases, should lead to higher quality judicial outputs and better decision
making (Baum, 2011).
However, recent research has called into question claims that judicial specialization
has policy-neutral outcomes (Unah, 1997; Howard, 2005; Miller and Curry, 2009, 2013).
Rather, this research is concerned with the possibility that specialization may have more
partisan and policy-focused consequences. Of particular concern is whether specialized courts
are captured by the agencies and litigants whose cases they review. The possibility of
non-neutral outcomes has led to concern that specialized courts may be subject to capture by
the agencies they review or by the litigants that appear before them.112 Fear that specialized
courts would produce outcomes disproportionately favorable to certain groups over others has
long pervaded the legal discourse over such courts.113 According to Dahl (1963) and Baum
(1977), for a litigant or agency to capture a court, the non-court actor should cause the court to
produce outcomes in cases that it would not otherwise produce. By its nature, specialization
leads to a concentration of judicial business in a particular venue. The potential for a group’s
influence, then, is related to whether it conducts most of its litigation in the court and whether
the court’s caseload is dominated by the group. Interest groups may influence specialized
courts either directly through case proceedings or indirectly by influencing how members of
the court are selected. Concentration of an agency’s litigation activity in a specialized court
underlies research that reveals Tax Court favoritism toward the federal government and the
IRS (Kroll, 1996; Maule, 1998; Smith, 2005; Billings, Crumbley and Murphy, 1992),
reflected in the government’s high winning percentage in the Tax Court, the higher winning
percentage of taxpayers in district courts,114 and the prior service of many of its judges in the
112The concept of agency or “regulatory” capture first originated, and continues to occupy the attention of a
legion of scholars, in the area of the bureaucracy and public administration (Huntington, 1952; Stigler, 1971;
Wilson, 1974; Yackee, 2013). Defined by Richard Posner (2013) as “the subversion of regulatory agencies by
the firms they regulate” (49), public bureaucracy scholars have used capture theory to evaluate the influence of
railroad interests (Huntington, 1952), public utilities (Gormley Jr, 1982; Berry, 1984), and the finance (Johnson
and Kwak, 2011; Kwak, 2013) and insurance industries (Schwarcz, 2013) on the regulatory policy-making
decisions of bureaucratic agencies.
113The Commerce Court, for example, was abolished after only thee years of operation in 1913 due to concern
that the court favored railroad interests (Dix, 1964; Baum, 1977).
114A wealth of literature agrees that taxpayers have higher winning percentages in the district courts (Geier,
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Treasury and Justice departments.
At a broad level, the question is about the nature of judicial independence in
specialized courts. If a specialized court is formed for a specific purpose, such as to explicitly
favor the federal government in the case of the original Court of Claims, for example, does
that organizational “mission” influence the decisions of the court once it begins operation?
Concern about potential agency capture abounds, and we must ask whether such courts defer
disproportionately to the agencies they are charged with overseeing.
Alternatively, scholars have argued that the development of expertise makes
specialized court judges less deferential to the agencies they review (Hansen, Johnson and
Unah, 1995; Howard, 2005; Miller and Curry, 2013). Their expertise makes these judges more
assertive and confident than their generalist court counterparts in considering the decisions of
federal agencies (Baum, 2011).115
Ultimately, scholars are divided as to how the imposition of specialization in the
judiciary affects outcomes on a given court. This chapter, while not delving deeply into the
question of capture, provides a look at agency deference in specialized courts by examining
the relationship between a specialized court, the CAVC, and the agency it reviews, the BVA.
Data
The data for this chapter include CAVC decisions issued between October 1, 2004,116
and September 7, 2005. To obtain this data, I collected all 929 court opinions from 2005 using
Lexis/Nexis Academic.117 After downloading all opinions from Lexis/Nexis, I used
1990; Caron, 1994, 1996; Howard, 2005).
115See the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
116Court decisions are tabulated by fiscal year. Thus, 2005 court decisions are from October 1, 2004-
September 30, 2005.
117Court opinions are available via Lexis/Nexis for fiscal years 1990-2017. There is a discrepancy between the
total number of cases decided in FY 2005 by the CAVC’s Annual Report and the number retrieved from Lexis.
The Annual Report indicates there should be around 1900 total decisions. While the Annual Reports for other
years also differ from the cases retrieved from Lexis, the disparity is much larger in 2005. I called both Lexis
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quantitative text analysis tools available in R to clean and prepare the text and to pull out
relevant information from each opinion. I then excluded all cases where the court disposed of
a case for lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, or for mootness, leaving only the court’s
“merits decisions” in which the court made a substantive ruling on a veteran’s claim for
benefits, 433 cases in total.
To obtain my dependent variable, I coded the outcome of each case as “1” if the court
ruled for the veteran (the BVA’s decision is reversed, set aside, or vacated and remanded), “0”
if the court affirmed the BVA’s decision, and “-1” if the court issued a mixed decision (both
for and against the veteran).118 To conduct the analysis that follows, I transform the data so
that my dependent variable is the percentage of the court’s decisions in favor of the veteran.
The primary analysis below is conducted at the weekly level.119 The number of observations
is 50 since that is the number of weeks in the dataset. In Table 13 below, “Pre” refers to the
weeks up to and including the court’s decision in Padgett, where the court altered its
interpretation of its standard of review. “Post” refers to the weeks after the court’s decision in
Padgett.
I also include three control variables. Because the CAVC primarily makes its decisions
by single-judge disposition, I include an indicator variable coded “1” if the chief judge issued
the decision, which allows me to compare the behavior between chief and associate judges. I
also include a variable coded “1” if the decision was made by a panel of three judges or by an
en banc sitting of the court. The three-judge panel is not typically used in the CAVC but is the
primary method of disposition for the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Research indicates panel
decision making has important differences from other means of adjudication (Farhang and
Wawro, 2004). Finally, I include an indicator variable for whether the veteran had the
and the court, but have not had my calls returned. A search of decisions on the court’s website returns about 900
cases.
118There are 39 of these mixed decisions in the dataset. While they are included to obtain percentages, I do not
treat these as decision for veterans.
119I treated week as Monday to Sunday. The Court’s first case during the 2005 fiscal year was decided on
October 1, which was a Friday. Thus, week 1 is October 1-3 in my analysis. Week 2 is Monday, October 4-
Sunday, October 10.
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representation of counsel before the court. Prior to the creation of the CAVC, attorneys were
prohibited from appearing on behalf of a veteran during the claims adjudication process if
their fees exceeded ten dollars. With the creation of the court, veterans gained greater
opportunity to obtain counsel. Because the CAVC rarely holds oral arguments, a veteran
represented by counsel would likely see benefits in the form of help in crafting legal appeals
and briefs, and chapters 3 and 4 have found important effects for the presence of attorneys in
specialized courts. Thus, I would expect veterans represented by counsel to do better than
non-represented veterans on average, due to attorneys’ expertise in legal filing and in
presenting effective arguments in legal form. I then transform each of these variables, so each
variable is the percentage of cases each week where counsel represented the veteran, the chief
judge issued the decision, and a decision was made by a three-judge panel or by the court
sitting en banc. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 13 for all time
periods, the pre (control) period, and the post (treatment) group, respectively. Looking at the
means for the dependent variable, “Percentage for Veteran,” one observes that the post
period’s percentage is much smaller than the pre period’s, a relationship that is at odds with
my hypothesized relationship. Moreover, the mean for percentage panel decision is very
small, which reflects the CAVC’s proclivity for single-judge adjudication. Finally, attorneys
represent veterans in the majority of cases.
Table 13: Summary Statistics: Weekly Data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N
Percentage Chief All Periods 0.261 0.221 0 0.833 N=50
Pre 0.305 0.193 0 0.667 N=30
Post 0.195 0.248 0 0.833 N=20
Percentage Panel All Periods 0.076 0.121 0 0.5 N=50
Pre 0.079 0.127 0 0.5 N=30
Post 0.071 0.114 0 0.333 N=20
Percentage Counsel All Periods 0.599 0.227 0.167 1 N=50
Pre 0.581 0.208 0.214 1 N=30
Post 0.626 0.258 0.167 1 N=20
Percentage for Veteran All Periods 0.417 0.271 0 1 N=50
Pre 0.510 0.274 0 1 N=30
Post 0.277 0.204 0 0.667 N=20
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Methods
In order to examine the causal effect of the court’s standard of review change on its
treatment of litigants, I employ a regression discontinuity/interrupted time series design,
which allows me to use the court’s abrupt shift in its standard of review to analyze the role of
law in specialized court decision making. The analysis below is conducted at the weekly
level, so the effect is after week 30, and the cutoff equals “Week 31,” because week 31 is the
first week the new standard went into effect.120 Because my running variable, “Week,” is time,
this is technically an interrupted time series design.
The basic form of the equation I estimate is depicted in Equation 1 below where
%Veteran is my dependent variable, percentage of decisions issued for veterans each week.
The running variable, “Week 31,” is an indicator variable that equals one if the decision
occurred at week 31 or after, and f(Week) is a stand-in for the flexible polynomial of the trend
that I will model in different forms on either side of the cutoff. I use a number of alternate
trend specifications. First, I model the equation with a single linear trend, as in Equation 2,
where the forcing variable Xi (which is the running time variable, “Week”) is centered around
the cutoff and is a variable equal to zero when the observation is at week 31. β1 is the
discontinuity or treatment effect and represents the difference in intercepts for the pre- and
post-cutoff groups at the cutoff. In Equation 2, because I have modeled only a single linear
trend, δ is the value of the slopes for the pre- and post-trends. Next, I move beyond this single
linear trend in Equation 3, which adds a separate trend for the post-cutoff group. Here, δ1 is
the slope for the pre-trend, β is still the difference in the intercepts for the before and after
cutoff groups at the cutoff, and δ1+δ2 is the slope for the post trend. Finally, I also model the
120In my analysis, I remove the four cases decided after Padgett in week 30. I do so because these cases may
be considered part of the post period. Thus, including them in week 30 means week 30 is not purely part of the
pre period. In Table 51, I present the results of analyses where these four cases are included as part of week 31.
Because they are decided after the Court’s shift in its interpretation of its standard of review, they can logically
be considered part of the post period. Results in Table 51 are substantively and significantly similar to those
presented in Table 14.
100
trend with a quadratic term in Equation 4.
%V eteran = α + β1(Week31i) + δ ∗ f(Week)i + εi (1)
Y = α + β1(Xi ≥ Week31) + δ(Week − 31) + εi (2)
Y = α + β1(Xi ≥ Week31) + δ1(Week − 31) + δ2(Week − 31) ∗ 1(Xi ≥ Week31) + εi
(3)
Y = α + β1(Xi ≥ Week31) + δ1(Week − 31) + δ2(Week − 31)2 + εi (4)
Regression discontinuity assumes that other determinants of the outcome variable,
decisions for the veteran, are continuous at the week 31 cutoff. Essentially, this method
assumes that a discontinuity exists only at the specified cutoff. To test this assumption, I
perform a number of placebo tests by arbitrarily assigning a different cutoff and examining
whether a discontinuity is present. I also test the robustness of my findings by estimating
models using different bandwidth specifications with different functional forms, including and
excluding controls (Tables 15 and 16). Finally, in the models that follow, I cluster standard
errors by week.
Results
Table 14 presents the results from five different regression discontinuity models.
Columns 1, 2, and 5 present models without controls and vary the functional form of the trend
specification, while columns 3 and 4 add control variables, using a single linear trend and pre-
and post-linear trends. Column 1 presents results using a single linear trend and no controls.
The discontinuity effect is statistically significant but negative. I hypothesized that the court’s
change in standard would have increased the percentage of decisions issued for veterans, but
this result runs counter to this expectation. The effect is substantively large as well, as the
discontinuity effect is a decrease of almost 37 percentage points at week 31, the first week
under the new standard of review. The coefficient on the linear trend indicates a very small
increase in the percentage of decisions for a veteran each week, but the effect is not
statistically significant. Column 2 adds a second linear trend for the post-cutoff period. Again,
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the discontinuity effect is statistically significant, but negative. The substantive effect size is
slightly smaller but still rather large. The coefficient on the linear trend is the slope for the
pre- or control period. Before week 31, the court saw a positive trend in its percentage of
decisions for veterans. The added parameter for the post- or treatment period indicates that
after week 31, there is a negative trend in the court’s percentage of decisions for veterans.
This effect is substantively small and statistically insignificant. The use of separate trends for
the pre- and post-periods appears to better fit the data than using a single linear trend.
Column 5 presents results when the data are fit with a quadratic trend. In this
specification, the discontinuity effect is substantively and statistically similar to the effect in
Columns 1 and 2. The coefficient on the quadratic trend is also significant. Adding full
controls to the model in column 3 yields a smaller effect size, but the discontinuity effect
remains statistically significant. In addition, a greater percentage of panel decisions per week
leads to an increase in the percentage of decisions for veterans. Column 4 introduces a post
linear trend. The discontinuity effect remains significant. Moreover, when a greater
percentage of cases have counsel present and when the court issues a panel decision, the
percentage of cases per week in favor of veterans increases. In this specification, the
discontinuity effect reaches statistical significance. Overall, these five specifications yield
consistent results. The discontinuity effect size is consistently negative, statistically
significant, and substantively large.
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Table 14: Weekly Regression Discontinuity Results
No Controls No Controls Full Controls Full Controls No Controls
(Intercept) 0.594∗∗ 0.634 ∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.598∗∗
(0.091) (0.107) (0.124) (0.126) (0.093)
Discontinuity Effect -0.369∗∗ -0.327∗∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.228∗∗ -0.282∗∗
(0.140) (0.133) (0.120) (0.113) (0.140)
Linear Trend 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.004 -0.0002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)








Chief Justice -0.024 -0.008
(0.206) (0.208)
Functional Form Linear Pre and Post Linear Pre and Post Quadratic
N 50 50 50 50 50
R2 0.204 0.221 0.363 0.377 0.237
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Week in Parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Clearer evidence for the existence of the discontinuity effect is presented in the
graphical representations in Figures 20 and 21. Figure 20 shows the discontinuity effect for
different functional forms without the control variables, while Figure 21 does the same for the
models including the control variables. In both figures, a sizable discontinuity appears evident
at the week 31 cutoff, regardless of how the trend is modeled and whether control variables
are included.
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I further explore this apparent discontinuity with a series of robustness checks. First, I
evaluate whether the method’s identifying assumption is valid in this case. Regression
discontinuity assumes that other determinants of the court’s decisions should vary
continuously over the cutoff, and only the court’s standard of review should vary
discontinuously at the week 31 cutoff. To examine this assumption, I conduct four sets of
placebo tests by assigning cutoffs to different weeks and observing whether a discontinuity
emerges. The graphical results of these placebo tests are presented in Figures 22 and 23. The
graphs in Figure 22 show discontinuities when the cutoff is placed at week 19 and week 24,
respectively, and the graphs in Figure 23 show discontinuities when the cutoff is placed at
week 28 and week 32. Ultimately, there is mixed evidence for whether the method’s
assumption is violated. While cutoffs relatively close to the true cutoff show a distinguishable
discontinuity, cutoffs placed further away from the true cutoff demonstrate little or no
discontinuity. Moreover, coefficients for the discontinuity effect variable reach conventional
levels of statistical significance in the model for week 32. With the exception of the model for
the week 32 cutoff, the substantive effect sizes are never as large as those for the true cutoff
models above. The results for the week 28 cutoff may indicate anticipation of the impending
standard change on the part of the judges, and the week 32 results may indicate a delayed
reaction.
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I also estimate model specifications using different bandwidths, each with different
functional forms to model trends. Tables 15 and 16 present the results of these models. I use
three different bandwidths, weeks 10-40, 15-35, and 25-32, to observe how the discontinuity
changes with the exclusion of data around the cutoff. For each bandwidth, I model the trend
as a single linear trend, with pre- and post-cutoff trends, and as a quadratic. I also model the
discontinuity effect including and excluding controls. The discontinuity effect is consistently
negative and substantively large for each bandwidth, but the effect is statistically significant
only for four out of the nine models.121 While this is expected due to the loss of observations
in the final two bandwidths, the addition of controls also yields no statistically significant
results. Thus, I am left with a certain level of doubt over the validity of the findings reported
above. Graphs are not presented due to space limitations, but they reveal the same general
patterns presented in Figures 20 and 21.122
Table 15: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Different Bandwidths and Specifications
Bandwidth Week 10-40 10-40 10-40 15-35 15-35 15-35
Functional Form Linear Post Quadratic Linear Post Quadratic
No Controls
Discontinuity -0.291 −0.427∗∗ −0.555∗∗ -0.408∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.530
(0.178) (0.180) (0.203) (0.204) (0.191) (0.310)
With Controls
Discontinuity -0.086 -0.201 -0.248 -0.072 -0.113 -0.118
(0.148) (0.142) (0.148) (0.160) (0.225) (0.299)
Observations 31 31 31 21 21 21
R2 No Controls 0.200 0.266 0.305 0.275 0.276 0.290
R2 With Controls 0.467 0.510 0.493 0.492 0.497 0.493
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Week in Parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
121The significance attained using separate trends for the pre and post periods provides further evidence that
modeling the data in this manner is the most appropriate methodological choice.
122Finally, estimating the regression discontinuity with a linear probability model (LPM) yields substantively
similar results but falls just short of conventional levels of statistical significance. Here I do not collapse the
data to weekly percentages but simply keep the binary coding of the variables and run a linear regression. These
results are available upon request.
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Table 16: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Different Bandwidths and Specifications
Bandwidth Week 25-32 Week 25-32 Week 25-32
Functional Form Linear Post Trend Quadratic
No Controls
Discontinuity -0.662 -0.567 -0.607
(0.358) (0.349) (0.495)
With Controls
Discontinuity -0.440 -0.351 0.526
(0.754) (1.012) (0.691)
Observations 8 8 8
R2 No Controls 0.400 0.440 0.402
R2 With Controls 0.675 0.747 0.929
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Week in Parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Discussion
The results above are puzzling and logically inconsistent. The adoption of a less
deferential standard should have increased the court’s percentage of decisions for veterans.
However, there are a number of potential limitations that future research should address. The
first are theoretical. It is possible that the results indicate a pattern of counter-correction in
that the court had previously favored veterans at too high a level.
Another possible explanation is that the court has been captured by the BVA. The new
standard may have allowed the court to increase its bias toward the BVA once it was given
more freedom to pursue an investigatory role. Some work on the CAVC suggests that the
court is inclined against veterans’ claims (Cragin, 1994; Hagel and Horan, 1994; Lowenstein
and Guggenheim, 2005) and has been captured by the executive branch (O’Reilly, 2001). This
perceived deference to the BVA is also supported by congressional attempts at modifying the
court’s standard of review, a signal that Congress viewed the relationship as too cozy (Sisk,
2003). However, Baum (2011) reports that the court fully or partially reversed or vacated
BVA decisions in more than one-quarter of its decisions on the merits from 2000 to 2009. If
the court is indeed captured by the agency it reviews, one should find patterns of
disproportionate deference to Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions. Future research should
investigate the validity of this explanation. However, other research I have conducted on the
CAVC suggests a fairly equitable treatment of veterans by the court. In the court’s merits
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decisions from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2016, the CAVC issued a decision favorable to
the veteran in almost of its approximately 9,300 cases.123 This data is presented in Table 17.
Table 17: Percentage of CAVC Merits Dispositions 2010-2016
Reversed/Vacated and Remanded/Remanded Affirmed Number of Cases
47.58 52.42 9350
Moreover, Lowenstein and Guggenheim (2005) report that the CAVC was made aware
of the veteran’s death only days after their April 19 decision. Yet this information still does
not explain the above findings. If this information mattered, there should be no discontinuity
effect rather than a negative effect. Also, the court did not act on this knowledge for six
months before finally dismissing its previous ruling.
The second set of limitations are methodological in nature. The current study is
hampered by the paucity of observations. Using data collapsed to the weekly level only
provided 50 observations. This small n problem could be improved by further considering
evidence of whether the court reverted to its original standard. Because the CAVC’s new
interpretation of its standard was seemingly invalidated on a technicality, and never by a
decision on the merits, the judges of the CAVC may have continued to apply the new standard
in the years after 2005. Future work should use these same methods to test this proposition
and also to solve the potential data limitations. Thus, the CAVC’s decisions could be coded
weekly, biweekly, or monthly from 2000-2005 as the pre-cutoff data and from 2006-2010 as
the post-cutoff data. Also, this study only examines the Court’s decisions up to the week it
reverted back to its old standard. Thus, future research should investigate whether the court’s
percentage of decisions for veterans continues to exhibit the same patterns after September 7
as it did from April 19 to September 7. Moreover, one could avoid collapsing the data to the
weekly level and use a logistic regression model, while still using a regression discontinuity
design. According to Berk and Rauma (1983), “logistic’s argument is in this instance nothing
more than the original linear-regression equation,” which “leaves the regression-discontinuity
principles intact” (23). Finally, the external validity of this study is limited given that I have
123I consider CAVC decisions that reverse, vacate and remand, and set aside the decisions of the BVA to
constitute decisions favorable to the veteran.
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examined just one rather unique court. Future work should look to other similar courts and
apply these methods to those that have also changed their standards of review. If the pattern
holds that other specialized courts do not move in the expected way (more or less lenient),
then attitudinal or institutional factors may be important explanatory factors for understanding
these judges’ actions.
Conclusion
While the results are puzzling and the robustness checks cast doubt on the validity of
the findings, focusing on a court’s change in its standard of review provides a more nuanced
way of evaluating the role of law in judicial decision making than just looking at legal
precedent. Like the concept of a jurisprudential regime, a court’s standard of review sets the
institutional boundaries in which judges can operate, and based on the results from this study,
different standards of review can lead to different outcomes for classes of litigants. In this
case, veterans may be disadvantaged by less legal restrictions on the CAVC’s jurisprudence.
Moreover, this study has implications for scholars attempting to understand the relationship
between specialized courts and the agencies they review. Court scholars are divided as to the
nature of this relationship, with some decrying a perceived cozy relationship and others
emphasizing the role that expertise plays in granting sufficient ability for specialized courts to
avoid capture. While this study provides a look at one aspect of this relationship with respect
to the CAVC and the BVA, it does not adjudicate between these competing considerations.
Finally, the uncertainty surrounding the CAVC’s continued use of its
”definite-and-firm conviction” interpretation of its standard of review has been criticized.
Lowenstein and Guggenheim (2005) argue that this new standard creates problems, including
exceeding the court’s statutory authority, placing greater strain on both the court’s and the
BVA’s resources, extending the delay in deciding cases, and making BVA decisions more
adversarial (785). The authors argue that if the court engages in more de novo type review, the
quality of its decisions would be diminished, and veterans would be adversely affected since





Professional life in industrial economies is characterized by specialization.
Specialization is necessary for attaining proficiency in one’s vocation or trade. Athletes
specialize by position, from the basketball point guard to the football wide receiver.
Symphony musicians specialize in particular instruments. And even academics, particularly
those writing dissertations, specialize in specific, niche topics. Perhaps surprisingly, the
American judiciary has been slow to adopt such specialization, and a prevailing preference for
generalist judges perseveres in the American judicial landscape, particularly among legal
practitioners such as Judges Deannell Reece Tacha and Richard Posner.124 Legal scholars
have even noted a celebration of the generalist model of judging (Cheng 2008, 520-521).
While specialized courts are not a new development in American politics, there has
been great growth over the past several decades, particularly at the state and local level with
the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. At the federal level, the judiciary saw the
introduction of a number of unique and issue-specific jurisdictional courts in the 1970s and
1980s, including the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the late 1970s
and the Court of International Trade, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s. The growth of specialization at the federal level
continued through the end of the decade. The creation of the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims gave veterans the right to judicial review over the VA’s denial of their benefits claims.
At the end of that same decade, the Office of the Special Masters within the Court of Federal
Claims was charged with adjudicating claims of vaccine injury. This “vaccine court” played
an important legal role in the controversy surrounding a false link between autism and
vaccines (Kirkland, 2016).
124See quotes in introductory chapter.
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The presence of specialization in a world where generalists are preferred offers
scholars an opportunity to consider how the decision making of specialized courts compares
to that of the more familiar generalist ones. The theories that scholars have developed for
courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court have not been subjected to great empirical scrutiny in
the specialized context. For one, ideology has long been a central explanatory force for
generalist court decisions, but the role that ideology plays in specialized courts has seen
limited scholarly attention. Moreover, generalist court scholars have long sought to
understand how law impacts judge decision making, particularly given the consistent impact
of ideology in these courts. Scholars have spilled considerable ink in the debate between legal
and attitudinal accounts of judicial decision making, with some calling judges’ use of legal
precedent merely window dressing (Segal and Spaeth, 1996, 2002). The specialized context
offers a new venue through which we can examine the influence of these factors. The more
subject-specific and technical nature of the issues considered in specialized courts may reduce
the role that ideology plays in these courts, as hearing the same types of cases offers greater
repetition and more consistent opportunities for application of law to cases.
Finally, central to the distinction between specialized and generalist courts is the
opportunity specialization affords for the development of expertise. Theoretically, expertise is
perhaps the focal dividing line between judges on generalist and specialized courts.
Practically, however, expertise varies between types of courts and within a given specialized
court. Understanding the sources from which expertise is derived and its effects is key to the
exploration of the decisions specialized judges make. Moreover, the impact of expertise is
seen not just with respect to judges, but also in how attorney expertise impacts the decisions
of judges. Generalist court scholars have given much attention to the role of attorneys, but the
type of attorney expertise that matters in specialized courts may be different. Ultimately, this
dissertation has examined the consequences that introducing specialization in the judiciary has
had on the decisions emanating from the federal bench and has tackled these three concepts -
ideology, expertise, and law - in the context of specialized courts. In this project, I provided a
more thorough and nuanced theoretical model of judicial expertise, argued for the impact of
ideology as conditional on expertise, considered the role of attorney expertise, and treated law
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as a dynamic, rather than mechanistic force, in decision making.
Beyond providing an opportunity to apply generalist court theories to the specialized
context, understanding the decision making of specialized courts is important for the litigants
that appear before specialized courts. In an increasingly backlogged judicial system where
litigants can expect lengthy wait times, understanding how certain factors, such as ideology,
expertise, and law, impact the decisions judges make becomes all the more important. For
example, in Fiscal Year 2018, the median time from appeal to case disposition in the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims was almost 8 months (233 days).125 For the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the median time from docketing to disposition was 14 months for the
same year.126 For litigants challenging the denial of their benefits claims in the case of the
CAVC or appealing a decision of patent infringement to the Federal Circuit, recognizing the
predispositions of the judges can be of strategic importance, particularly if ideology plays a
role, as the chapter 3 and 4 results suggest it does.
Recognizing the potential non-neutral inclinations of specialized courts begins with
the appointment process. In chapter 2, I presented evidence for a disparity in how the U.S.
Senate treats the individuals chosen for the specialized and generalist courts. Examining the
confirmation votes of judges sitting on the 12 generalist circuit courts of appeals and six
specialized courts, I find that most specialized court judges are confirmed by voice vote or
unanimous consent, while generalist appellate court judges often receive recorded votes and
votes against them. This seeming congressional inattention to specialized courts extends not
only to the confirmation process but also to the histories surrounding their creation. As Larry
Baum (2011) writes of those involved in the creation of these courts: “They rely more on
vague perceptions of the performance of past and current courts than on actual evidence about
that performance,” and they “often act without thorough consideration of the prospects for
success” (Baum, 2011, 211-212).
Importantly, the disparity demonstrated above does not indicate that specialized court
125CAVC 2018 Annual Report available at https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf.
126CFC data available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/07MedDispTimeMERITStable.pdf.
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judges are not fit for office. While there is a statistically significant difference in the American
Bar Association’s subjective assessment of the qualifications of generalist and specialized
court judges in favor of generalist judges, the median rating for specialized judges is well-
qualified. This suggests that the seeming inattention on the part of the Senate to specialized
nominees may reflect a perception that the president’s choices to specialized courts are well
qualified for their roles. On the other hand, this apparent inattention given to specialized court
appointees does signal the potential for great influence by the president and interest groups on
the direction of certain areas of law, which may be seen in the ideological decisions emanating
from some specialized court judges (Howard, 2005; Miller and Curry, 2009).127
The role of ideology for specialized court judges is a core focus of the third chapter of
this project, and I argue that the application of ideology by specialized judges to their more
technical cases is conditioned on the extent to which they demonstrate expertise relevant to
their subject matter. It is in this chapter that I build the three-part model of judicial expertise
that expands how the concept has been treated in previous literature. Specifically, I theorize
that judicial expertise is derived from credentials, experience on the court, and previous
background attributes, which provides a more thorough consideration of the concept.
Importantly, while the effects are mixed, I do find a conditional effect for ideology for
some components of expertise in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. With respect to
the single-judge decision analysis, the impact of ideology is conditional on a judge’s years of
experience on the court. This result fits with how I theorized different components of
expertise would matter in different specialized courts. I expected that years of experience
would matter more on the CAVC than the Federal Circuit. Indeed Miller and Curry (2009)
found no conditional impact for ideology based on a judge’s experience on the bench in the
Federal Circuit, where I find such an effect on the CAVC. Ultimately, the results in chapter 3
add to a growing body of literature showing that ideology does play a role in specialized
courts, despite the expectation that ideology would be removed in these more technical areas.
127Recent specialized court confirmations suggest this pattern of inattention may be ending, as the two most
recent judges to be confirmed to the Court of Federal Claims, Richard A. Hertling and Ryan T. Holte, were
confirmed 69-27 and 60-35, respectively.
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Moreover, the panel decisions analysis for the CAVC in chapter 3, as well as the Federal
Circuit in chapter 4, finds a significant effect for panel ideology in the expected direction.
Ideological decision making has important implications for those litigants seeking redress in
specialized courts, whether it be patent holders challenging the invalidation of their patents in
the Federal Circuit or taxpayers challenging income tax assessments in the Tax Court. Indeed,
scholars have found that the tax court is less likely to rule for individuals than district courts
on income tax questions (Howard, 2005), while expert, conservative judges demonstrate a
greater propensity to uphold patent rights (Miller and Curry, 2009).
Indeed, a focal part of this project is the nature of expertise in specialized courts and
the impact such expertise has on the outcomes emanating from these courts. While chapter 3
considered the role of expertise for judges, chapter 4 pivots to how the expertise of attorneys
arguing before specialized courts affects the likelihood of their clients receiving favorable
dispositions. The important role attorneys play in specialized courts can first be seen in results
from chapter 3. Of the cases analyzed in the single-judge analysis in that chapter, about 25%
of these cases featured appellants who did not have attorney representation before the CAVC.
This figure from Fiscal Years 2010-2016 matches with that reported by the court for 2018,
where 26% of appellants were pro se at the time the appeal was filed.128 In the regression
models presented in chapter 3, appellants who had the benefit of counsel were more likely to
receive a favorable decision from the court than were those appellants who were
self-represented. The role of attorneys in the CAVC is particularly important given the history
of attorney representation in the veterans claims adjudication process. Prior to the court’s
creation, attorneys could only appear on behalf of a veteran during the claims adjudication
process if their fees did not exceed ten dollars. These findings suggest that the inclusion of
attorneys in this process has had an important effect for veterans in obtaining benefits.
In chapter 4, I find that the importance of attorneys in specialized courts extends to the
Federal Circuit, specifically with respect to the type of expertise they bring to bear in court. In
this chapter, I consider not just whether an attorney is present but how an attorney’s presence
128https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf.
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affects the likelihood of a litigant winning in court. In specialized courts, I theorize and find
that the attorney who possesses greater process expertise, or experience with a certain court
and its working environment, should have an advantage when compared to an attorney who
possesses greater subject-matter expertise. In specialized courts, an attorney with
subject-matter expertise encounters judges who also possess similar levels of issue-specific
know-how. Thus, unlike generalist court judges, these specialized judges need not rely on
these attorneys with respect to specific technical aspects of the legal area. However, attorneys
who are repeat players and develop a working knowledge of the court, its working
environment, and its personnel should possess advantages that accrue from this inside
baseball. The repeat player advantage that emerges in this chapter has important implications
for litigants and who wins in the American political system. The literature on litigant
resources finds a consistent advantage for the “Haves” over the “Have Nots.” With respect to
litigating in specialized courts, these results indicate that wealthy litigants, such as
corporations contesting intellectual property cases, with the financial means to do so can
simply hire the most experienced Federal Circuit patent attorney they can find. This only
increases the resource disparity that already exists in American politics. Already faced with a
lengthy time for their cases to be decided, ordinary litigants face yet one more obstacle to
political success.
This dissertation’s final substantive chapter transitions from ideology and expertise
to the role of law in specialized courts. Building on the generalist court literature’s theory of
jurisprudential regimes to explain the impact of law on court decisions, I consider how a shift
in a court’s interpretation of its standard of review impacts the direction of its decisions with
respect to its litigants. Contrary to expectation, regression discontinuity estimates indicate that
the CAVC decreased the percentage of its decisions for veterans following a purported change
in its interpretation of its standard of review. The consideration of a court’s standard of review
represents a novel way of considering how law affects the decisions emanating from courts. In
this way, I depart from generalist scholars’ consideration of law and provide another method




Scholars are just beginning to consider the important effects judicial specialization
has on the decision making of specialized court judges, and this dissertation forms a starting
point for a research program that considers various questions stemming from the presence of
specialized courts in a world that prefers judges who are generalists.
In my broader research agenda, I plan to continue this research track by examining
other aspects of specialized courts. Specifically, I plan to examine how specialized appellate
courts treat the decisions of the specialized and generalist courts they review, and whether
specialized appellate courts give greater deference to specialized over generalist courts. For
example, does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit treat the decisions of the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims differently than decisions it reviews from the federal district
courts? One way to measure policy influence is to consider whether the opinions of certain
courts are being cited and how they are being cited. For example, the Federal Circuit hears
patent appeals from the specialized Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the generalist district
courts. How is the Federal Circuit choosing to cite previous cases from these courts? What are
the characteristics of the cases that get cited? Why does the federal circuit choose to cite some
over others? Is it because of a certain judge or the type of decision (panel vs. single-judge)?
I am also interested in how generalist appellate courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, treat
the specialized court decisions it reviews as compared with how it treats generalist decisions.
Looking at citation patterns may also be one way of addressing this question.
This discussion also begs the reverse question: how do specialized courts treat the
decisions and precedent of hierarchically superior courts. Baum (1994) finds that the former
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a specialized court, cited Supreme Court precedent less
than did the federal courts of appeals in similar cases. This question is ripe for a modern
update.
Examining citations provides another avenue for explaining the results in chapter 5.
Recall that the CAVC seemed to briefly invoke a new interpretation of its standard of review
119
in Fiscal Year 2005. According to some legal scholars, its decision in Padgett v. Nicholson
seemed to indicate a shift in the court’s interpretation of its standard to one that gave the court
more leeway in considering the Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions. Yet rather than
increase the decisions it issued in favor of veterans, I found that the percentage of decisions
for veterans decreased during the short time period when the standard shift was in effect.
However, not all decisions will necessarily be ones in which the CAVC will have need to
invoke the new standard. Thus, future research should examine the cases where the Padgett
decision was cited. If the decisions where Padgett is cited are treated more favorably from the
veteran’s perspective than other cases decided in the same time period where Padgett is not
cited, that would be strong evidence and consistent with my hypothesis that veterans should
be advantaged in the court under the new standard. Essentially, if the court adheres to the new
regime, there should be evidence of it in its opinions.
Finally, almost all research on federal specialized courts has been quantitative in
nature. Researchers should seek to supplement their quantitative tests with qualitative study of
these courts. Future research should seek to interview judges, clerks, and staff of the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
State and Local
Moving beyond the federal judiciary, the largest growth in judicial specialization has
been at the state and local level, rather than the federal level. These courts, which are often
more therapeutic in purpose than the federal courts I have examined, constitute an important
avenue for exploring the role of specialization in the American judiciary. At this more local
level, specialized courts are employed to combat social problems such as drug use, domestic
violence, and mental illness through the application of therapeutic jurisprudential tools and
interdisciplinary cooperation with law enforcement and community treatment providers
(Wexler, 1990; Wexler and Winick, 1991; Wexler, 1992; Nolan Jr, 2003). Understanding the
effectiveness of these courts in providing alternative pathways through the criminal justice
system and in reducing negative outcomes, such as recidivism, among their participants has
enormous normative implications for the evolution of the criminal justice system from
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adversarial and punitive to rehabilitative and merciful. Scholars in political science have
already begun examining important questions regarding these courts, including how they
diffuse across states and localities (Douglas, Raudla and Hartley, 2015). Particularly ripe for
consideration are mental health courts, a problem-solving court model now adopted by
jurisdictions in more than forty states (Trupin and Richards, 2003; Steadman, Redlich, Griffin,
Petrila and Monahan, 2005; Lurigio and Snowden, 2009).
Concluding Thoughts
I began this dissertation by noting the uniqueness of the American judiciary in terms
of its resistance to specialization. However, in terms of the decision making that characterizes
the specialized courts considered in this project, specialized courts may not be all that special
or different from their generalist counterparts. Like in the generalist courts, ideology plays an
important role in understanding how specialized courts make decisions. Moreover, attorney
process expertise has a significant impact in specialized courts, as it does in the generalist
ones. However, the role of ideology in specialized courts is more circumscribed, and the
effectiveness of attorney substantive expertise is limited in the specialized context.
Uniqueness aside, specialized courts have become an increasingly important part of the
federal judiciary. In taking on specific types of cases from the generalist courts, specialized
courts shape the direction of law in many important areas, including patents, taxes, and
veterans claims. Understanding these courts, their characteristics, and how they operate is
central to a full understanding of the American legal system.
While this dissertation does not consider the mechanics of specialized judges’
opinions, it seems appropriate that I end this dissertation by referencing Baum’s theory of
judicial presentation (Baum, 2009). Like generalist judges who see judging as a form of
self-presentation, the following example suggests the same can be said of specialized judges.
Thus, I conclude this dissertation with the words of former CAVC Chief Judge Lawrence
Hagel. In a dissenting opinion in Young v. Shinseki, Hagel chose to air his grievances in an
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unusual fashion.129 As he writes, “In any event, at times the essence of disagreement can best
be expressed without citing authority, resorting to legal maxims and jargon, or even using
Latin. Sometimes it is best to rely instead on just plain common sense. I believe that this case
presents such a situation. Therefore, I offer, in my own unconventional way, a less legalistic
rationale for disagreeing with the majority’s opinion.” The following is an excerpt from
Hagel’s unconventional dissent.130
The Judges gathered one day
bedecked in their robes four did say,
”Most cases are boring.
We need something rip-roaring
to establish a new vérité.”
“We must choose a difficult subject,
our reasoning to which none can object.
The issue must be obscure,
but a real problem du jour,
with an outcome few would suspect.”
“Of jurisdiction we don’t have enough,
to get more we know will be tough.”
Then they scrunched up their faces
and pounded their maces and cried,
“Where can we find such stuff?!”
Then the Board made an unusual slip,
referral not remand, the quip.
129Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 203 (2012).
130Interestingly, Hagel’s choice of verse lends some support for Richard Posner’s concern that specialization
would lead to job dissatisfaction among specialized court judges due to the monotony of repeatedly deciding
similar cases.
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It now had arrived,
the case for which they contrived,
more power they could use it to grip.
“Speed is required,” they pled,
“Only remand puts vets ahead..”
But the problem, you see,
the reverse comes to be
when the Court sticks its nose in instead.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2
Tables 18 through 22 show the confirmation votes and appointing president
information for current and senior specialized court judges and currently sitting generalist
court judges on the courts of appeals. Tables 23, 24, and 25 present ABA ratings for current
generalized court judges.
Table 18: Confirmation Votes of Judges of the Federal Specialized Jurisdiction Courts
Court Judge Year Appointed Appointing President Confirmation Vote
Armed Forces Scott W. Stuckey 2006 Bush II Voice Vote
Armed Forces Margaret A. Ryan 2006 Bush II Voice Vote
Armed Forces Kevin A. Ohlson 2013 Obama Voice Vote
Armed Forces John E. Sparks 2016 Obama Voice Vote
Armed Forces Gregory E. Maggs 2017 Trump Voice Vote
Federal Circuit Sharon Prost 2001 Bush II 97-0
Federal Circuit Pauline Newman 1984 Reagan Voice Vote
Federal Circuit Alan David Lourie 1990 Bush II Unanimous Consent
Federal Circuit Timothy B. Dyk 2000 Clinton 74-25
Federal Circuit Kimberly Ann Moore 2006 Bush II 92-0
Federal Circuit Kathleen M. O’Malley 2010 Obama Voice Vote
Federal Circuit Jimmie V. Reyna 2011 Obama 86-0
Federal Circuit Evan Wallach 2011 Obama 99-0
Federal Circuit Richard G. Taranto 2013 Obama 91-0
Federal Circuit Raymond T. Chen 2013 Obama 97-0
Federal Circuit Todd M. Hughes 2013 Obama 98-0
Federal Circuit Kara Farnandez Stoll 2015 Obama 95-0
Federal Claims Thomas C. Wheeler 2005 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Claims Margart M. Sweeney 2005 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Claims Patricia Campbell-Smith 2013 Obama Voice Vote
Federal Claims Elaine D. Kaplan 2013 Obama 64-35
Federal Claims Lydia Kay Griggsby 2015 Obama Voice Vote
International Trade Timothy C. Stanceu 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
International Trade Leo M. Gordon 2006 Bush II 82-0
International Trade Mark A. Barnett 2013 Obama Voice Vote
International Trade Claire R. Kelly 2013 Obama Voice Vote
International Trade Jennifer Choe-Groves 2016 Obama Voice Vote
International Trade Gary S. Katzmann 2016 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court L. Paige Marvel 1998, 2014 Clinton, Obama Voice; Voice
Tax Court Maurice B. Foley 1995, 2011 Clinton, Obama Voice; Voice
Tax Court Joseph H. Gale 1996, 2011 Clinton, Obama Voice; Voice
Tax Court Michael B. Thornton 1998, 2013 Clinton, Obama Voice; Voice
Tax Court David Gustafson 2008 Bush II Voice Vote
Tax Court Richard T. Morrison 2008 Bush II Voice Vote
Tax Court Elizabeth Crewson Paris 2008 Bush II Voice Vote
Tax Court Kathleen Kerrigan 2012 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Ronald L. Buch 2013 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Albert G. Lauber 2013 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Joseph W. Nega 2013 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Tamara W. Ashford 2014 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Cary Douglas Pugh 2014 Obama Voice Vote
Tax Court Patrick J. Urda 2018 Trump Voice Vote
Tax Court Elizabeth A. Copeland 2018 Trump Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Robert N. Davis 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Mary J. Schoelen 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Coral W. Pietsch 2012 Obama Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Margaret Bartley 2012 Obama Voice Vote
Veterans Claims William S. Greenberg 2012 Obama Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Michael P. Allen 2017 Trump Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Amanda L. Meredith 2017 Trump Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Joseph L. Toth 2017 Trump Voice Vote
Veterans Claims Joseph L. Falvey, Jr. 2018 Trump Voice Vote
Only federal Specialized Courts whose judges are subject to presidential appointment and Senate confirmation are included.
Multiple entries in Year Appointed column indicate judge was reappointed.
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Table 19: Confirmation Votes of Active Senior Judges of the Federal Specialized Courts
Court Judge Year Appointed Appointing President Vote
Armed Forces Walter T. Cox III 1984 Reagan Voice Vote
Armed Forces Eugene R. Sullivan 1986 Reagan Voice Vote
Armed Forces Susan J. Crawford 1991 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Armed Forces Andrew S. Effron 1996 Clinton Voice Vote
Armed Forces James E. Baker 2000 Clinton Voice Vote
Armed Forces Charles E. Erdmann 2002 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Circuit Haldane Robert Mayer 1987 Reagan Voice Vote
Federal Circuit S. Jay Plager 1989 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Federal Circuit Raymond Clevenger III 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Federal Circuit Alvin Anthony Schall 1992 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Federal Circuit William Curtis Bryson 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
Federal Circuit Richard Linn 1999 Clinton Voice Vote
Federal Claims Marian Blank Horn 1986, 2003 Reagan, Bush II Voice Vote; 89-0
Federal Claims Mary E.C. Williams 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Claims Victor J. Wolski 2003 Bush II 54-43
Federal Claims Charles F. Lettow 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Claims Susan G. Braden 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Federal Claims Loren A. Smith 1985 Reagan Voice Vote
Federal Claims Eric G. Bruggink 1986 Reagan Voice Vote
Federal Claims John Paul Wiese 1982 Reagan Voice Vote
Federal Claims Robert H. Hodges, Jr. 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Federal Claims Lynn J. Bush 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
Federal Claims Edward J. Damich 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
Federal Claims Nancy B. Firestone 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
CIT Jane A. Restani 1983 Reagan Voice Vote
CIT Thomas J. Aquilino Jr. 1985 Reagan Voice Vote
CIT Richard W. Goldberg 1991 Bush I Unanimous Consent
CIT Richard K. Eaton 1999 Clinton Voice Vote
Tax Court Juan F. Vasquez 1995, 2010 Clinton, Obama Voice; Voice
Tax Court Mark V. Holmes 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Tax Court Joseph Robert Goeke 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Tax Court Mary Ann Cohen 1982 Reagan Unanimous Consent
Tax Court John O. Colvin 1988 Reagan Unanimous Consent
Tax Court Joel Gerber 1984 Reagan Voice Vote
Tax Court James S. Halpern 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Tax Court Julian I. Jacobs 1984 Reagan Voice Vote
Tax Court Robert P. Ruwe 1987 Reagan Unanimous Consent
Tax Court Thomas B. Wells 1986, 2001 Reagan, Bush II Voice Vote
CAVC Frank Q. Nebeker 1989 Bush I Unanimous Consent
CAVC Kenneth B. Kramer 1989 Bush I Unanimous Consent
CAVC Ronald M. Holdaway 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
CAVC William P. Greene, Jr. 1997 Clinton Voice Vote
CAVC Bruce E. Kasold 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
CAVC Lawrence B. Hagel 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
CAVC William A. Moorman 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
CAVC Alan G. Lance, Sr. 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
Only federal Specialized Courts whose judges are subject to presidential appointment and Senate confirmation
are included. Multiple entries in Year Appointed column indicate judge was reappointed.
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Table 20: Confirmation Votes of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge Year Appointed Appointing President Confirmation Vote
First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard 2002 Bush II 99-0
First Circuit Juan R. Torruella 1984 Reagan Voice Vote
First Circuit Sandra Lynch 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
First Circuit O. Rogeriee Thompson 2010 Obama 98-0
First Circuit William J. Kayatta Jr. 2013 Obama 88-12
First Circuit David Jeremiah Barron 2014 Obama 53-45
Second Circuit Robert Katzmann 1999 Clinton Voice Vote
Second Circuit Dennis Jacobs 1992 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Second Circuit Jose A. Cabranes 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
Second Circuit Rosemary S. Pooler 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
Second Circuit Peter W. Hall 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
Second Circuit Debra Ann Livingston 2007 Bush II 91-0
Second Circuit Denny Chin 2010 Obama 98-0
Second Circuit Raymond Lohier 2010 Obama 92-0
Second Circuit Susan L. Carney 2011 Obama 71-28
Second Circuit Christopher F. Droney 2011 Obama 88-0
Second Circuit Richard J. Sullivan 2018 Trump 79-16
Third Circuit D. Brooks Smith 2002 Bush II 64-35
Third Circuit Theodore McKee 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
Third Circuit Thomas L. Ambro 2000 Clinton 96-2
Third Circuit Michael Chagares 2006 Bush II 98-0
Third Circuit Kent A. Jordan 2006 Bush II 91-0
Third Circuit Thomas Hardiman 2007 Bush II 95-0
Third Circuit Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. 2010 Obama 84-0
Third Circuit Patty Shwartz 2013 Obama 64-34
Third Circuit Cheryl Ann Krause 2014 Obama 93-0
Third Circuit L. Felipe Restrepo 2016 Obama 82-6
Third Circuit Stephanos Bibas 2017 Trump 53-43
Third Circuit David James Porter 2018 Trump 50-45
Fourth Circuit Roger Gregory 2000 Clinton/Bush II 93-1
Fourth Circuit J. Harvie Wilkinson III 1984 Reagan 58-39
Fourth Circuit Paul V. Niemeyer 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Fourth Circuit Diana Gribbon Motz 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
Fourth Circuit Robert Bruce King 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
Fourth Circuit Allyson Kay Duncan 2003 Bush II Voice Vote
Fourth Circuit G. Steven Agee 2008 Bush II 96-0
Fourth Circuit Barbara Milano Keenan 2010 Obama 99-0
Fourth Circuit James A. Wynn Jr. 2010 Obama Voice Vote
Fourth Circuit Albert Diaz 2010 Obama Voice Vote
Fourth Circuit Henry Franklin Floyd 2011 Obama 96-0
Fourth Circuit Stephanie Thacker 2012 Obama 91-3
Fourth Circuit Pamela Harris 2014 Obama 50-43
Fourth Circuit Julius N. Richardson 2018 Trump 81-8
Fourth Circuit A. Marvin Quattlebaum 2018 Trump 62-28
Fifth Circuit Carl E. Stewart 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit Edith H. Jones 1985 Reagan Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit Jerry Edwin Smith 1987 Reagan Unanimous Consent
Fifth Circuit James L. Dennis 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit Priscilla Owen 2005 Bush II 55-43
Fifth Circuit Jennifer Walker Elrod 2007 Bush II Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit Leslie H. Southwick 2007 Bush II 59-38
Fifth Circuit Catharina Haynes 2008 Bush II Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit James E. Graves Jr. 2011 Obama Voice Vote
Fifth Circuit Stephen A. Higginson 2011 Obama 88-0
Fifth Circuit Gregg Costa 2014 Obama 97-0
Fifth Circuit Don Willett 2018 Trump 50-47
Fifth Circuit James C. Ho 2018 Trump 53-43
Fifth Circuit Kyle Stuart Duncan 2018 Trump 50-47
Fifth Circuit Kurt Damian Engelhardt 2018 Trump 62-34
Fifth Circuit Andrew S. Oldham 2018 Trump 50-49
Only active circuit judges listed. Senior judges excluded.
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Table 21: Confirmation Votes of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge Year Appointed Appointing President Confirmation Vote
Sixth Circuit R Guy Cole Jr. 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Sixth Circuit Karen Nelson Moore 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Sixth Circuit Eric L. Clay 1997 Clinton Voice Vote
Sixth Circuit Julia Smith Gibbons 2002 Bush II 95-0
Sixth Circuit Jeffrey Sutton 2003 Bush II 52-41
Sixth Circuit Richard Allen Griffin 2005 Bush II 95-0
Sixth Circuit Raymond M. Kethledge 2008 Bush II Voice Vote
Sixth Circuit Helene N. White 2008 Bush II 63-32
Sixth Circuit Jane Branstetter Stranch 2010 Obama 71-21
Sixth Circuit Bernice B. Donald 2011 Obama 94-2
Sixth Circuit Amul Thapar 2017 Trump 52-44
Sixth Circuit John K. Bush 2017 Trump 51-47
Sixth Circuit Joan Larsen 2017 Trump 60-38
Sixth Circuit John B. Nalbandian 2018 Trump 53-45
Sixth Circuit Chad A. Readler 2019 Trump 52-47
Sixth Circuit Eric E. Murphy 2019 Trump 52-46
Seventh Circuit Diane P. Wood 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Seventh Circuit Joel Martin Flaum 1983 Reagan Unanimous Consent
Seventh Circuit Frank H. Easterbrook 1985 Reagan Voice Vote
Seventh Circuit Michael Stephen Kanne 1987 Reagan Voice Vote
Seventh Circuit Ilana Rovner 1992 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes 2004 Bush II 70-27
Seventh Circuit David F. Hamilton 2009 Obama 59-39
Seventh Circuit Amy Coney Barrett 2017 Trump 55-43
Seventh Circuit Michael Brian Brennan 2018 Trump 49-46
Seventh Circuit Michael Yale Scudder, Jr. 2018 Trump 90-0
Seventh Circuit Amy J. St. Eve 2018 Trump 91-0
Eighth Circuit Lavenski Smith 2002 Bush II Voice Vote
Eighth Circuit James B. Loken 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
Eighth Circuit Steven Colloton 2003 Bush II 94-1
Eighth Circuit Raymond Gruender 2004 Bush II 97-1
Eighth Circuit William Duane Benton 2004 Bush II Voice Vote
Eighth Circuit Bobby Shepherd 2006 Bush II Voice Vote
Eighth Circuit Jane L. Kelly 2013 Obama 96-0
Eighth Circuit Ralph R. Erickson 2017 Trump 95-1
Eighth Circuit L. Steven Grasz 2018 Trump 50-48
Eighth Circuit David Stras 2018 Trump 56-42
Eighth Circuit Jonathan A. Kobes 2018 Trump 50-50
Ninth Circuit Sidney Runyan Thomas 1996 Clinton Voice Vote
Ninth Circuit Susan P. Graber 1998 Clinton 98-0
Ninth Circuit M. Margaret McKeown 1998 Clinton 80-11
Ninth Circuit Kim McLane Wardlaw 1998 Clinton Voice Vote
Ninth Circuit William A. Fletcher 1998 Clinton 57-41
Ninth Circuit Ronald M. Gould 1999 Clinton Voice Vote
Ninth Circuit Richard A. Paez 2000 Clinton 59-39
Ninth Circuit Marsha S. Berzon 2000 Clinton 64-34
Ninth Circuit Johnnie B. Rawlinson 2000 Clinton Voice Vote
Ninth Circuit Jay Bybee 2003 Bush II 74-19
Ninth Circuit Counsuelo Maria Callahan 2003 Bush II 99-0
Ninth Circuit Carlos Bea 2003 Bush II 86-0
Ninth Circuit Milan Smith 2006 Bush II 93-0
Ninth Circuit Sandra Segal Ikuta 2006 Bush II 81-0
Ninth Circuit Mary H. Murguia 2011 Obama 89-0
Ninth Circuit Morgan Christen 2012 Obama 95-3
Ninth Circuit Jacqueline Nguyen 2012 Obama 91-3
Ninth Circuit Paul J. Watford 2012 Obama 61-34
Ninth Circuit Andrew D. Hurwitz 2012 Obama Voice Vote
Ninth Circuit John B. Owens 2014 Obama 56-43
Ninth Circuit Michelle Friedland 2014 Obama 51-40
Ninth Circuit Mark J. Bennett 2018 Trump 72-27
Ninth Circuit Ryan D. Nelson 2018 Trump 51-44
Ninth Circuit Eric D. Miller 2019 Trump 53-46
Only active circuit judges listed. Senior judges excluded.
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Table 22: Confirmation Votes of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge Year Appointed Appointing President Confirmation Vote
Tenth Circuit Timothy Tymkovich 2003 Bush II 58-41
Tenth Circuit Mary Beck Briscoe 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Tenth Circuit Carlos F. Lucero 1995 Clinton Voice Vote
Tenth Circuit Harris L. Hatz 2001 Bush II 99-0
Tenth Circuit Jerome Holmes 2006 Bush II 67-30
Tenth Circuit Scott Matheson Jr. 2010 Obama Voice Vote
Tenth Circuit Robert E. Bacharach 2013 Obama 93-0
Tenth Circuit Gregory A. Phillips 2013 Obama 88-0
Tenth Circuit Carolyn B. McHugh 2014 Obama 98-0
Tenth Circuit Nancy Moritz 2014 Obama 90-3
Tenth Circuit Allison H. Eid 2017 Trump 56-41
Tenth Circuit Joel M. Carson 2018 Trump 77-21
Eleventh Circuit Edward Carnes 1992 Bush I 62-36
Eleventh Circuit Gerald Tjoflat 1975 Ford Voice Vote
Eleventh Circuit Stanley Marcus 1997 Clinton Voice Vote
Eleventh Circuit Charles R. Wilson 1999 Clinton Voice Vote
Eleventh Circuit William H. Pryor Jr. 2004 Bush II 53-45
Eleventh Circuit Beverly B. Martin 2010 Obama 97-0
Eleventh Circuit Adalberto Jordan 2012 Obama 94-5
Eleventh Circuit Robin S. Rosenbaum 2014 Obama 91-0
Eleventh Circuit Jill A. Pryor 2014 Obama 97-0
Eleventh Circuit Kevin Newsom 2017 Trump 66-31
Eleventh Circuit Elizabeth L. Branch 2018 Trump 73-23
Eleventh Circuit Britt C. Grant 2018 Trump 52-46
DC Circuit Merrick Garland 1997 Clinton 76-23
DC Circuit Karen L. Henderson 1990 Bush I Unanimous Consent
DC Circuit Judith W. Rogers 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
DC Circuit David S. Tatel 1994 Clinton Voice Vote
DC Circuit Thomas B. Griffith 2005 Bush II 73-24
DC Circuit Sri Srinivasan 2013 Obama 97-0
DC Circuit Patricia Millett 2013 Obama 56-38
DC Circuit Cornelia Pillard 2013 Obama 51-44
DC Circuit Robert L. Wilkins 2014 Obama 55-43
DC Circuit Gregory G. Katsas 2017 Trump 50-48
Only active circuit judges listed. Senior judges excluded.
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Table 23: ABA Ratings of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge ABA Rating
First Circuit Jeffrey R. Howard Qualified/Not Qualified
First Circuit Juan R. Torruella Qualified
First Circuit Sandra Lynch Well Qualified
First Circuit O. Rogeriee Thompson Qualified/Not Qualified
First Circuit William J. Kayatta Jr. Well Qualified
First Circuit David Jeremiah Barron Well Qualified/Qualified
Second Circuit Robert Katzmann Well Qualified
Second Circuit Dennis Jacobs Qualified
Second Circuit Jose A. Cabranes Well Qualified
Second Circuit Rosemary S. Pooler Qualified
Second Circuit Peter W. Hall Well Qualified
Second Circuit Debra Ann Livingston Well Qualified
Second Circuit Denny Chin Well Qualified
Second Circuit Raymond Lohier Qualified/Not Qualified
Second Circuit Susan L. Carney Qualified/Not Qualified
Second Circuit Christopher F. Droney Well Qualified
Second Circuit Richard J. Sullivan Well-Qualified/Qualified
Third Circuit D. Brooks Smith Well Qualified
Third Circuit Theodore McKee Qualified/Not Qualified
Third Circuit Thomas L. Ambro Well Qualified/Qualified
Third Circuit Michael Chagares Well Qualified
Third Circuit Kent A. Jordan Well Qualified
Third Circuit Thomas Hardiman Well Qualified
Third Circuit Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. Well Qualified
Third Circuit Patty Shwartz Well Qualified
Third Circuit Cheryl Ann Krause Well Qualified
Third Circuit L. Felipe Restrepo Well Qualified/Qualified
Third Circuit Stephanos Bibas Well Qualified
Third Circuit David James Porter Qualified
Fourth Circuit Roger Gregory Qualified
Fourth Circuit J. Harvie Wilkinson III Qualified/Not Qualified
Fourth Circuit Paul V. Niemeyer Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Diana Gribbon Motz Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Robert Bruce King Well Qualified/Qualified
Fourth Circuit Allyson Kay Duncan Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit G. Steven Agee Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Barbara Milano Keenan Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit James A. Wynn Jr. Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Albert Diaz Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Henry Franklin Floyd Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Stephanie Thacker Well Qualified/Qualified
Fourth Circuit Pamela Harris Well Qualified
Fourth Circuit Julius N. Richardson Well-Qualified
Fourth Circuit A. Marvin Quattlebaum Well-Qualified
Fifth Circuit Carl E. Stewart Qualified/Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit Edith H. Jones Qualified
Fifth Circuit Jerry Edwin Smith Qualified
Fifth Circuit James L. Dennis Qualified
Fifth Circuit Priscilla Owen Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit Jennifer Walker Elrod Qualified
Fifth Circuit Leslie H. Southwick Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit Catharina Haynes Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit James E. Graves Jr. Qualified
Fifth Circuit Stephen A. Higginson Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit Gregg Costa Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit Don Willett Well Qualified
Fifth Circuit James C. Ho Well Qualified/Qualified
Fifth Circuit Kyle Stuart Duncan Well Qualified/Qualified
Fifth Circuit Kurt Damina Engelhardt Well-Qualified
Fifth Circuit Andrew S. Oldham Well-Qualified
Sources: Unah (1998), ABA (2019)
Also https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/history/judges.xlsx
ABA ratings are on a three item scale (Not Qualified, Qualified, Well Qualified).
Single entries in Column 3 reflect unanimous ratings.
For multiple entries in Column 3, the first entry is the rating from the majority.
The second is the rating from the minority.
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Table 24: ABA Ratings of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge ABA Rating
Sixth Circuit R Guy Cole Jr. Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit Karen Nelson Moore Qualified/Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit Eric L. Clay Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit Julia Smith Gibbons Well Qualified/Qualified
Sixth Circuit Jeffrey Sutton Qualified/Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit Richard Allen Griffin Well Qualified/Qualified
Sixth Circuit Raymond M. Kethledge Well Qualified/Qualified
Sixth Circuit Helene N. White Qualified/Not Qualified
Sixth Circuit Jane Branstetter Stranch Qualified/Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit Bernice B. Donald Well Qualified/Qualified
Sixth Circuit Amul Thapar Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit John K. Bush Qualified
Sixth Circuit Joan Larsen Well Qualified
Sixth Circuit John B. Nalbandian Well-Qualified
Sixth Circuit Chad A. Readler Well-Qualified/Qualified
Sixth Circuit Eric E. Murphy Qualified/Well Qualified
Seventh Circuit Diane P. Wood Well Qualified
Seventh Circuit Joel Martin Flaum Well Qualified
Seventh Circuit Frank H. Easterbrook Qualified/Not Qualified
Seventh Circuit Michael Stephen Kanne Qualified
Seventh Circuit Ilana Rovner Well Qualified
Seventh Circuit Diane S. Sykes Well Qualified/Qualified
Seventh Circuit David F. Hamilton Well Qualified
Seventh Circuit Amy Coney Barrett Well Qualified/Qualified
Seventh Circuit Michael Brian Brennan Well-Qualified
Seventh Circuit Michael Yale Scudder, Jr. Well-Qualified
Seventh Circuit Amy J. St. Eve Well-Qualified
Eighth Circuit Lavenski Smith Qualified
Eighth Circuit James B. Loken Well Qualified/Qualified
Eighth Circuit Steven Colloton Qualified/Well Qualified/Not Qualified
Eighth Circuit Raymond Gruender Qualified
Eighth Circuit William Duane Benton Well Qualified
Eighth Circuit Bobby Shepherd Well Qualified
Eighth Circuit Jane L. Kelly Qualified
Eighth Circuit Ralph R. Erickson Well Qualified/Qualified
Eighth Circuit L. Steven Grasz Not Qualified
Eighth Circuit David Stras Well Qualified
Eighth Circuit Jonathan A. Kobes Not Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Sidney Runyan Thomas Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Susan P. Graber Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit M. Margaret McKeown Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Kim McLane Wardlaw Qualified
Ninth Circuit William A. Fletcher Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Ronald M. Gould Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Richard A. Paez Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Marsha S. Berzon Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Johnnie B. Rawlinson Qualified
Ninth Circuit Jay Bybee Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Counsuelo Maria Callahan Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Carlos Bea Qualified/Not Qualified
Ninth Circuit Milan Smith Well Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Sandra Segal Ikuta Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Mary H. Murguia Qualified/Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Morgan Christen Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Jacqueline Nguyen Qualified
Ninth Circuit Paul J. Watford Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Andrew D. Hurwitz Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit John B. Owens Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Michelle Friedland Well Qualified
Ninth Circuit Mark J. Bennett Well-Qualified/Qualified
Ninth Circuit Ryan D. Nelson Qualified
Ninth Circuit Eric D. Miller Well-Qualified
Sources: Unah (1998), ABA (2019)
Also https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/history/judges.xlsx
ABA ratings are on a three item scale (Not Qualified, Qualified, Well Qualified).
Single entries in Column 3 reflect unanimous ratings.
For multiple entries in Column 3, the first entry is the rating from the majority.
The second is the rating from the minority.
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Table 25: ABA Ratings of Judges of the Generalist Appellate Courts
Court Judge ABA Rating
Tenth Circuit Timothy Tymkovich Qualified/Not Qualified
Tenth Circuit Mary Beck Briscoe Well Qualified
Tenth Circuit Carlos F. Lucero Well Qualified
Tenth Circuit Harris L. Hatz Well Qualified/Qualified
Tenth Circuit Jerome Holmes Qualified
Tenth Circuit Scott Matheson Jr. Qualified
Tenth Circuit Robert E. Bacharach Well Qualified
Tenth Circuit Gregory A. Phillips Well Qualified
Tenth Circuit Carolyn B. McHugh Well Qualified
Tenth Circuit Nancy Moritz Qualified
Tenth Circuit Allison H. Eid Well Qualified/Qualified
Tenth Circuit Joel M. Carson Well-Qualified/Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Edward Carnes Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Gerald Tjoflat Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Stanley Marcus Well Qualified/Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Charles R. Wilson Well Qualified/Qualified
Eleventh Circuit William H. Pryor Jr. Qualified/Not Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Beverly B. Martin Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Adalberto Jordan Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Robin S. Rosenbaum Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Jill A. Pryor Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Kevin Newsom Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Elizabeth L. Branch Well Qualified
Eleventh Circuit Britt C. Grant Qualified
DC Circuit Merrick Garland Well Qualified
DC Circuit Karen L. Henderson Well Qualified
DC Circuit Judith W. Rogers Well Qualified
DC Circuit David S. Tatel Well Qualified
DC Circuit Thomas B. Griffith Qualified/Not Qualified
DC Circuit Sri Srinivasan Well Qualified
DC Circuit Patricia Millett Well Qualified
DC Circuit Cornelia Pillard Well Qualified
DC Circuit Robert L. Wilkins Well Qualified
DC Circuit Gregory G. Katsas Well Qualified
Sources: Unah (1998), ABA (2019)
Also https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/history/judges.xlsx
ABA ratings are on a three item scale (Not Qualified, Qualified, Well Qualified).
Single entries in Column 3 reflect unanimous ratings.
For multiple entries in Column 3, the first entry is the rating from the majority.
The second is the rating from the minority.
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APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3
Descriptive Graphs and Figures
Tables 26-37 and Figures 24-29 show the previous experience of specialized court
judges.
Table 26: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Court Judge Prior Experience
Armed Forces Scott W. Stuckey JAG; Counsel, US Air Force; Counsel, Senate Armed
Services Committee; Member and Panel Chairman,
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
Armed Forces Margaret A. Ryan Marine Corps; JAG; Aide de Camp to Marine Corps
Commandant; Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court;
SC Law Clerk, Clarence Thomas
Armed Forces Kevin A. Ohlson Army Paratrooper/JAG; US Attorney; Chief of Staff to
AG/Deputy AG; Member, Board of
Immigration Appeals; Director, EOIR
Armed Forces John E. Sparks Marine Corps; JAG; Deputy Legal Advisor, NSC; Special
Assistant, Secretary of Agriculture; Deputy General Counsel,
US Navy; Commissioner to Chief Judge, CAAF
Armed Forces Gregory E. Maggs Researcher, Robert Bork; Law Clerk: Federal Circuit Court;
SC Law Clerk: Kennedy, Thomas; Law Professor: University
of Texas and George Washington University; Consultant to
Kenneth Starr, Independent Counsel; Colonel, US Army
Reserve, JAG Corps; Trial/Appellate Military
Judge; Special Master, US Supreme Court
Acronoyms: JAG=Judge Advocate General; AG=Attorney General; NSC=National Security Counsel;
EOIR=Executive Office for Immigration Review; CAAF=Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces;
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Table 27: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Court Judge Previous Experience
Armed Forces Walter T. Cox III JAG Corps, Army; Resident Judge, 10th Judicial Circuit, South
Carolina; Acting Associate Justice, South Carolina Supreme Court;
Member, House of Delegates of the South Carolina Bar;
Member, Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
Armed Forces Eugene R. Sullivan Active duty, US Army; Instructor, Army Ranger School;
Law Clerk: Federal Circuit Court; Private Practice; Assistant Special
Counsel, White House; Trial Attorney, U.S. DOJ;
Deputy General Counsel, Department of Air Force;
Governor, Wake Island
Armed Forces Susan J. Crawford Private Practice; Assistant States Attorney, Garrett County, Maryland;
Instructor, Garrett County Community College; Deputy
General Counsel and General Counsel, Department of the Army;
Special Counsel, Secretary of Defense;
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Armed Forces Andrew S. Effron Legislative Aide, Representative William A. Steiger; JAG, US Army;
Attorney-Adviser in Office of the General Counsel, Department of
Defense; Counsel/General Counsel/Minority Counsel
to Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
Armed Forces James E. Baker Attorney, Department of State;
Counsel, Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board;
Intelligence Oversight Board; Deputy Legal Advisor/Special
Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor,
National Security Counsel; Military Service: U.S.
Marine Corps/Marine Corps Reserve; Legislative Aide and
Acting Chief of Staff, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Armed Forces Charles E. Erdmann Military Service, U.S. Marine Corps, JAG Air National Guard;
Assistant Montana Attorney General; Chief Counsel, Montana;
State Auditors Office Chief Staff Attorney,
Montana Attorney Generals Office, Antitrust Bureau;
Bureau Chief, Montana ; Medicaid Fraud Bureau General Counsel,
Montana School Boards Association; Private Practice; Associate
Justice, Montana Supreme Court; Office of High Representative of
Bosnia and Herzegovina Judicial Reform; Coordinator
and Head of Human Rights and Rule
of Law Department; Chairman and Chief Judge, Bosnian
Election Court; Judicial Reform and
International Law Consultant
Acronoyms: JAG=Judge Advocate General; DOJ=Department of Justice; AG=Attorney General; NSC=National
Security Counsel
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Fig. 24: Previous Experience-Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
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Table 28: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Court Judge Prior Experience
Federal Circuit Sharon Prost Labor Relations Specialist, Civil Service Commission,
GAO; Attorney, IRS; Trial Attorney, FLRA; Chief
Counsel’s Office, USDT; Solicitor, NLRB; Chief/Deputy
Chief Counsel, Senate Labor and Judiciary Committee
Federal Circuit Pauline Newman Research Scientist; Patent Attorney, FMC Corp.;
Science Policy Specialist; UNESCO; Member, ABA
and Patent, Trademark, Copyright Section
Federal Circuit Alan David Lourie Chemist; Patent Agent; Vice-Chair, IFAC for Dept. of
Commerce and Office of US ; Trade Rep Member of
Various Patent Law Associations
Federal Circuit Timothy B. Dyk SC Law Clerk, Reed, Burton, Warren; Special Asst to
Assistant AG; Private Practice; Adjunct Law Professor
Federal Circuit Kimberly Ann Moore Electrical Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center;
Private Practice; Law Clerk, Federal
Circuit Court; Law Professor
Federal Circuit Kathleen M. O’Malley Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; Private Practice; First
Assistant Attorney General and Chief of Staff, Ohio AG;
Intellectual Property Educator; Federal
District Court Judge
Federal Circuit Jimmie V. Reyna Private Practice; Panel Member, WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism; Leadership, ABA Sections on
International Law and Dispute Settlement
Federal Circuit Evan Wallach Judge, Court of International Trade;
General Counsel/Advisor, Harry Reid; JAG,
Nevada National Guard; Law Professor
Federal Circuit Richard G. Taranto Law Clerk, Federal District and Circuit Courts; SC Law
Clerk, O’Connor; Assistant to Solicitor General;
Private Practice; Harvard University, Taught Patent Law
Federal Circuit Raymond T. Chen Deputy General Counsel and Solicitor, USPTO;
Technical Assistant, CAFC; Private Practice; Scientist
Federal Circuit Todd M. Hughes Deputy/Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation
Branch of DOJ Civil Division; Trial Attorney;
Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court
Federal Circuit Kara Farnandez Stoll Patent Examiner, USPTO; Law Clerk, CAFC; Private
Practice; Adjunct Law Professor
Acronoyms: GAO=General Accounting Office; FLRA=Federal Labor Relations Authority; USDT=US
Department of the Treasury; NLRB=National Labor Relations Board; UNESCO=United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization; ABA=American Bar Association; IFAC=Industry Functional Advisory
Committee; SC=Supreme Court; AG=Attorney General; WTO=World Trade Organization; USPTO=US Patent
and Trademark Office; DOJ=Department of Justice; CAFC=Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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Table 29: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Court Judge Previous Experience
Federal Circuit Haldane Robert Mayer Infantry, JAG Corps, U.S. Army; U.S. Army Reserve,
Lieutenant Colonel; Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court;
Private Practice; Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Assistant,
Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E. Burger;
Deputy/Acting Special Counsel US Merit Systems Protection
Board; Judge, Court of Federal Claims
Federal Circuit S. Jay Plager Commander, Navy; Professor of Law; Counselor to the Under
Secretary, DHS; Associate Director, OMB; Administrator,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB
Federal Circuit Raymond Clevenger III SC Law Clerk, Justice White; Special Assistant
to General Counsel, DOT; Private Practice
Federal Circuit Alvin Anthony Schall Private Practice; Assistant US Attorney; Chief of the
Appeals Division, Trial Attorney, Senior Trial Counsel, Civil
Division, DOJ; Assistant to the AG
Federal Circuit William Curtis Bryson Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; SC Law Clerk, Marshall;
Private Practice; Criminal Division, Office of SG,
Office of Associate AG, DOJ
Federal Circuit Richard Linn Patent Examiner, USPTO; Patent Agent, Naval Research
Laboratory; Patent Advisor, Naval Air Systems Command;
Board of Governors, Virginia State Bar Section on Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law; Member, Various Patent Bar
Associations; Private Practice; Practice Group Leader,
Electronics Practice Group, and Intellectual
Property Department; Adjunct Professor or Law
Acronoyms: JAG=Judge Advocate General; DHS=Department of Health and Human Services; OMB=Office of
Management and Budget; DOT=Department of Transportation; DOJ=Department of Justice; AG=Attorney
General; USPTO=United States Patent and Trademark Office
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Fig. 25: Previous Experience-Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Table 30: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Court of Federal Claims
Court Judge Prior Experience
Federal Claims Thomas C. Wheeler Private Practice; Member, ABA
Public Contracts and Litigation Section
Federal Claims Margart M. Sweeney Law Clerk, US Court of Federal Claims;
Trial Attorney, DOJ; President, Court of Federal
Claims Bar Association; Special Master, Court ;
of Federal Claims Attorney Advisor, DOJ;
Master, Delaware Family Court
Federal Claims Patricia Campbell-Smith Law Clerk, Federal District and Circuit Courts
and Court of Federal Claims; Special Master/Chief
Special Master, Court of Federal Claims
Federal Claims Elaine D. Kaplan Solicitor’s Office, DOL; Head, US Office of Special
Counsel; Acting Director/General Counsel, OPM;
Senior Deputy General Counsel,
National Treasury Employees Union
Federal Claims Lydia Kay Griggsby Trial Attorney, DOJ Civil Division; Assistant
US Attorney; Counsel, Senate Select Committee
on Ethics; Privacy Counsel,
Senate Judiciary Committee
Acronoyms: DOJ=Department of Justice; ABA=American Bar Association; DOL= Department of Labor; OPM=
Office of Personnel Management
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Table 31: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Court of Federal Claims
Court Judge Previous Experience
Federal Claims Susan G. Braden Private Practice; Special Counsel, FTC; Special Counsel to
Chairman/Senior Attorney Advisor Antitrust Division
and Energy Section, DOJ; Special Assistant AG,
State of Alabama; Counsel RNC Platform 1996
; Coordinator for
Regulatory Reform and Antitrust Policy, Dole Campaign;
Asst. General Counsel, RNC; Member, ABA Section on
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
Federal Claims Charles F. Lettow Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; SC Law Clerk, Burger;
Counsel to Council on Environmental Quality, EOP
Federal Claims Mary E.C. Williams Assistant U.S. Attorney, Civil Division; Administrative Judge,
General Services Board of Contract Appeals;
Chair, Section of Public Contract Law
Federal Claims Victor J. Wolski Speechwriter, Secretary of Agriculture;
paralegal specialist, Office of the general counsel, DOE;
Law Clerk, U.S. District Court; Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation,
1992-97; General Counsel, Sacramento County Republican ;
Central Committee Counsel, Senator Connie Mack; General Counsel,
Joint Economic Committee U.S. Congress; Private Practice
Federal Claims Eric G. Bruggink Law Clerk, Federal District Court; Private Practice; Assistant
Director, Alabama Law Institute; Director, Office of Energy and
Environmental Law; Director, Office of Appeals Counsel,
Merit Systems Protection Board
Federal Claims John Paul Wiese Law Clerk, Trial Division of US Court of Claims; Law Clerk, Court
of Claims;Private Practice; Trial Commissioner, US Court of Claims
Federal Claims Robert H. Hodges, Jr. Legislative Aide, Senator Strom Thurmond; Legislative Assistant,
Congressman Floyd Spence; Vice President/General Counsel, First
National Bank of South Carolina;
Executive Vice President and General Counsel of
South Carolina Bankers Association; Private Practice
Federal Claims Lynn J. Bush Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, DOJ;
Senior Trial Attorney, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Department of the Navy; Counsel, Engineering Field Activity
Chesapeake, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Department of the Navy; Administrative judge,
HUD Development Board of Contract Appeals
Federal Claims Marian Blank Horn Acting Solicitor/Principal Deputy Solicitor, DOI;
Associate Solicitor for General Law/Associate Solicitor for Surface
Mining, DOI; Deputy Assistant General Counsel for
Procurement and Financial Incentives/Senior Attorney
for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve/Litigation Attorney,
Department of Energy; Adjunct Professor of Law;
Project Manager, DOJ; Private Practice; Deputy
Chief of the Appeals Bureau in DA’s Office, Bronx County, NY.
Federal Claims Edward J. Damich Professor of Law; Commissioner of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal;
Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee
Federal Claims Nancy B. Firestone Attorney, Appellate Section and Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. DOJ;
Assistant Chief, Policy Legislation and Special Litigation, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, DOJ; Deputy Chief, Environmental Enforcement
Section, DOJ; Associate Deputy Administrator, EPA; Judge, Environmental Appeals
Board, EPA; Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources
Division, DOJ; Adjunct Law Professor
Federal Claims Loren A. Smith Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States;
Chairman, Council of Independent Regulatory Agencies; Deputy Director, Executive
Branch Management Office of Presidential Transition; Chief Counsel,
Reagan for President Campaigns; Professor of Law, Delaware Law School;
Special Assistant United States Attorney; Assistant to the Special Counsel to the
President; General Attorney, Federal Communications Commission; Private Practice
Acronoyms: FTC=Federal Trade Commission; EOP=Executive Office of the President; DOE=Department of
Energy RNC=Reublican National Committee; DOJ=Department of Justice; DOI=Department of the Interior;
EPA=Environmental Protection Agency
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Fig. 26: Previous Experience-Court of Federal Claims
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Table 32: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Court of International Trade
Court Judge Prior Experience
International Trade Timothy C. Stanceu Private Practice; Deputy Director, Office of Trade and Tariff
Affairs, Department of Treasury; Special Assistant to Assistant
Secretary for Enforcement, Department of Treasury; Program
Analyst/Environmental Protection Specialist, EPA
International Trade Leo M. Gordon Counsel at Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law, US House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary (Principal Attorney responsible for bill that
created the CIT); Assistant Clerk/Clerk,
Court of International Trade
International Trade Mark A. Barnett Office of Chief Counsel, Staff Attorney/Senior Counsel/Deputy
Chief Counsel for Import Administration US DOC; Member;
US negotiating teams for US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement;
Member; WTO Doha and Round Rules Negotiating Group;
Member, Trans-Pacific Partnership; Trade Counsel; US House
Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade;
Board of Directors, International Model
United Nations Association, Inc.
International Trade Claire R. Kelly Private Practice; Legal Writing Instructor/Professor of Law/
Co-Director of Center for the Study of International
Business Law, Brooklyn Law School
International Trade Jennifer Choe-Groves ADA, New York County; Private Practice; Senior Director of
Intellectual Property and Innovation; US Trade Representative;
CEO; Legal Consulting Firms
International Trade Gary S. Katzmann Law Clerk, Federal District Court; SC Law Clerk: Breyer;
Research Associate, Center for Criminal Justice
at Harvard Law School; Special Investigator, Administrative
Board; Assistant US Attorney; Chief Appellate Attorney;
Deputy Chief, Criminal Division; Chief Legal Counsel,
US Attorney; Associate Deputy Attorney General, DOJ;
Attorney, Office of Director of FBI; Lecturer,
Harvard Law School; Research Fellow/Project
Director, Governance Institute; Research Fellow/Project
Director, Kennedy School of Government;
Associate Justice, Massachusetts Appeals Court
Acronoyms: EPA=Environmental Protection Agency; CIT=Court of International Trade; DOC=Department of
Commerce; WTO=World Trade Organization; ADA=Assistant District Attorney; DOJ=Department of Justice
Table 33: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Court of International Trade
Court Judge Previous Experience
International Trade Jane A. Restani Trial Attorney/Assistant Chief/Director, Commercial
Litigation Section, Civil Division, DOJ
International Trade Thomas J. Aquilino Jr. U.S. Army; Law Clerk, Federal District Court;
Private Practice; Adjunct Professor of Law of Law
International Trade Richard W. Goldberg Owner/Operator, Grain Processing Firm; State Senator, ND;
Military Law Instructor, North Dakota State University;
Vice-Chairman of the Board, Minneapolis Grain Exchange;
Deputy Under Secretary for International
Affairs and Commodity Programs and
Acting Under Secretary, Department of
Agriculture; Attorney-Advisor, FCC; Private Practice
International Trade Richard K. Eaton Private Practice; Regional Director/Legislative Director/
Chief of Staff, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Acronoyms: DOJ=Department of Justice; FCC=Federal Communications Commission; ND=North Dakota
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Fig. 27: Previous Experience-Court of International Trade
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Table 34: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Tax Court
Court Judge Prior Experience
Tax Court L. Paige Marvel Private Practice; Member, ABA Section of Taxation; Fellow and Former Regent,
American College of Tax Counsel; Co-Editor, Procedure Department of Journal of;
Taxation; Member, Commissioner’s Review Panel on IRS Integrity;
Member, Advisory Committee to the Maryland State Department
of Economic and Community Development
Tax Court Maurice B. Foley Attorney, Legislation and Regulations Division of IRS;
Tax Counsel, US Senate Committee on Finance; Deputy
Tax Legislative Counsel, US Treasury Office of Tax Policy.
Tax Court Joseph H. Gale Private Practice; Tax Legislative Counsel, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan;
Tax Legislative Counsel/Chief Tax Counsel/Minority Staff Director, Senate
Finance Committee; Member, ABA Section of Taxation
Tax Court Michael B. Thornton Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; Private Practice;
Tax Counsel, US House Committee on Ways and Means; Chief Minority Tax Counsel,
US House Committee on Ways and Means; Attorney-Adviser, US Treasury Department;
Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel in the Office of Tax Policy, US Treasury Department
Tax Court David Gustafson Private Practice; Trial Attorney/Assistant Chief/Chief,
Court of Federal Claims Section of the Tax Division in DOJ;
Coordinator, Tax Shelter Litigation for Tax Division, DOJ;
President, Court of Federal Claims Bar Association
Tax Court Richard T. Morrison Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; Private Practice;
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Review and Appellate Matters,
Tax Division DOJ; Acting Assistant Attorney General; DOJ
Tax Court Elizabeth Crewson Paris Private Practice; Tax Counsel, US Senate Finance Committee;
Member, ABA Sections of Taxation and Real Property and Probate;
Adjunct Professor of Law
Tax Court Kathleen Kerrigan Legislative Director, Congressman Richard E. Neal;
Private Practice; Tax Counsel, Senator John F. Kerry
Tax Court Ronald L. Buch Consultant, KPMG Washington National Tax; Attorney-Advisor and Senior
Legal Counsel, IRS Office of Chief Counsel; Private Practice; Chair, DC Bar Tax Audits
and Litigation Committee; Chair, ABA Tax Sections
Administrative Practice Committee.
Tax Court Albert G. Lauber SC Law Clerk, Blackmun; Private Practice;
Tax Assistant to the Solicitor General,/Deputy SG, DOJ;
Visiting Professor and Director, Graduate Tax & Securities Programs, Georgetown Law
Center Professorial Lecturer/Adjunct Law Professor; Member, DC Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board; Member, ABA Section of Taxation.
Tax Court Joseph W. Nega Staff/Legislation Attorney/Legislation Counsel/
Senior Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation US Congress.
Tax Court Tamara W. Ashford Law Clerk, State Court of Appeals; Trial Attorney in the Appellate Section,
Tax Division, DOJ; Private Practice; Assistant to the Commissioner/U.S. Director for the
Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre/Senior Advisor to the Commissioner,
Large and Mid-Size Business Division, IRS; Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General and Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Policy and Planning, DOJ;
Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Tax Division; DOJ.
Tax Court Cary Douglas Pugh Law Clerk, Federal District Court; Private Practice;
Minority Tax Counsel/Majority Tax Counsel/Special Counsel to the Chief Counsel,
Committee on Finance US Senate; Member, ABA Section of Taxation;
Chair/Council Director, Tax Shelter Committee and Government Relations Committee;
Fellow, American College of Tax Counsel; Adjunct Law Professor
Tax Court Patrick J. Urda Appellate Attorney, DOJ Tax Division; Law Clerk, US 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals; Private Practice
Tax Court Elizabeth A. Copeland Attorney Advisor, U.S. Tax Court; Private Practice; Law Clerk,
Texas Supreme Court; CPA
Acronoyms: ABA=American Bar Association; IRS=Internal Revenue Service; DOJ=Department of Justice;
SG=Solicitor General; CPA=Certified Public Accountant
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Table 35: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Tax Court
Court Judge Previous Experience
Tax Court Juan F. Vasquez Accountant; Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel IRS;
Private Practice; Member, ABA Tax Section
Tax Court Mark V. Holmes Private Practice; Law Clerk, Federal Circuit Court; Counsel
to Commissioners, US ITC; Counsel; Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division; Member,
ABA Litigation and Tax Sections
Tax Court Joseph Robert Goeke Trial Attorney/Senior Trial Attorney/Special International
Trial Attorney, Chief Counsel’s Office IRS; Private Practice
Tax Court Mary Ann Cohen Private Practice; Member, American Bar
Association, Section of Taxation
Tax Court John O. Colvin Office of the Chief Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard; Tax Counsel, Senator
Bob Packwood; Chief Counsel/Chief Minority Counsel, U.S. Senate
Finance Committee; Chair, Tax Section, Federal
Bar Association;; Adjunct Professor of Law
Tax Court Joel Gerber Trial Attorney/Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. Treasury Department/
Internal Revenue Service; District Counsel; Deputy Chief
Counsel; Acting Chief Counsel; Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University
Tax Court James S. Halpern Private Practice; Assistant Professor of Law;
Principal Technical Advisor, Assistant Commissioner and Associate
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service; Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve
Tax Court Julian I. Jacobs Attorney, Internal Revenue Service; Private Practice;
Chairman, Study Commission to Improve the Quality of
the Maryland Tax Court; Chairman, Section of
Taxation, Maryland State Bar Association; Adjunct Professor of Law
Tax Court Robert P. Ruwe Special Agent, Intelligence Division, Internal Revenue Service;
Trial Attorney/Director of Criminal Tax Division/Deputy Association
Chief Counsel and Director Tax Litigation Division, Office of
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
Tax Court Thomas B. Wells Active Duty, US Naval Reserve, Private Practice;
Member, American Bar Association, Section of Taxation;
Active in Various Tax Organizations
Acronoyms: ABA=American Bar Association; IRS=Internal Revenue Service; ITC=International Trade
Commission
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Fig. 28: Previous Experience-Tax Court
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Table 36: Previous Experience of the Current Judges of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Court Judge Prior Experience
Veterans Claims Robert N. Davis Appellate Attorney, Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
Attorney, United States Department of Education, Business, and
Administrative Law Division of the Office of General Counsel; Special
Assistant, United States Attorneys Office; Founder and Faculty
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of National Security Law; Arbitrator/ Mediator,
American Arbitration Association and the US Postal Service;
Appointee, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws; United States Navy Reserve Intelligence Program; Law Professor
Veterans Claims Mary J. Schoelen Law Clerk, National Veterans Legal Services Project; Legal Intern,
US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs; Staff Attorney, Vietnam
Veterans of America; Minority Counsel/General Counsel/Deputy
Staff Director, US Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
Veterans Claims Coral W. Pietsch Active Duty JAG; Brigadier General, US Army Reserve;
Deputy Attorney General, Hawaii; Attorney-Advisor/Labor Counselor,
US Army; Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator, Department of State;
Chair; Hawaii Civil Rights Commission
Veterans Claims Margaret Bartley Law Clerk, CAVC; Staff Attorney, National Veterans Legal Services
Program; Senior Staff Attorney, National Veterans Legal Services Program;
Director of Outreach and Education for Veterans Consortium
Pro Bono Program
Veterans Claims William S. Greenberg Law Clerk, New Jersey Superior Court; Private Practice;
Chairman, Judicial and Prosecutorial Appointments Committee of the NJ
State Bar Association; President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America,
New Jersey; Founder/Chair, New Jersey State Bar Association Program
of Military Legal Assistance; Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board;
JAG; Brigadier General, Army Reserves; Special Litigation Counsel,
Adjutants General Association of the US; Special Litigation Counsel
Pro Bono, National Guard Association of the United States;
Adjunct Professor of Military Law
Veterans Claims Michael P. Allen Private Practice; Full Professor or Law
Director of Veterans Law Institute, Stetson University
Veterans Claims Amanda L. Meredith Republican Staff/Deputy Staff Director/General Counsel, US Senate
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs; Director, CAVC Task Force for Backlog
Reduction; Executive Attorney, CAVC Chief Judge Kenneth Kramer;
Law Clerk, CAVC
Veterans Claims Joseph L. Toth Law Clerk, Federal District and Circuit Courts; Navy JAG Corps;
Field Officer, Afghanistan; Senior Defense Counsel, Naval Station
Pearl Harbor; Associate Federal Defender, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Veterans Claims Joseph L. Falvey, Jr. District Counsel, Detroit District, US Army Corps of Engineers;
Assistant US Attorney; Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law and
University of Detroit School of Law;
US Marine Corps Officer, Armor Office; JAG;
Senior Judge Advocate; Special Courts-Martial Judge; Appellate Judge,
US Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals; Commanding Officer,
Marine Forces Reserve, Legal Services Support Section
Acronoyms: JAG=Judge Advocate General; CAVC=Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
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Table 37: Previous Experience of the Senior Judges of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Court Judge Prior Experience
Veterans Claims Frank Q. Nebeker Correspondence Secretary, White House; Trial Attorney,
Internal Security Division, Department of Justice; Assistant
U.S. Attorney Chief, appellate division, Office
of the U.S. Attorney; Associate Judge,
District of Columbia Court of Appeals;
Director, Office of Government Ethics
Veterans Claims Kenneth B. Kramer Captain, US Army; JAG Corps; Counsel, Army Physical
Disability Evaluation Board; Prosecutor, Office of the Deputy
District Attorney; Private Practice; Colorado House of
Representatives; U.S. House of Representatives;
US Senate Candidate, Colorado; Vice President,
Aries Properties; Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Financial Management)
Veterans Claims Ronald M. Holdaway Brigadier General, U.S. Army; Staff Judge Advocate,
Executive to the Judge Advocate General, Assistant
Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army Judge
Advocate General, U.S. Army Europe; Chief Judge,
U.S. Army Court of Military Review and Commander,
U.S. Army Legal Services Agency
Veterans Claims William P. Greene, Jr. Chief Prosecutor, Fort Knox, KY; Chief Defense Counsel,
Army Command, Hawaii; Army Chief Recruiter for Lawyers;
Department Chair, Criminal Law Division, the Judge Advocate
General’s School; Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Third Infantry
Division; Staff Judge Advocate, Second Infantry Division;
Staff Judge Advocate of the United States Military Academy;
Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Leavenworth, KS;
Immigration Judge, Department of Justice;
Veterans Claims Bruce E. Kasold Lieutenant Colonel, Air Defense Artillery and JAG, US Army;
Private Practice; Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee
on Rules and Administration; Chief Counsel,
Secretary of the Senate and Senate Sergeant at Arms;
Veterans Claims Lawrence B. Hagel Second Lieutenant, Infantry Officer, US Marine Corps;
JAG; Deputy General Counsel and General Counsel,
Paralyzed Veterans of America
Veterans Claims William A. Moorman Second Lieutenant, US Air Force; Major General, JAG Corps,
Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force; Counselor to the
General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs; Assistant
to the Secretary for Regulation Policy
and Management, Department of Veterans Affairs
Veterans Claims Alan G. Lance, Sr. US Army; Judge Advocate Generals Corps, US Army;
Private Practice; Idaho House of Representatives;
National Commander, American Legion
Acronoyms: JAG=Judge Advocate General; CAVC=Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
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Fig. 29: Previous Experience-Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Previous Occupation Analysis
It is certainly understandable to theorize that previous occupation expertise should be
considered not as one composite measure, but as a series of variables considering different
career paths. I present the following analysis to consider this possibility. Ultimately, each
variable’s positive sign indicates the effect I have posited: judges with previous occupation
expertise will be more likely to rule for veterans than their non-expert counterparts.
To explore the impact of previous experience, I employ a series of indicator variables
tapping different occupational backgrounds prior to joining the court.131 For the CAVC, I
divide previous experience into five categories. The first, “Judge Experience,” encompasses
two related background attributes of a judge. The first is coded “1” if the judge previously
served as a member of another court. As noted above, the majority of specialized court judges
do not have prior judicial experience. On the CAVC, only three of the fifteen judges in my
131I explored the potential that these variables may be tapping into a common latent dimension rather than
constituting separate effects. For example, “Judge Experience” and “Law Clerk” theoretically tap into the same
type of skills, as might “VSO/Veterans Attorney” and ”JAG.” However, both confirmatory factor analysis and
principal components analysis indicate little overlap between the six variables. Neither “Judge Experience” and
“Law Clerk” nor “VSO/Veterans Attorney” and “JAG” load onto common factors. Eigenvalues for the recovered
dimensions are rather small and the variables present a fair degree of uniqueness.
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dataset previously served on a bench.132 This 20 percent figure matches well with the overall
level of prior judicial experience seen across the six specialized courts considered in this
chapter (see Figure 7a). The second background attribute I included is whether the judge
previously served as a law clerk to a federal or state judge.133 I then combine these attributes
into a single measure of judge experience to include judges who have previous experience as a
judge or as a law clerk. I expect that previous judicial experience as a judge or law clerk will
lead these judges to be less deferential to the federal government and bureaucratic agencies.134
To the extent that judicial experience familiarizes judges with legal arguments and the process
and substance of the court and its issues (process expertise, see Haire, Lindquist and Hartley
(1999)), judges should develop greater expertise with which to adjudicate legal issues.
Judicial scholars have argued that the accumulation of expertise by judges in specialized
courts places these justices on equal footing with the agencies they review and leads to less
deference to agency decisions.
• Hypothesis 1: Judges with previous experience on a court (either as a judge or law
clerk) will be less deferential to the federal government and federal agencies than
judges without this experience.
The second, “JAG,” is coded “1” if the judge was a member of the Judge Advocate
General’s Corps. Nine of the 15 judges considered in this chapter served in the JAG corps.135
The third, ”Congressional Experience,” denotes whether a judge worked as a counsel for a
Senate committee or as a legislative aide to a member of Congress. Only two judges fit this
132Senior Judge Ronald Holdaway was Chief Judge of the United States Army Court of Military Review.
Senior Judge Frank Nebeker spent 18 years as an Associate Judge on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
and Senior Judge William Greene was an Immigration Judge.
133Only Judges William Greenberg and Margaret Bartley fall into this category. However, while they are not
represented in this empirical analysis, two of Trump’s appointees, Joseph Toth and Amanda Meredith, were
former law clerks.
134The federal government or an executive agency or cabinet department is the most frequent defendant in
specialized courts.
135Those nine judges are: William Greene, Ronald Holdaway, Bruce Kasold, Lawrence Hagel, Alan Lance,
William Moorman, Kenneth Kramer, Coral Wong Pietsch, and William Greenberg.
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category. Judge Mary Schoelen was General and Minority Counsel to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and Judge Bruce Kasold was Chief Counsel to the U.S.
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and to the Secretary of the Senate and Senate
Sergeant at Arms.
The fourth category, ”Executive/Military Agency Experience,” considers whether a
judge previously worked in the executive bureaucracy or as a military administrator. The
backgrounds of seven judges fit this criteria. Senior judges Donald Ivers and William
Moorman held positions in the Veterans Administration (now Department of Veterans
Affairs). Senior Judges Frank Nebeker and John Farley and current Chief Judge Robert Davis
all worked in the Department of Justice, and Senior Judge Kenneth Kramer and active judge
Coral Wong Pietsch held positions of administration in the U.S. Army. I expect that judges
with former executive agency experience may be more likely to defer to the federal
government or agencies, particularly if judges with this background owe their appointments to
patronage. Moreover, one might expect these judges to have potentially internalized the
mission of the executive.
• Hypothesis 2: Judges with previous executive experience will be more deferential to
the federal government and federal agencies than judges without previous executive
experience.
Finally, the fifth category, ”VSO/Veterans Attorney,” denotes judges who worked as
attorneys for veterans service organizations136 Four judges fit this criteria. Deriving
hypotheses about the potential impact of previous occupation expertise on judges’ decision
making on the bench depends on the court and venue in which the expertise was achieved. In
this present study, I expect that judges with this experience will be more likely to rule in favor
of veterans.137
136VSOs include the American Legion, Paralyzed Veterans of America, and the Vietnam Veterans of
Americans. Prior to the creation of the CAVC, VSOs represented the primary means of assistance for veterans
seeking benefits from the VA. Because attorneys were barred from the VA claims adjudication process, veterans
turned to VSOs for help. While their role in this process has been diminished with the introduction of judicial
review and attorneys, VSOs still provide immense services to veterans in this process.
137Judge Mary Schoelen was Staff Attorney for the Vietnam Veterans of America. Judge Lawrence Hagel was
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• Hypothesis 3: CAVC judges who served as attorneys for VSOs or as veterans’ attorneys
will be more likely to issue decisions favorable to veterans than judges who did not.
I also include three control variables. Because the CAVC primarily makes its decisions
by single-judge disposition, I include an indicator variable coded “1” if the chief judge issued
the decision, which allows me to compare the behavior between chief and associate judges.
I also include an indicator variable for whether the veteran had the representation of counsel
before the court. A sizable percentage of veterans are not represented by counsel before the
CAVC, so a veteran represented by counsel would likely see benefits in the form of help in
crafting legal appeals and briefs. Thus, I would expect veterans represented by counsel to do
better than non-represented veterans on average, due to counsel’s expertise in legal filing and
in presenting effective arguments in legal form. Additionally, I include a variable for whether
the judge issuing the decision is a senior judge. Most specialized courts allow judges who
have retired from active service or had their initial terms expire to continue on the bench as
senior judges. Finally, I include the continuous variable, “Fiscal Year, to control for the linear
effect of year on a judge’s vote. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table
38. The summary statistics for the outcome variable, “Decision for Veteran,” include only
decisions coded as “0” or “1,” as I exclude mixed decisions from the analysis.138
General Counsel for the Paralyzed Veterans of America. Judge Margaret Bartley was Staff Attorney/Senior Staff
Attorney for the National Veterans Legal Services Program, and Judge William Greenberg represented soldiers
at Walter Reed Medical Center during the Physician Disability Hearings. Greenberg also co-founded the New
Jersey State Bar Association program of military legal assistance for Reserves called into active duty after 9/11.
138Including these decisions as decisions for a veteran leads to results that are substantively and statistically
similar.
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Table 38: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max N
Decision for Veteran 0.476 0.499 0 1 9350
Ideology 0.461 0.426 -0.438 0.693 10593
JAG 0.655 0.475 0 1 10593
Judge Experience 0.186 0.389 0 1 10593
Congressional Experience 0.236 0.425 0 1 10593
Executive/Military Agency Experience 0.351 0.477 0 1 10593
VSO/Veterans Attorney 0.342 0.474 0 1 10593
Chief Judge 0.111 0.315 0 1 10593
Senior Judge 0.109 0.312 0 1 10593
Counsel 0.765 0.424 0 1 9918
Fiscal Year 2012.752 1.946 2010 2016 10593
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression to analyze the
relationship between the outcome and predictor variables. However, because the data is
structured as cases within years within judges, I estimate a mixed effects logistic regression
model with random intercept for judge ID. I use the following basic model, where the
dependent variable is whether the court issued a decision in favor of the veteran:
yt =β0 + β1Ideology + β2JAG + β3Judge Experience + β4Congressional Experience
+ β5Executive/Military Agency Experience + β6VSO/Veterans Attorney
+ β7Chief Judge + β8Senior Judge + β9Counsel + β10FiscalYear
+ Random Intercept for Judge + ε
Table 39 presents the results from two random effects logistic regression models.139 Column 2
adds the control for representation by counsel.140 Of the five variables tapping previous
139Estimates produced from Stata 13 using the melogit command. Using xtmelogit or meqrlogit provides
nearly identical results. Moreover, I run models with an additional random intercept for Fiscal Year, rather than
including Fiscal Year as a covariate. Results are substantively and statistically similar. Using the Collin package
in Stata, I tested for the extent of multicollinearity. The VIFs obtained from this robustness check fell well below
10. I also ran models where an indicator variable for Fiscal Year was included. These models produced results
that were substantively similar to those presented in Table 39.
140I estimate these models separately, because I lose more than 600 observations by including the counsel
measure. This loss of data is due to an inability to determine whether the veteran was represented by counsel.
To determine the veteran’s representation status, I relied on the text of the judges’ opinions. The majority of
cases included language in the judge’s opinion that specified whether the veteran was represented by counsel or
appeared pro se. However, in some cases, it is impossible to observe a veteran’s representation status from the
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experience, three yield statistically significant parameter estimates in at least one of the two
models. CAVC judges who previously worked as attorneys for veterans service organizations
or worked in executive or military agencies demonstrate a greater likelihood of ruling for
veterans. Thus, my expectation that veterans attorneys would be disposed toward veterans as
judges is supported (Hypothesis 3). While significant, previous executive/military agency
experience does not comport to expectations, as I expected that CAVC judges with experience
in the executive bureaucracy or a military agency would be less likely to rule for a veteran
seeking government benefits in an adversarial court setting (Hypothesis 2). The positive and
significant results may have more to do with veterans as a class of favorable litigant. However,
in Model 2, prior judicial experience (either as a law clerk or judge) increases the probability
that judges on the CAVC will rule for a veteran. This matches my expectation in Hypothesis 1
that the expertise that results from familiarity with certain case types places specialized court
judges on an equal footing with litigants, and may nullify the repeat player advantages
possessed by the federal government and its agencies. In the case of the CAVC, many of the
judges who have previous judicial experience served in capacities relevant to considering
veterans, military, or claims issues. For example, William P. Greene has four years of
experience as an Immigration Judge, and Margaret Bartley served as a law clerk to former
CAVC judge Jonathan Steinberg. This finding is in keeping with scholarship that finds greater
capacity for agency scrutiny among specialized court judges (Hansen, Johnson and Unah,
1995).
Finally, prior experience as a Judge Advocate General and in Congress yield
statistically insignificant effects on the likelihood of issuing decisions favorable to veterans.
As expected, veterans who have the assistance of counsel are more likely to receive a
favorable decision from the court. Finally, there appear to be no differences between senior
and current judges and chief and associate judges, although my control for the linear effect of
year is significant.
text of the opinion. These cases are excluded from the model when the counsel variable is included.
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Table 39: Mixed Effects Logit Results, CAVC Decisions 2010-2016







VSO/Veterans Attorney 1.272∗∗ 1.179∗∗
(0.328) (0.295)
Judge Experience 0.290 0.646∗
(0.360) (0.356)
Congressional Experience 0.413 0.460
0.392 (0.353)




Chief Judge 0.087 0.029
(0.105) (0.106)
Senior Judge −0.010 0.095
(0.168) (0.158)
Fiscal Year 0.055∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
N 9350 8725
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
The substantive effects can be better observed through the predicted probability plots
presented below. In Figure 30(a), one observes that moving from a judge with no previous
experience as a VSO/Veterans Attorneys to a judge with such experience yields an
approximately 30 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of ruling for a
veteran. In Figure 30(b) for Executive/Military Agency experience, one observes an
approximately 21 percentage point increase for judges with experience in executive/military
agencies. Finally, Figure 30(c) depicts an approximately 15 percentage point increase in the
predicted probability of ruling for a veteran when moving from no judicial experience to
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experience as either a judge or law clerk.
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Experience in Executive/Military Agency




















Predicted Probability of Ruling For Veteran
(c) Predicted Probability-Judicial Experience
Table 40 models the effects of judge’s background experience on decision making and
includes separate indicator variables for prior experience as a judge and prior experience as a
law clerk. VSO and Executive/Military agency experience remain significant.
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Table 40: Mixed Effects Logit Results, CAVC Decisions 2010-2016







VSO/Veterans Attorney 0.953∗∗ 0.932∗∗
(0.366) (0.336)
Judge Experience 0.137 0.483
(0.365) (0.366)
Congressional Experience 0.469 0.493
0.366 0.336
Executive/Military Agency Experience 0.632∗ 0.826∗∗
(0.357) (0.341)




Chief Judge 0.083 0.027
(0.105) (0.106)
Senior Judge −0.012 0.109
(0.166) (0.157)
Fiscal Year 0.054∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
N 9350 8725
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
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Extra Analysis
The tables below present various alternative specifications for modeling the data in
this chapter. Tables 41 to 45 present results for the single-judge decisions analysis. Table 41
presents a mixed effects logistic regression that includes a centered ideology variable. Table
42 shows results only using data from 2013-2016. Table 43 presents results when no variables
are centered. Table 44 presents alternative treatments of the variable “Fiscal Year,” and Table
45 presents results when mixed outcomes are coded as decisions for the veteran.
Tables 46 to 49 present results for the panel decisions analysis. Table 46 presents a
mixed effects logistic regression that includes a centered ideology variable. Table 47 presents
results when mixed outcomes are coded as decisions for the veteran. Finally, Table 48 adds a
second random intercept for Fiscal Year, and Table 49 includes indicators for Fiscal Year.
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Previous Occupation 0.048* 0.049*
(0.014) (0.012)
Chief Judge 0.107 0.107
(0.103) (0.103)














Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
Indicators for Fiscal Year included but not shown
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Previous Occupation 0.055* 0.064*
(0.012) (0.016)
Chief Judge 0.108 0.105
(0.136) (0.140)














Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
Indicators for Fiscal Year included but not shown
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Table 43: Non-Centered Results
FY Continuous FY FE No FY FY Random Intercept
Ideology 0.192 -0.196 0.207 0.007
(0.739) (0.721) (0.779) (0.789)
Years on Bench -0.016 -0.036+ -0.003 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Ideology*Years on Bench 0.031 0.071* 0.047 0.051
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
Credentials -1.685* -1.557* -1.871* -1.785*
(0.312) (0.305) (0.317) (0.329)
Ideology*Credentials 0.568 0.287 0.684 0.514
(0.524) (0.509) (0.550) (0.563)
Previous Occupation 0.066* 0.060* 0.077* 0.070*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Ideology*Previous Occupation -0.035 -0.023 -0.043 -0.032
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033)
Chief Judge 0.069 0.107 0.068 0.138
(0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.157)
Senior Judge 0.270 0.313+ 0.162 0.209
(0.167) (0.171) (0.158) (0.231)
Counsel 0.756* 0.777* 0.769* 0.780*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Fiscal Year 0.035+
(0.019)
Intercept -70.877+ -0.897+ -1.509* -1.280*
(37.685) (0.479) (0.509) (0.521)
N 8725 8725 8725 8725
AIC 11091.381 11067.461 11092.720 11059.880
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Table 44: Mixed Effects Logit Centered Results, CAVC Single-Judge Decisions
FY Continuous No FY FY Random Intercept
Ideology -0.532+ -0.683* -0.664*
(0.275) (0.273) (0.283)
Years on Bench -0.016 -0.003 -0.015
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Ideology*Years on Bench 0.031 0.047 0.051
(0.029) (0.029) (0.033)
Credentials -1.685* -1.871* -1.785*
(0.312) (0.317) (0.329)
Ideology*Credentials 0.568 0.684 0.514
(0.524) (0.550) (0.563)
Previous Occupation 0.066* 0.077* 0.070*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Ideology*Previous Occupation -0.035 -0.043 -0.032
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Chief Judge 0.069 0.068 0.138
(0.103) (0.104) (0.157)
Senior Judge 0.270 0.162 0.209
(0.167) (0.158) (0.231)




Intercept -69.512+ 0.096 0.168
(37.803) (0.168) (0.173)
N 8725 8725 8725
AIC 11091.381 11092.720 11059.880
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Previous Occupation 0.046* 0.056*
(0.012) (0.018)
Chief Judge 0.132 0.132
(0.093) (0.093)














Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
Indicators for Fiscal Year included but not shown
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Years on Bench -0.010 0.014
(0.023) (0.024)
Previous Occupation 0.016 0.018
(0.016) (0.015)
Chief Judge 0.156 0.181
(0.245) (0.243)




Separate Opinion 0.015 0.007
(0.152) (0.152)












Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Years on Bench -0.008 0.014
(0.021) (0.040)
Previous Occupation 0.010 0.051
(0.014) (0.034)
Chief Judge 0.142 0.171
(0.227) (0.226)




Separation Opinion 0.153 0.147
(0.141) (0.141)












Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
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Years on Bench -0.005 0.019
(0.022) (0.044)
Previous Occupation 0.019 0.048
(0.016) (0.034)
Chief Judge 0.160 0.179
(0.255) (0.248)
















Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
164








Years on Bench 0.030
(0.046)




















Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05
Indicators for Fiscal Year included but not shown
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APPENDIX C: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4
Figure 31(a) presents the frequency distribution of the natural log of the number of
previous oral arguments of the appellant’s attorney before the Federal Circuit. Figure 31(b)
does the same for the appellee’s attorney. Figure 32 presents the distribution when the natural
log of the appellee attorney’s previous arguments is subtracted from the appellant’s. Table 50
presents results from a mixed effects logistic regression model with a random intercept for
judge and a random intercept for year. The results are substantively and statistically similar to
those presented above.
Table 50: Logit Results, Sample of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions
Mixed Effects-Two Random Intercepts
(Intercept) 0.375∗∗
(0.177)
Difference in Attorney Experience 0.107∗∗
(0.043)
Appellant Attorney Patent Bar -0.326∗∗
(0.149)
Appellee Attorney Patent Bar -0.192
(0.138)
Appellant Attorney IP Law School 0.045
(0.164)
Appellee Attorney IP Law School 0.031
(0.149)















∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
No Difference is excluded baseline category for Patent Bar and IP Law School
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APPENDIX D: SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5
The results presented in Table 51 reflect the inclusion of four additional cases in week
31, as explained in footnote 119. The results are substantively similar to those depicted in
Table 14. The results presented in Table 52 are from logistic regression models where I
include a indicator variable coded 1 if the case was decided after the court’s standard change.
All variables are indicator variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Column 1
includes only cases where the court either affirmed the BVA or ruled in favor of the veteran,
while Column 2 includes cases where the court’s decision was mixed as decisions for veterans
(i.e., affirmed-in-part and vacated and remanded-in-part). The coefficient on Post-Padgett is
negative and statistically significant in both models.
Table 51: Weekly Regression Discontinuity Results
No Controls No Controls Full Controls Full Controls No Controls
(Intercept) 0.592∗∗ 0.634 ∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.361∗∗ 0.595∗∗
(0.091) (0.107) (0.123) (0.125) (0.093)
Discontinuity Effect -0.362∗∗ -0.317∗∗ -0.258∗ -0.217∗ -0.272∗
(0.141) (0.134) (0.122) (0.114) (0.141)
Linear Trend 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)








Chief Justice -0.016 -0.007
(0.209) (0.210)
Functional Form Linear Pre and Post Linear Pre and Post Quadratic
N 50 50 50 50 50
R2 0.219 0.230 0.390 0.398 0.235
Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Week in Parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.10
∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Chief Judge −0.105 −0.074
(0.340) (0.315)





∗∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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